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BANKING LAW
Roy C. Snodgrass III*
Shawna L. Johannsen**
A in previous years, many of the cases included in this Survey focus
on litigation arising from insolvencies of financial institutions as the
courts continue to interpret and define the rights of the various par-
ties following an insolvency of a financial institution. The cases indicate a
willingness on the part of the courts to uphold the broad enforcement pow-
ers provided to the regulatory agencies with respect to officers and directors
of failed financial institutions. This result is not surprising in light of the
broad spectrum of enforcement powers enacted in response to the savings
and loan and banking industry crises.
I. CASE LAW
A. DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY
1. Duty of Controlling Shareholder and Director
In FDIC v. Wheat' the Fifth Circuit broadly construed the bounds of the
fiduciary duty of a bank's controlling shareholder and chairman of the
board. Wheat involves a suit for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and
breach of contract, brought by the FDIC, acting in its corporate capacity,
against Ben Sudderth. Sudderth was the Chairman of the board of directors
and majority shareholder of Early Bank, a state chartered financial institu-
tion located in Early, Texas. On June 21, 1984, Sudderth entered into nego-
tiations with George Day to sell the bank. Eight days later, Early Bank
made a personal, unsecured loan of $125,000 to Day (Day loan). Day subse-
quently bought United Traverlers Insurance Company (UT). On November
16, 1984, Day sent the President of UT, Jack Pike, to Early Bank to execute
the necessary documentation for a $126,753.41 loan to UT (UT loan). The
sole collateral for the UT loan was the personal guaranty of Pike, whose net
worth equaled approximately $10,000. In addition, the terms of the note
explicitly revealed that UT's financial strength was not security for the loan.
The cashier's check for the UT loan was processed through the bank's ledger
and proof machine on November 21, 1984; however, UT did not cash the
* The author is a shareholder in the Austin office of Jenkens & Gilchrist, a Professional
Corporation, where he practices in the Financial Services section of the Firm.
** The author is a member of the Financial Institutions Section of Jenkens & Gilchrist, a
Professional Corporation. Ms. Johannsen lectures and writes freqently on topics concerning
financial institutions.
1. 970 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1992).
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check until December 17, 1984. The funds were used to pay off the Day
loan.
At the time the UT loan was approved, Sudderth presided over the bank's
loan committee and received daily loan information from the bank's cashier.
As chairman of the board of directors, Sudderth developed the loan proce-
dures and guidelines for the bank. Sudderth also wrote a memorandum to
the bank's loan officers regarding the bank's loan policy, which stated in
part: "There will be no more unsecured loans made by this Bank without
written approval from Ben D. Sudderth, Chairman of the Board."' 2 Addi-
tionally, Sudderth wrote the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the
FDIC) inspectors in October 1984, stating that "every loan (regardless of
size) [must] be approved by the Loan Committee" with "[myself] ... attend-
ing all Loan Committee meetings." '3
The sale of the Early Bank to Day was scheduled to close on November
16, 1984. At Day's request, the closing was postponed until November 20,
1984. Sudderth elected Day and Day's nominees to the bank's Board of
Directors and then resigned from the board of directors on November 26,
1984. In October 1985, the FDIC was appointed as receiver for Early Bank
and on October 18, 1985, the FDIC, in its receivership capacity, assigned all
assets of Early Bank to the FDIC, in its corporate capacity. 4
In its analysis, the court initially considered whether the statute of limita-
tions had expired before the FDIC brought suit against Sudderth alleging
damages proximately caused by Sudderth's negligence, breach of contract,
and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the UT loan transactions.
Applying the three year limitation period for tort claims used when the
United States is a party, 5 the court held that the limitations period did not
begin until the FDIC had constructive knowledge of the cause of action. 6
Early Bank made the UT loan in November 1984 between FDIC and state
inspections that occurred in September 1984 and the appointment of the
2. Id. at 129 n.ll.
3. Id. at 129.
4. The FDIC in its receivership capacity has all rights and duties that any other receiver
would have in accordance with the laws of the state where the insolvent bank is organized.
When the FDIC, as receiver, assigns rights, title, and interest in the assets of the failed institu-
tion to the FDIC, in its corporate capacity, then the rights and obligations of the FDIC, in its
corporate capacity, are determined by the applicable federal law. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1823
(Supp. 11 1990); FDIC v. Sumner Fin. Corp., 602 F.2d 670, 679 (5th Cir. 1979). See also
Vernon v. RTC, 907 F.2d 1101, 1106 (11 th Cir. 1990) (FDIC in its corporate capacity has a
complete defense against state claims); FDIC v. Lauterbach, 626 F.2d 1327, 1330 n. 4 (7th Cir.
1980) (FDIC, as two separate entities, may deal with itself); FDIC v. Design and Dev., Inc., 73
F.R.D. 442, 443 (ED. Wis. 1977).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (Supp. 11 1990).
6. Wheat, 970 F.2d at 128. The court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2415 is subject to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2416, which states:
For the purpose of computing the limitations periods established in § 2415,
there shall be excluded all periods during which -
(c) facts material to the right of action are not known and reasonably could
not be known by an official of the United States charged with the responsibility
to act in the circumstances...
28 U.S.C. § 2416(c) (1988).
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FDIC as receiver in October 1985. Because the UT loan was made after the
most recent regulatoory examinations of the bank, but prior to the appoint-
ment of the FDIC as receiver, the court reasoned that neither the FDIC nor
the state regulatory authority could reasonably have known about the UT
loan until October 1985. Thus, the court determined the statute of limita-
tions began to run when the FDIC was appointed receiver in October 1985,
and since the FDIC commenced the action in July 1988, the claim was not
barred.7
Sudderth contended he had no duty with respect to the UT loan because
no evidence supported his alleged knowledge of the loan and because he no
longer served as director of the Bank when the check was presented for pay-
ment. The Wheat court cited Lyman v. Bank of the United States,8 Hoye v.
Meek, 9 and Seale v. Baker,10 and ruled that a fiduciary duty exists if the
director knew or should have known about the loan.I The court rejected
Sudderth's contentions, noting that a director's duty to a Bank has both
statutory and common law origins.' 2 The statutory duty arises, in part,
from the Texas Banking Code of 1943, as amended, 13 (the Banking Code),
which provides that prior to taking office, each director takes an oath that he
will diligently perform his duties as director.14 A director's duties include
the obligation to "review and approve or disapprove each loan and invest-
ment made."' 5 The Wheat court, citing Seale, also noted a director's com-
mon law duty to the Bank.' 6 The court then considered the facts that
Sudderth (i) presided over the loan committee when the UT loan was made,
(ii) wrote the loan procedures and guidelines for the Bank, (iii) wrote a
memo to the Bank's loan officers directing that no unsecured loans be made
by the Bank without his written approval, (iv) wrote the FDIC inspectors
that "every loan (regardless of size) [must] be approved by the Loan Com-
mittee" with "[myself] ... attending all Loan Committee meetings,"'' 7 and
7. Id.
8. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 225, 243 (1851).
9. 795 F.2d 893, 896 (10th Cir. 1986).
10. 70 Tex. 283, 289, 7 S.W. 742, 745 (1888).
11. Wheat, 970 F.2d at 129.
12. Id.
13. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
14. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-407 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
15. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-409 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
16. Wheat, 970 F.2d at 129. The Wheat court set forth the common law existence of a
director's duty to the bank as follows:
Directors of banking corporations occupy one of the most important and re-
sponsible of all business relations to the general public. By accepting the posi-
tion, and holding themselves out to the public as such, they assume that they
will supervise and give direction to the affairs of the corporation, and impliedly
contract with those who deal with it that its affairs shall be conducted with
prudence and good faith. They have important duties to perform toward its
creditors, customers, and stockholders, all of whom have the right to expect that
these duties will be performed with diligence and fidelity, and that the capital of
the corporation will thus be protected against misappropriation and diversion
from the legitimate purposes of the corporation.
Seale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 289, 7 S.W. 742, 744 (1888).
17. Wheat, 970 F.2d at 129.
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(v) received daily loan information from the cashier. It concluded this to be
a sufficient basis for holding that Sudderth knew or should have known
about the UT loan and therefore had a fiduciary duty as a matter of law
when the UT loan was made.18 The court relied on the enforcement provi-
sions in the Change in Bank Control Act19 and held that Sudderth's sale of
the Bank and his resignation as a director did not eliminate the FDIC's right
to sue him for breach of fiduciary duties.2 0
The court then examined the extent of Sudderth's liability to the FDIC for
the breach of these duties. The Banking Code stipulates that "directors...
of state Banks shall be liable for financial losses sustained ... to the extent
that directors ... of other corporations are now responsible for such losses in
equity and common law. ' '2t In order to determine the extent of Sudderth's
liability pursuant to the provisions of the Banking Code, the court examined
the liability of a corporate director for breach of fiduciary duty to the corpo-
ration itself pursuant to Texas common law. The court held that Texas
common law provides that a director is personally liable for a breach of
fiduciary duty only to the entity that he or she represents, not to individual
shareholders or creditors of the corporation. 22 Based on these findings, the
court held Sudderth liable to the FDIC in its corporate capacity, since it
stood in the shoes of the failed Bank.23 Sudderth asserted that the jury
charges given by the court were flawed, contending that the special issues
regarding duty should have been excluded and a special issue on the business
judgment defense should have been given instead. On review, the court held
that the jury charges accurately and completely stated the law.24
18. Id.
19. Financial Institutions Reform Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 905(d), 103 Stat. 460 (codified as amended in 12. U.S.C. § 1828(j)(6)
(Supp. 11 1990)). Section 905(d) of FIRREA states in relevant part:
The resignation . . .of an institution-affiliated party . . . shall not affect thejurisdiction and authority of the Corporation to ... proceed under this section
against any such party, if such notice is served before the end of the 6-year
period beginning on the date such party ceased to be a party with respect to such
nonmember bank ... (whether such date occurs before, on, or after August 9,
1989).
FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 128 n.8 (5th Cir. 1992).
20. Wheat, 970 F.2d at 130.
21. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-410 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
22. Wheat, 970 F.2d at 130.
23. Id.
24. Id. The jury instructions on fiduciary duty and the business judgment rule were given
as follows:
BREACH OFFIDUCIAR YDUTY. Directors and officers of a bank owe a fidu-
ciary duty to the bank, its shareholders, depositors, and creditors. As fiducia-
ries, directors and officers have a duty to act with the highest degree of loyalty,
trust, and allegiance toward the bank, and with the utmost candor, unselfishness
and good faith. Directors and officers of a bank are held to a higher standard of
fair-dealing than a person not in a fiduciary position because they are responsi-
ble for other people's money. A breach of fiduciary duty consists of any failure
of a director or officer to comply with such standards. A director or officer of a
bank shall not be held liable if his conduct falls within the business judgement
rule, as defined in these instructions.
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE. You are instructed that a director or officer
of a bank shall not be liable for claims against him if, in the discharge of his
[Vol. 46
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Sudderth contended that the FDIC should have tried to mitigate its dam-
ages by collecting payment for the UT Loan from the UT and its assets. The
court reasoned that although the usual duty of a tort plaintiff to mitigate
damages applies in failed bank director and officer cases, based upon the
terms of the loan agreement between the bank and the borrower, which pro-
vided that UT's financial status was not collateral for the UT loan the FDIC
could not assert an action against the insurance company's assets. 25 There-
fore, the FDIC did not violate its duty to mitigate damages. 26
2. Negligence Standard
In FDIC v. Williams27 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas followed the weight of authority28 by holding that section
212(k) of FIRREA 29 does not establish a national standard of gross negli-
gence as the threshold for liability for breach of a director's duty. 30 The
court relied on FDIC v. McSweeney 3' for the proposition that the plain lan-
guage of the statute does not preempt causes of action for less than gross
negligence pursuant to state law. 32 The statute at issue reads as follows:
[A] director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held
personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf
of, or at the request or direction of the [FDIC or RTC], which action is
prosecuted wholly or partially for the benefit of the Corporation [FDIC
or RTC] . . . for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or
conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than
gross negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms
are defined and determined under applicable State Law. Nothing in this
paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the [FDIC or RTC] under
other applicable law .3 3
A number of courts have reviewed this provision in order to determine
whether a national standard of gross negligence for director liability exists
duties, he exercised ordinary care and acted in good faith and honestly exercised
his best business judgment within the limits of the actual authority of his posi-
tion with the bank.
A director or officer of a bank shall not be held liable for honest mistake of
judgment if he acted with due care, in good faith, and in furtherance of a ra-
tional business purpose.
Id. at n.13.
25. Id. at 132.
26. Id.
27. 779 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
28. Other cases decided in favor of the government include: FDIC v. McSweeney, 976
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992). FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992); cert. dismissed, 113
S. Ct. 516 (1992); FDIC v. Nihiser, 799 F. Supp. 904 (C.D. Ill. 1992); FSLIC v. Shelton, 789
F. Supp. 1360 (M.D. La. 1992); FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Ill. 1991); FDIC v.
Fay, 779 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Tex. 1991); FDIC v. Burrell, 779 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Iowa 1991);
FDIC v. Haddad, 778 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1991); FDIC v. Isham, 777 F. Supp. 828 (D.
Colo. 1991); FDIC v. Black, 777 F. Supp. 919 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
29. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (Aug. 9, 1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)).
30. Williams, 779 F. Supp. at 64.
31. 772 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Cal. 1991).
32. Williams, 779 F. Supp. at 64.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 11 1990).
1993]
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(thereby preempting state law), or whether directors can be held personally
liable under varying state laws for conduct short of gross negligence. 34 The
government's position in these cases has been that FIRREA preempts only
those state laws that seek to insulate directors from liability for conduct
more culpable than gross negligence, and not state laws that would hold the
directors liable for lesser conduct.35 The defendants in these cases have typi-
cally argued that FIRREA establishes gross negligence as a minimum na-
tional uniform standard of liability, preempting state remedies predicated on
a lesser degree of fault.3 6 Thus, the defendants argue they cannot be held
liable for actions constituting less than gross negligence. This issue contin-
ues to be one of the most controversial issues in the area of directors' and
officers' liability. To date, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have ruled in favor
of the government's position. 37
3. Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance
The Fifth Circuit examined the right of the FDIC to recover under a di-
rectors' and officers' liability insurance policy which provides an exclusion
for coverage of claims made against officers and directors by any state or
federal official or ageacy. In Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Conner38
the FDIC appeale." a judgment that declared Fidelity & Deposit Company
of Maryland (F&E did not have a duty to provide coverage under a direc-
tors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance policy issued to Northwest
Commercial Bank, N.A. (Northwest) for claims by the FDIC against former
Bank directors of Northwest.
Northwest purchased a D&O policy from F&D that was in effect January
3, 1986, through April 3, 1987. The policy contained a regulatory exclusion
that provided:
[i]t is understood and agreed that the Company shall not be liable to
make payment for Loss in connection with any claim made against the
Directors and Officers by any State or Federal Official or Agency, in-
cluding but not limited to the [FDIC] or Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation.39
The policy also included an insured versus insured exclusion provision
that provided:
[i]t is understood and agreed that the company shall not be liable to
make any payment for Loss in connection with any claim made against
the Directors and Officers by any other Director or Officer of the
Bank/Association or by the Bank/Association, except for a share-
holder's derivative action when such action is brought by a shareholder
who is neither a Director nor Officer of the Bank/Association nor a
34. For a list of relevant cases, see supra, note 28.
35. See supra, note 31.
36. FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc.), affig prior panel, 957 F.2d
786 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'g district court, 763 F. Supp. 533 (D. Utah 1991), petition for cert.
filed 61 USLW 3205 (Sept. 14, 1992) (No. 92-454), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
37. 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992); 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992).
38. 973 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1992).
39. Conner, 973 F.2d at 1238.
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beneficial holder of shares for a Director or Officer of the
Bank/Association. 40
On June 11, 1987, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
closed Northwest and appointed the FDIC as receiver in accordance with 12
U.S.C. section 1821(c). 41 The FDIC, as receiver, then transferred North-
west's assets to itself in its corporate capacity. The assets transferred in-
cluded Northwest's right to assert claims against its officers and directors
for failure to adequately perform their duties as officers and directors. The
FDIC filed suit on January 9, 1989 against eight of Northwest's former di-
rectors seeking damages in excess of $2,000,000 for breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, negligence per se, and breach of contract under federal law. On
February 1, 1990, Thomas Conner, a defendant director, filed a third party
complaint against a number of former directors not named as defendants by
the FDIC, alleging that the directors were jointly liable. Most of the defend-
ants notified F&D of the lawsuit and demanded that F&D defend them
under the terms of the D&O policy. F&D refused to provide defense for the
defendant directors.
On March 17, 1989, F&D filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment,
stating that it had no duty to provide coverage under the D&O policy for
further claims asserted by the FDIC against Northwest's directors. The
FDIC then intervened in the action. The District Court for the Southern
District of Texas granted a summary judgment in favor of F&D, holding
that the regulatory exclusion is applicable and coverage for the claims as-
serted by the FDIC are barred.42 The court also held that the third party
claims asserted by Conner were not covered by the D&O policy. 43
The FDIC asserted on appeal that its suit is a shareholder derivative suit
and, to the extent that the regulatory exclusion bars the FDIC from bringing
such claims but does not bar shareholders from bringing a claim, the exclu-
sion is invalid as a matter of public policy. The FDIC agreed that the exclu-
sion violated public policy because the FDIC, as receiver, is entitled to "all
rights, titles, powers, and privileges" 44 of the shareholders and depositors of
Northwest with respect to the assets of Northwest. The court held that the
FDIC's action was not derivative for purposes of section 1821(d)(2)(A)(i), 45
Noting that the FDIC did not allege facts meeting the requirement for estab-
40. Id.
41. FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 128 n.8 (5th Cir. 1992); see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1988)
(notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever the comptroller of the currency shall
appoint a receiver ... he shall appont the Corporation receiver for such closed bank").
42. Connor, 973 F.2d at 1236.
43. Id. at 1239-40.
44. Id. at 1239.
45. Section 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) provides that:
The corporation shall, as conservator or receiver, and by operation of law, suc-
ceed to -
(i) all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution,
and of any stockholder, member, account holder, depositor, officer, or director
of such institution with respect to the institution and the assets of the institution
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. I. 1989).
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lishing independent shareholder liability, which is necessary for a share-
holder derivative suit. In order to meet this requirement, the FDIC would
have had to show that an independent breach of duty by Northwest's officers
and directors toward Northwests's depositors or shareholders occurred. 46
Further, the court noted that the FDIC's complaint did not comply with the
pleading requirements of Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.47 The requirements of Rule 23.1 indicate that a shareholder's or de-
positor's right to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation arises
out of an unwillingness on the part of the management of that corporation to
bring the claim directly.48 Thus, the court found that the FDIC's claims
against the Bank's directors did not constitute the exercise of share-
holder/depositor derivative rights. Instead, the claims were asserted as a
subrogee of the Bank.49
The FDIC also argued that the D&O policy exclusions deprived the
FDIC of its statutory rights under 12 U.S.C. section 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) as sub-
rogee of Northwest or as subrogee of Northwest's shareholders and deposi-
tors. In rejecting this argument, the court relied on the plain language
contained in the regulatory exclusion and noted that such exclusion "explic-
itly omits coverage of all of these entities for claims brought by the FDIC." 50
The court reasoned that because Northwest did not have the right to sue its
officers and directors pursuant to the regulatory exclusion, the FDIC, in its
corporate capacity, also had no right to recover under the insurance policy
as subrogee of Northwest. 5'
Finally, the FDIC asserted that enforcement of the regulatory exclusion
was against public policy and would "substantially impair the congressional
policy" reflected in FIRREA. 52 The court noted that "[a]lthough contrac-
tual agreements may be invalidated on grounds of public policy, public pol-
icy opens only a narrow exception within this general rule - an exception to
46. Connor, 973 F.2d at 1236; Commonwealth of Mass. v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 407-08,
168 S.W.2d 216, 221-22 (1942).
47. Connor, 973 F.2d at 1240 n.9. Rule 23.1 provides in part:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to en-
force a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corpora-
tion or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be
asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff
was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff
complains or that the plaintiff's share or membership thereafter devolved on the
plaintiff by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to
confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise
have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made
by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or
comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and
the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
48. Connor, 973 F.2d at 1240-41.
49. Id. at 1241.
50. Id. at 1240.
51. Id.
52. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Connor, 973 F.2d 1236, 1239 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
Brief for FDIC at 2).
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be applied cautiously and only in plain cases involving dominant public in-
terests."'53 In order to determine whether such interests existed, the court
reviewed the legislative history of FIRREA and concluded that "Congress
intended to remain neutral regarding regulatory exclusions."'5 4 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on a statement made by Senator Garn re-
garding the enforceability of the regulatory exclusion. Senator Garn stated:
[w]ith respect to Directors' and Officers' liability insurance contracts,
there has been a substantial split in the decisions relating to the validity
of regulatory exclusion clauses that prohibits a regulator from enforcing
rights under the contract. It is not the intent of the conferees to influ-
ence these decisions or to affect the development of case law or statu-
tory provisions relating to the validity of these clauses and directors'
and officers' liability insurance contracts or fidelity or indemnity bonds.
The intent of the conferees is to remain neutral in these matters. 55
The court reasoned that in light of the legislative history of FIRREA, no
dominant public interest existed, and held that the "FDIC cannot rely upon
FIRREA as creating public policy against enforcement of the regulatory
exclusion." 56
B. ENFORCEMENT
1. Net Worth Maintenance Agreements
In Akin v. Office of Thrift Supervision Department of Treasury57 the Fifth
Circuit upheld an order from the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) requiring Akin to pay over $19 million to restore the net worth defi-
ciency of a failed association, pursuant to the terms of a Net Worth Mainte-
nance Agreement. 58 Akin was the sole shareholder, President, Chief
Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board of TexasBanc Savings Associ-
ation in Conroe, Texas. He executed a Net Worth Maintenance Agreement
with the FSLIC on February 10, 1987, which provided that Akin would
maintain TexasBanc Savings Association's net worth at levels required by
applicable regulations. 59 Akin agreed to be personally liable for any net
worth deficiency. Further, he agreed that upon notification from the FSLIC
of any net worth deficiency, he would infuse capital correcting the deficiency
within ninety days of the date of the notice. Beginning in March 1989, the
FSLIC and its successor, OTS, issued a series of net worth deficiency notices
to Akin. By September 30, 1989, the net worth deficiency totaled
$19,597,000. On November 7, 1989, the OTS brought formal cease and de-
sist proceedings to enforce the Net Worth Maintenance Agreement under 12
53. Connor, 973 F.2d at 1241; see Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S.
353, 356 (1931).
54. Connor, 973 F.2d at 1242.
55. Id. at 1242-3 n.16 (citing 135 Cong. Rec. S10198 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement
of Sen. Garn)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 331, 416-17, reprinted
in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 127, 212-13.
56. Connor, 973 F.2d at 1242-43.
57. 950 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1992).
58. Id. at 1186.
59. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.13 (1986).
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U.S.C. section 1818(b)(1). 60 Akin denied any net worth deficiency in a hear-
ing before an administrative law judge on February 7, 1990. On February
23, 1990 the Director of the OTS appointed the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion (RTC) as receiver for TexasBanc Savings Association. On the same
day, the judge issued his proposed decision to the directors. This decision
found that Akin had breached the Net Worth Maintenance Agreement and
recommended that he be required to infuse a sufficient amount of capital to
remedy the deficiencies resulting from the breach. On December 24, 1990,
the Director of the OTS issued a final decision and a cease and desist order
against Akin. The order required Akin to immediately pay $19,527,000 into
the TexasBanc Savings Association receivership. Akin appealed the order,
claiming it was unenforceable because it exceeded the cease and desist pow-
ers granted to the OTS under 12 U.S.C. section 1818(b)(1). The court noted
that 12 U.S.C. section 1818(b)(6) authorizes the director to issue a cease and
desist order requiring affirmative action to correct conditions resulting from
violations of regulations or written agreements, including the power to seek
reimbursement and restitution when a party is unjustly enriched through the
violation. 61 The court rejected Akin's argument that the Net Worth Mainte-
nance Agreement was invalid because of lack of consideration. 62 In reach-
ing this decision, the court relied on Groos Natl. Bank v. Comptroller of the
Currency,63 in which the Fifth Circuit held that agreements between regula-
60. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) provides as follows:
If, in the opinion of the appropriate Federal banking agency, .... any institution-
affiliated party is engaging or has engaged, or the agency has reasonable cause to
believe that ... any institution-affiliated party is about to engage, in an unsafe or
unsound practice in conducting the business of such depository institution, or is
violating or has violated, or the agency has reasonable cause to believe ... any
institution-affiliated party is about to violate, a law, rule, or regulation, or any
condition imposed in writing by the agency in connection with ... any written
agreement entered into with the agency, the agency may issue and serve upon
... such party a notice of charges in respect thereof ... [If] upon the record
made at any such hearing, the agency shall find that any violation or unsafe or
unsound practice specified in the notice of charges has been established, the
agency may issue and serve upon the ... institution-affiliated party an order to
cease and desist from any such violation or practice. Such order may, by provi-
sions which may be mandatory or otherwise, require the depository institution
or its institution-affiliated parties to cease and desist from the same, and, further,
to take affirmative action to correct the conditions resulting from any such viola-
tion or practice.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1990).
61. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(b)(6) provides:
The authority to issue an order under this subsection and subsection (c) of this
section which requires an insured depository institution or any institution-affili-
ated party to take affirmative action to correct any condition resulting from any
violation or practice with respect to which such order is issued includes the
authority to require such depository institution or such party to -
(A) make restitution or provide reimbursement, indemnification, or guarantee
against loss if -
(i) such depository institution or such party was unjustly enriched in connection
with such violation or practice ...
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6) (Supp. H 1990).
62. Akin, 950 F.2d at 1186.
63. 573 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1978).
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tory agencies and financial institutions may be employed to achieve compli-
ance with regulatory schemes" and that such agreements pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 1818(b), notwithstanding the lack of contractual
consideration. 65
The court also rejected Akin's argument that he was not unjustly en-
riched.66 The court found that the benefit received by Akin, forbearance
from an immediate cease and desist action, as well as the retention of capital
that he was obligated to contribute but failed to pay, constituted sufficient
unjust enrichment for purposes of section 1818(b)(6)(A)(i). 67 The court
noted that the use of section 1818(b) orders to recover monies from bank
officers has been upheld when the bank has suffered losses as a consequence
of the officer's actions.68
In reaching its holding, the court analyzed Larrimore v. Comptroller of the
Currency,69 a Seventh Circuit decision which held that the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency's (OCC) cease and desist authority did not ex-
tend to requiring reimbursement from bank directors who had authorized
loans in violation of lending limits. 70 The court found that Larrimore was
distinguishable because the OCC had not shown that the directors were
aware of the violation and none of the directors had directly benefitted from
the violation.7 1 More importantly, the court noted that the legislative his-
tory of FIRREA indicated that section 1818 was intended to strengthen the
agency's regulatory authority in situations involving unsafe or unsound
banking practices where an officer was unjustly enriched by a violation. 72
The court also rejected Akin's argument that the cease and desist authority
under section 1818 is not viable once an institution is placed in receiver-
ship. 73 Citing 12 U.S.C. section 1818(i)(3),74 the court held that section
1818 is applicable even after an institution is taken into receivership. 75
64. Id. at 896.
65. Id.
66. Akin, 950 F.2d at 1184.
67. Akin, 950 F.2d at 1184.
68. Id. (citing Hoffman v. F.D.I.C., 912 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1990); del Junco v. Conover,
682 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983)).
69. 789 F,2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
70. Id. at 1256.
71. Akin, 950 F.2d at 1184.
72. Id. at 1184. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 was specifically enacted to stop challenges against
agency authority to seek restitution and reimbursement. See H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 467-68 (1989).
73. Akin, 950 F.2d at 1185.
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(3) provides as follows:
The resignation, termination of employment or participation, or separation of an
institution-affiliated party (including a separation caused by the closing of an
insured depository institution) shall not affect the jurisdiction and authority of
the appropriate Federal banking agency to issue any notice and proceed under
this section against any such party, if such notice is served before the end of the
6-year period beginning on the date such party ceased to be such a party with
respect to such depository institution (whether such date occurs before, on, or
after August 9, 1989).
12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(3) (Supp. 11 1990).




The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System of the United States v. MCorp Financial, Inc. 76 that the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) can pro-
ceed with administrative actions against MCorp Financial, Inc. (MCorp) for
alleged statutory violations. 77 Alleged to have been violated were the Fed-
eral Reserve Board's 'source of strength' regulation 78 and section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act.79 In March 1989, MCorp, a bank holding company,
filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions and initiated an adversary proceeding
against the Federal Reserve Board in order to enjoin the prosecution of ad-
ministrative proceedings concerning alleged statutory violations. The dis-
trict court enjoined both proceedings and the Federal Reserve Board
appealed. The court of appeals held that the district court had no jurisdic-
tion to enjoin the section 23A proceeding. The court of appeals relied upon
Leedom v. Kyne8° in its determination that the district court had jurisdiction
to review the validity of the source of strength regulation. The court of ap-
peals ruled that the Federal Reserve Board exceeded its statutory authority
by promulgating and enforcing the source of strength regulation.
The U.S. Supreme Court did not address the validity of the source of
strength regulation in its opinion. Instead, the Court decided the case on a
jurisdictional basis, relying on the plain language contained in 12 U.S.C.,
section 1818(i)(1),81 which states "[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the
issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to re-
view, modify, suspend, terminate or set aside any such notice or order."'82
MCorp argued that either the automatic stay provision in the Bankruptcy
Code83 or the provision of the Judicial Code 84 authorizing district courts in
bankruptcy proceedings to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over certain civil
proceedings authorized the district court to issue its injunction against the
Federal Reserve Board's enforcement proceedings. The Supreme Court re-
jected these arguments, stating that "the Board's actions also fall squarely
within section 362(b)(4), which expressly provides that the automatic stay
will not reach proceedings to enforce a governmental unit's police or regula-
tory power."' 85
76. 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
77. Id. at 463-65.
78. The "source of strength" regulation provides in relevant part: "A bank holding com-
pany shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and
shall not con[d]uct its operations in an unsafe or unsound manner." Id. at 461 n. I (citing 12
C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1991)).
79. 12 U.S.C. § 23A. "Section 23A sets forth restrictions on bank holding companies'
practices, including restrictions in transactions between subsidiary banks and nonbanking affil-
iates." Id. at n.2 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988).
80. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
81. MCorp, 112 S. Ct. at 463-65; see 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1)(1988).
82. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988).
85. MCorp, 112 S. Ct. at 464. Section 362(b)(4) provides:
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MCorp also claimed that sections 362(a)(3) and 362(a)(6) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provide a basis for the district court's ruling. These sections of
the Bankruptcy Code stay any act done in order to obtain possession of, or
exercise control over, property of the estate, or to recover claims against the
debtor that arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.86 MCorp
asserted that the Federal Reserve Board's goal in enforcing the source of
strength regulation is to exercise control of corporate assets and that the
section 23A proceeding seeks enforcement of a prepetition claim. The
Supreme Court rejected these arguments, noting that a final order affecting
the Bankruptcy Court's control over the property of the estate had not been
entered.87 The Court reasoned that the mere possibility that such an order
may be entered in the future is not sufficient to justify the operation of the
stay against an enforcement proceeding that is expressly exempted by 11
U.S.C. section 362(b)(4).88 The Court said that "[t]o adopt such a charac-
terization of enforcement proceedings would be to render section 362(b)(4)'s
exception almost meaningless." 8 9 The Court also noted that it may be
proper for the Bankruptcy Court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. section 1334(b) at such time as the Federal Reserve Board's
proceedings culminate in a final order, if the judicial proceedings are com-
menced to enforce such an order.9°
MCorp also argued that the district court's ruling was valid based upon 28
U.S.C. section 1334(b). This section provides that the district court may
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over certain bankruptcy-related civil pro-
ceedings that would otherwise be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of an-
other court. 91 The Court rejected this argument, pointing out that the
Federal Reserve Board is an administrative agency rather than a court.92
The Supreme Court also rejected the Fifth Circuit Court of appeals read-
ing of Leedom v. Kyne9 3 that judicial review of any agency action that is
alleged to have exceeded the agency's statutory authority is authorized.94
The Court distinguished Kyne by noting that the National Labor Relations
(b) The filing of a petition under §§ 301, 302 or 303 of this title, or of an appli-
cation under § 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15
U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay -
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation
of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's police or regulatory power ....
II U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988).
86. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3) and 362(a)(6)(1988).




91. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988) provides: "Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that
confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district
court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under
title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11."
92. MCorp, 112 S. Ct. at 465.
93. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
94. MCorp, 112 S. Ct. at 465-66.
1993]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Act95 did not expressly authorize any method for judicial review of adminis-
trative determinations. 96 Thus, there was no mechanism for review by a
court following the determination. The Court noted that the Financial Insti-
tutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA)97 expressly provides MCorp with an
opportunity for judicial review of the validity of the source of strength regu-
lation. 98 The Court went on to state that "if and when the Board finds that
MCorp has violated that regulation, MCorp will have, in the court of ap-
peals, an unquestioned right to review both the regulations and their applica-
tion." 99 The Court also noted that in FISA, unlike the statute at issue in
Kyne, Congress clearly stated that "[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to af-
fect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any [Board]
notice or order under this section."' 00 It is clear from Akin and MCorp that
the enforcement powers of regulatory agencies continue to enjoy broad inter-
pretation by the courts. Although MCorp focuses only on a narrow jurisdic-
tional question, the holding indicates that enforcement actions by the
regulatory authorities will be difficult to overrule in the future.
C. BANK CRIMES
1. Double Jeopardy
In United States v. Woods' 01 the Fifth Circuit considered whether an
ongoing criminal prosecution for bank fraud placed the defendant in double
jeopardy after the savings and loan association, where the alleged fraud oc-
curred, had been placed into receivership. The defendant, Jarrett E. Woods,
Jr., the sole owner of a savings and loan association that was placed in re-
ceivership by the government, contended that the harm he suffered
amounted to a punishment for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. He
claimed this caused his prosecution on a thirty-seven count indictment relat-
ing to bank fraud to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. The court relied upon United States
v. Halper 02 for the proposition that the government may pursue both civil
and criminal remedies against the same defendant for the same conduct. 103
Further, the court stated that a civil remedy is not punishment as long as it
does not serve the goals of punishment, i.e., retribution and deterrence. 1 4
In addition, the court noted that here the receivership was directed at the
corporation and not at Woods.10 5 The court reasoned that even if it consid-
ered the receivership to be directed against Woods personally, the goal and
operation of the receivership is to protect the United State Treasury from
95. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1988).
96. MCorp, 112 S. Ct. at 465.
97. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (1988).
98. MCorp, 112 S. Ct. at 466.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 466 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (Supp. I 1988)).
101. 949 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1991).
102. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).





avoidable insurance losses. Such a goal is not retributive nor meant as a
deterrent, as these words have been interpreted to mean in the criminal law
context. 106
2 False Financial Statement
United States v. Huntress10 7 was a criminal prosecution under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1014.108 The defendant had presented a false financial statement to several
banks and had made false oral statements regarding his continued ownership
of assets listed on the statements. The financial statements listed an exten-
sive stock portfolio which did not exist. He was tried and convicted and
sentenced to two consecutive two-year sentences, five years of probation, and
restitution of $730,000. The court held that the essence of the offense is
making a false statement with the intent to influence. '0 9 It does not matter if
the defendant accomplished that purpose or not. In addition, the intent re-
quired to be proved is the intent to do the act. 10 The government is not
required to prove that the defendant knew that what he was doing was a
violation of law. " '
3. Bank Bribery
The constitutionality of the Bank Bribery Act" 12 was attacked by the de-
fendant in United States v. Kelly.' 13 Kelly, an officer of Valley-Hi National
Bank, and Marburger, an officer at La Hacienda Savings Association, ar-
ranged for reciprocal loans to each other through their respective financial
institutions. Kelly was convicted of violating the Bank Bribery Act. On
appeal, he claimed the Act was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him,
because he could not have reasonably understood that it prohibited his con-
duct since it is not clear that a loan is anything of value under the statute.
The court held that the Bank Bribery Act is not unconstitutionally vague
when applied to one who promises to give a loan from his bank to another in
return for a loan from the other's bank.' 14 Promising a loan "cannot reason-
ably be understood to be anything other than giving, offering, or promising a
thing of value, or seeking, accepting, receiving or agreeing to receive any-
thing of value contrary to the proscriptions of Section 215."" is
106. Id.
107. 956 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1992).
108. The elements of an offense under 12 U.S.C. § 1014 are: 1) the defendant made a false
statement to an insured financial institution; 2) the defendant made the false statement know-
ingly; 3) the statement was made for the purpose of influencing the financial institution's ac-
tion; and 4) the statement was false as to a material fact. 12 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988).
109. Id. at 1317-18.
110. Id. at 1318.
111. Id.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 215 (1988).
113. 973 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1992).





United States v. Briggs' 16 involved the prosecution of the employee of two
bank customers who made unauthorized transfers from her employers' ac-
counts to her own. She pled guilty under the bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344(a)(2), but appealed her conviction, claiming that her guilty plea was
not made intelligently and knowingly because she mistakenly believed that
her conduct was covered by that statute. The issue before the court was
whether transferring funds to one's personal account violates the bank fraud
statute which makes it illegal to obtain funds from a financial institution by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. The
court ruled that by actually making the transfers, the defendant was im-
pliedly representing that she had the authority to do so, and thus, violated
the statute." 7 By falsely holding herself out as having authority, the defend-
ant obtained the funds by false pretenses.' 18
D. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
In FDIC v. Ernst & Young' 19 the Fifth Circuit reviewed an accounting
firm's liability to the FDIC for negligently performing an audit as assignee of
a corporation with a dominating sole owner. In Ernst, Arthur Young &
Company (Arthur Young) and its successor, Ernst & Young (Ernst) per-
formed audits of Western Savings Association (Western) for the years end-
ing December 31, 1984, and December 31, 1985. All of the common stock
of the parent company of Western was owned by Jarrett E. Woods, Jr. Mr.
Woods was the Chairman of the Board and Chief Operating Officer of West-
ern. He also served on the Executive, Loan, Audit, Compliance, and Credit
Policy Committees of Western. Additionally, he held various offices in
Western's wholly owned subsidiaries, including Westwood Mortgage Com-
pany and WS Service Corporation. Due to Western's aggressive pursuit of
complex commercial ventures, which were often based upon unsafe and un-
sound underwriting practices, Western's financial condition seriously deteri-
orated. On June 22, 1984 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
issued a temporary order to cease and desist Western's improper commercial
lending practices. In accordance with the cease and desist order, Western
engaged Arthur Young to review its financing transactions and to conduct
independent audits for the years ending December 31, 1984, and December
31, 1985. Arthur Young's engagement letters specified its duties with re-
spect to these audits. Arthur Young completed its audits and certified that it
conducted the audits in accordance with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples. As a result of the 1984 audit, Arthur Young indicated that Western
had a net worth of over $41 million at the end of 1984. But in reality, West-
ern was insolvent by more than $100 million at that time. Similarly, Arthur
116. 965 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 12.
118. Id.
119. 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
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Young's 1985 audit report certified that Western had a net worth of over $49
million when it was actually insolvent by over $200 million.
On September 12, 1986 the FSLIC was appointed as receiver for Western.
Under FIRREA,120 all FSLIC assets, including this claim, were transferred
to the FSLIC Resolution Fund, which is managed by the FDIC. The FDIC
filed a lawsuit against Ernst alleging damages of $560 million, resulting from
negligence and breach of contract by Arthur Young. The FDIC claimed
that had Arthur Young's audits been accurate, Western's Board of Directors
or government regulators could have prevented further losses. Although the
FDIC had the authority to sue Ernst on its own behalf, or on behalf of
Western's creditors, it brought suit only as assignee of a claim by Western
against Ernst.12'
The critical factor in the court's holding is the capacity in which the
FDIC brought its suit. Since the FDIC did not sue on its own behalf nor on
Western's creditors' behalf, the court viewed this as a client case where the
client is suing its auditor. Thus, the court disregarded the effect of the audi-
tor's alleged negligence on third parties 122 noting that "[a]n assignee obtains
only the right, title, and interest of his assignor at the time of his assignment,
and no more. Accordingly, an assignee may recover only those damages
potentially available to his assignor."1 23 Noting the FDIC contended that
the court should treat it differently from other assignees.The court, relying
upon FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert and Holland,124 declined to treat the FDIC
differently from other assignees. In Cherry, the FDIC sued a partnership of
certified public accountants for their negligent audit of a Bank. The Cherry
court held that the FDIC, as assignee, was subject to the same defenses that
could be asserted against other assignees.125 The Woods court stated that
"No statutory justification or public policy exists to treat the FDIC differ-
ently from other assignees when the FDIC, as a matter of choice in this case,
has limited its claim to that of an assignee."' 26
The court then reviewed whether the district court had erred in granting
Ernst's motion for summary judgment based on the allegation that neither
Woods nor Western had relied upon the audit.' 27 The FDIC argued that
the district court erred in granting the summary judgment, stating that reli-
ance is not an element of a negligence claim. The court reasoned that
although an injury caused by reliance is not expressly a necessary element of
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
121. According to Section 1821(d)(2)(A), FIRREA grants the receiver "all rights, titles,
powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution, and of any.., account holder [or]
depositor . . . with respect to the institution and the assets of the institution." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1990). Therefore, the FDIC can pursue claims on behalf of deposi-
tors, shareholders and creditors.
122. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 169.
123. Id. (citing State Fidelity Mortgage Co. v. Varner, 740 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. App.-
Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, writ denied)).
124. 742 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
125. Id. at 617.




negligence, "[p]roximate cause includes two essential elements: (1) foresee-
ability; and (2) cause in fact ... Cause in fact means that the act or omission
was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury and without which no
harm would have incurred."' 128 The court held that without relying on the
audit, there could not have been a "substantial factor in bringing about the
injury."' 129 Following this reasoning, the court reviewed whether either
Woods or Western had relied upon Arthur Young's audit to cause injury to
Western. 130
Woods clearly did not rely upon the audit, as he had personal knowledge
of the practices that led to the deteriorating financial condition of Western.
His knowledge of the true financial condition of Western is also shown by his
false entries in Western's books and records in an effort to deceive auditors
and examiners. The court applied the test set forth in Greenstein, Logan &
Co. v. Burgess Marketing, Inc. 131 in reaching its decision that Woods acted
on Western's behalf and therefore his knowledge was imputable to West-
ern132 The court in Greenstein set forth a test questioning whether an em-
ployee's fraud is attributable to a corporation. It states:
Fraud on behalf of a corporation is not the same thing as fraud against
it. Fraud against the corporation usually hurts just the corporation; the
stockholders are the principal if not only victims; their equities vis-a-vis
a careless or reckless auditor are therefore strong. But the stockholders
of a corporation whose officers commit fraud for the benefit of the cor-
poration are beneficiaries of the fraud ... But the primary costs of a
fraud on the corporation's behalf are borne not by the stockholders but
by outsiders to the corporation, and the stockholders should not be al-
lowed to escape all responsibility for such fraud, as they are trying to do
in this case.'33
Applying this standard, the court held that Woods' fraudulent actions, taken
on behalf of Western, benefitted himself as sole shareholder and injured out-
siders to Western.' 34 Finally, the court rejected the FDIC's argument that,
but for Arthur Young's negligence, someone, such as Western's creditors or
government regulators would have rescued Western. 135 Western was al-
ready aware of its financial condition and chose to ignore it.
It is important to note that the court specifically limited its holding to the
facts of this case under Texas law, i.e. a case in which "the FDIC, as as-
signee of a corporation with a dominating sole owner, sues an auditor for
negligently performing an audit upon which neither the owner nor the cor-
128. 967 F.2d 166, 170 (citing McClure v. Allied Stores of Texas, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901,
903 (Tex. 1980)).
129. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 170 (citing 601 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1980, no writ)).
130. Id.
131. 744 S.W.2d 170, 190-91 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied) (quoting Cenco, Inc. v.
Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)).
132. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 171.
133. Greenstein, 744 S.W.2d at 190-91.




poration relied."' 136 The court specifically did not rule on whether Ernst can
be liable for its negligence should the FDIC bring a cause of action on its
own behalf or on behalf of Western's creditors.137
E. PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION TRANSACTIONS
1. Ratable Dividends
In Texas American Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarket38 the Fifth Circuit re-
viewed the structure of a purchase and assumption transaction in which
creditors closely affiliated with the insolvent bank were treated differently
than unaffiliated creditors. The unaffiliated creditors received one hundred
percent of the amount owed them while the affiliated creditors received only
the liquidated value of their claims, i.e. approximately sixty-seven percent.
The court reviewed whether such treatment by the FDIC violated sections
91139 and 194140 of the National Banking Act.14 ' The case involved Texas
American Bancshares, Inc. (TAB), which was the parent company of
twenty-two national banks located in Texas and of two Texas state chartered
banks. The deposits of the twenty-four banks were insured by the FDIC.
TAB Fort Worth, a national bank located in Fort Worth, Texas, began
experiencing financial difficulties in 1988. On July 20, 1989 the Comptroller
of the Currency declared TAB Fort Worth insolvent and appointed the
FDIC as receiver. The OCC also granted a bridge bank charter under the
name Texas American Bridge Bank, N.A. (Bridge Bank). 142 In this case of
first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the sole issue on appeal was whether the
FDIC violated sections 91 and 194 of the National Bank Act, which requires
receivers of national banks to make ratable dividends and to avoid prefer-
ence to creditors. 143 The FDIC, in its receivership capacity (FDIC Re-
136. Id. at 172.
137. Id. at 172. The FDIC appealed the Fifth Circuit decision; however, the OTS, FDIC,
and RTC settled all of their existing and potential claims against Ernst & Young for $400
million on November 23, 1992. Bank Bailout Litigation News, Vol. 3 No. 47 p. 1, November
26, 1992.
138. 954 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1992).
139. 12 U.S.C. § 91 (1988).
140. 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1988).
141. 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1988).
142. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988). The court explained:
A bridge bank is a chartered bank that exists for a limited time to effectuate
purchase and assumption transactions ... § 1821 (n). The bridge bank is author-
ized to assume deposits or other liabilities and/or purchase assets of the insured
bank. Id. § 1821(n)(1)(B). The FDIC may provide operating funds or assist-
ance to the bridge bank. Id. § 1821(n)(5), (7). The bridge bank terminates on
the earliest of the following events: the passage of two years after the bridge
bank was given a charter; the merger of the bridge bank with another bank; the
sale of the stock of the bridge bank to another entity; or the assumption of sub-
stantially all the deposits and other liabilities of the bridge bank by another
bank. Id. § 1821(n)(10).
954 F.2d 329, 333 n.5.
143. Section 194 provides that:
From time to time, after full provision has been first made for refunding to the
United States any deficiency in redeeming the notes of such association, the
comptroller shall make a ratable dividend of the money so paid over to him by
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ceiver), entered into a purchase and assumption agreement with the Bridge
Bank and a contract of sale with the FDIC in its corporate capacity (FDIC
Corporate).
The contract of sale provided that certain assets of TAB Fort Worth,
which were not transferred to Bridge Bank, would be transferred to FDIC
Corporate. In exchange for such assets, FDIC Corporate would provide
FDIC Receiver sufficient funds to pay all of the liabilities of TAB Fort
Worth that were not assumed by the Bridge Bank. The contract of sale
provided that the liabilities would be paid on pro rata basis, based on the
aggregate fair market value of the assets of TAB Fort Worth, together with
interest. FDIC Receiver then transferred most of the assets of TAB Fort
Worth to the Bridge Bank, and the Bridge Bank assumed most of the TAB
Fort Worth's obligations. The obligations for federal funds sold to TAB
Fort Worth by other TAB subsidiary banks and the certificate of deposits
that the other TAB subsidiaries had purchased from TAB Fort Worth were
not assumed by the Bridge Bank. Those obligations, totalling approximately
$800 million, were retained by the FDIC Receiver. The FDIC then notified
the Comptroller of the Currency that the other TAB subsidiary banks,
which were owed the $800 million by TAB Fort Worth, would receive only
sixty-seven percent of the face amount of the obligations owed to them by
TAB Fort Worth from the TAB Fort Worth receivership. As a result, the
Comptroller determined that all twenty-one of the other TAB subsidiary na-
tional banks were insolvent, ordered them closed, and appointed the FDIC
as receiver for each. In addition, the two TAB state chartered Bank subsidi-
aries were declared insolvent and were closed in a similar manner. The re-
maining twenty-three subsidiary banks were then sold to the same purchaser
as TAB Fort Worth, through a series of coordinated purchase and assump-
tion transactions.
If the banks had received one hundred percent of the federal funds sold to,
and any certificates of deposit purchased from, TAB Fort Worth, or if such
such receiver on all such claims as may have been proved to his satisfaction or
adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction, and, as the proceeds of the
assets of such association are paid over to him, shall make further dividends on
all claims previously proved or adjudicated; and the remainder of the proceeds,
if any, shall be paid over to the shareholders of such association, or their legal
representatives, in proportion to the stock by them respectively held.
12 U.S.C. § 194 (1988). Section 91 provides:
All transfers of the notes, bonds, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt
owing to any national banking association, or of deposits to its credits; all as-
signments of mortgages, sureties on real estate, or of judgments or decrees in its
favor; all deposits of money, bullion, or other valuable things for its use, or the
use of any of its shareholders or creditors; and all payments of money to either,
made after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in contemplation thereof,
made with a view to prevent the application of its assets in the manner pre-
scribed by this chapter, or with a view to the preference of one creditor to an-
other, except in payment of its circulating notes, shall be utterly null and void;
and no attachment, injunction, or execution, shall be issued against such associ-
ation or its property before final judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding, in
any State, county or municipal court.
12 U.S.C. § 91 (1988).
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items had been assumed by the Bridge Bank, thirteen of the banks would not
have become insolvent. The thirteen TAB subsidiary banks along with their
parent company, TAB, brought this lawsuit. The court rejected TAB's ar-
gument that the FDIC sale of TAB Fort Worth to an outside investor in a
purchase and assumption transaction generated proceeds that the FDIC was
required to distribute equally to all TAB Fort Worth creditors. 144 The court
held that 12 U.S.C. section 194 imposes a requirement of ratable payments
to creditors; however, such payments are to be made only to the extent of the
assets of the failed bank.145 The parties had stipulated that if the TAB
Banks had been liquidated, the proceeds generated from the liquidation of
TAB Fort Worth would have paid the creditors no more than sixty-seven
percent of the amounts owed them. The court held that the receipt of sixty-
seven percent of the claims by the subsidiaries constituted a ratable distribu-
tion of the proceeds of the assets of TAB Fort Worth.
Further, the court reasoned that TAB's claim ignored the dual role that
the FDIC played in the purchase and assumption transaction.146 The FDIC
acted both in its corporate capacity and as a receiver of TAB Fort Worth.
As receiver, the FDIC sold the majority of the assets of TAB Fort Worth to
the Bridge Bank. FDIC Corporate provided operating funds to the Bridge
Bank and injected $900 million from the insurance fund so that nonaffiliated
creditors could be paid one hundred percent of their claims instead of only
the sixty-seven percent pro rata share to which they were entitled. The court
distinguished the obligations of the FDIC in its capacity as receiver to dis-
tribute the proceeds of the assets of a failed Bank ratably, from the obliga-
tions of the FDIC in its corporate capacity to compensate insured depositors
fully. 147
In reaching its holding, the court distinguished First Empire Bank - New
York v. FDIC,148 a case in which the FDIC closed United States National
Bank of San Diego (USNB) and entered into a purchase and assumption
agreement with Crocker National Bank. The majority of the assets and lia-
bilities of USNB were purchased and assumed by Crocker; however, certain
assets and liabilities associated with USNB's controlling shareholder were
not assumed by Crocker. In connection with the transaction, the FDIC, in
its corporate capacity, lent to the FDIC as receiver $128,780,000, which was
transferred by the receiver to Crocker pursuant to the purchase and assump-
tion agreement. In order to secure its loan to the receivership, the FDIC, in
its corporate capacity, received and retained a first lien, superior to that of
any unassumed creditor, in all of the assets of the receivership estate that
were not transferred to Crocker. The creditors whose claims were not as-
sumed brought an action against the FDIC for payment of their claims in
full. The First Empire court ruled in favor of the creditors on the basis that
sections 91 and 194 of the National Bank Act apply to the FDIC when
144. Texas American, 954 F.2d at 335.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 335-36.
148. 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978).
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acting as receiver for a failed bank. 149 The court noted that the critical dif-
ference between First Empire and the present case is that in First Empire, the
"FDIC made no provision for any payment of the creditors' claims that
were not assumed in First Empire; the unassumed creditors, unlike the plain-
tiff TAB Banks here, did not receive a ratable dividend of the assets of the
failed Bank."' 50 Because the lien held by the FDIC would consume the
remaining assets of the receivership estate, the unassumed creditors would
have been left without any recovery, thereby denying the unassumed credi-
tors what they would have received in a straight liquidation.
The court in Texas American noted that the parties extensively briefed the
issue of whether FIRREA controls the outcome of the case. FIRREA was
enacted approximately one month following the closure of the TAB Banks
by the Comptroller.' 5 ' The court declined to address the issue in a specific
holding but said that the case would have been decided the same way even if
FIRREA had applied.152
2. Loan Participations
In First Indiana Federal Savings Bank v. FDIC'53 the Fifth Circuit set
forth basic rules for loan participation contests in which one party is a failed
institution and the other party remains open. The predecessor of First Indi-
ana Savings Bank (First Indiana) entered into a loan participation contract
with the predecessor of United Savings Association of Texas (Old United).
First Indiana acquired various interests in participations covering the devel-
opment of four apartment complexes in Houston. First Indiana's interests
equalled approximately ninety percent of the total outstanding loans on the
apartment complexes. Old United retained ten percent of the total loans,
along with the management responsibilities and the right to compensation
for managerial services rendered. The participation agreement contained an
option allowing First Indiana to direct Old United to repurchase First Indi-
ana's interest in the loans if Old United violated any terms of the participa-
tion agreement and failed to cure such violations within thirty days after
notice. Three of the four apartment complexes began experiencing problems
leading to foreclosure on the underlying loans. First Indiana sued Old
United seeking specific performance of repurchase of the participations pur-
suant to the participation agreement, claiming that Old United failed to no-
tify First Indiana in advance of the problems and defaults as required by the
participation agreement. Old United counterclaimed for management fees
related to the properties.
149. Id. at 1371.
150. Texas American, 954 F.2d at 337.
151. Id. at 340.
152. Id. FIRREA amended The Federal Deposit Insurance Act to provide that the maxi-
mum liability of the FDIC "acting as receiver or in any other capacity" to any person having a
claim against the receiver or the failed bank shall be the amount the claim and would have
received if the FDIC had liquidated the assets and liabilities of the bank. See also 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(i)(2) (1988).
153. 964 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1992).
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A trial followed in which the jury only answered special interrogatories,
rather than rendering an overall verdict. The jury found against Old United
on several issues; however, it found against First Indiana on other issues
including a finding that First Indiana had waived its claims. Approximately
three years elapsed before the district court entered its judgment. During
that time, Old United was declared insolvent and United Savings Associa-
tion of Texas, FSB (New United) was formed by the FSLIC as successor to
Old United. Pursuant to an acquisition agreement between FSLIC and New
United, most of the assets of Old United were sold to New United. Follow-
ing the sale, New United intervened in the suit to reassert Old United's
claims against First Indiana for management fees. First Indiana filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment, arguing that the insolvency of Old United was
an event of default that terminated the participation agreement and triggered
repurchase. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas entered judgments against First Indiana on its repurchase claim and
awarded a money judgment to New United for $77,403 in unpaid fees and
expenses. The court dismissed First Indiana's claims against the FDIC as
successor of the FSLIC and receiver of Old United. 154
The appellate court reviewed section 3 of the acquisition agreement be-
tween the FSLIC and New United in making its determination of the rights
of the parties. Section 3 states:
[New United] hereby expressly assumes and agrees to pay, perform and
discharge . . . (b) [Old United's] liabilities that are secured by assets
purchased by [New United] pursuant to section 2 of this Agreement to
the extent of the value of the security ... except as expressly set forth
in this section 3, [New United] will not assume any of the claims, debts,
obligations or liabilities (including, without limitation, known or un-
known, contingent or unasserted claims, demands, causes of action or
judgments, or debts, obligations or liabilities; or commitments to loan
or obligations to make future fundings or advances under existing loans
or other obligations even if such loans or other obligations are acquired
by [New United]) of [Old United] . . .155
First Indiana argued that Old United's obligations under the participation
agreement were "liabilities that are secured by assets purchased"' 156 by New
United pursuant to the acquisition agreement between the FSLIC and New
United. The court disagreed, holding that the parties' obligations under the
participation agreement were never "anything more than unsecured personal
obligations between the parties."1 57 Therefore, the court reasoned that to
the extent First Indiana had any valid claims against Old United, such
claims were not secured claims and did not survive the transfer of assets
under the acquisition agreement between the FSLIC and New United. 158
Instead, the unsecured liabilities of Old United, including the claims against
154. First Indiana, 964 F.2d at 503.






Old United, accrued as of the date of the transfer and were retained by the
FSLIC. Thus, First Indiana's only recourse was to bring an action against
the FDIC as receiver for Old United. The court noted that it was not rele-
vant whether the claims of First Indiana against Old United were valid be-
cause the liabilities of Old United exceeded its assets; therefore, there were
no assets for the FDIC as receiver to distribute to general creditors of Old
United such as First Indiana. 159
Further, the court acknowledged that Congress intended to limit the max-
imum liability of the FDIC as receiver to the amount the claimant would
have received had the institution been liquidated pursuant to federal priority
regulations.160 Applying this standard, the court noted that First Indiana
would have received nothing as an unsecured creditor had the FDIC liqui-
dated Old United. 161 The determination regarding the value of Old United
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) established the value of
First Indiana's unsecured claim and bound the court hearing the actions on
those claims. 162 The court's decision is binding only as to claims made by
First Indiana based on actions of Old United. 63 As successor in interest to
Old United, New United is liable for any failure to live up to its responsibili-
ties under the participation agreement after its transfer of assets from the
FSLIC to New United. '64 The court stated "As far as obligations of the
seller under the participation agreement are concerned, New United got a
'fresh start' as of the time it acquired the interest of Old United by transfer
from the FSLIC."' 165 As successor in interest to Old United, New United
was also entitled to any rights and benefits of Old United under the partici-
pation agreement, regardless of the date such rights and benefits may have
accrued or may accrue in the future. 166 Thus, the court affirmed the judg-
ment against First Indiana based on Old United's counterclaim for unpaid
fees and expenses. 167
F. THIRD PARTY V. THE FDIC OR RTC
1. Enforcement of Standby Letters of Credit
In Citizens State of Lometa v. FDIC168 the court examined whether
standby letters of credit issued by a national bank are valid against the
FDIC, when the underlying default on the letter of credit occurs after the
date the national bank is placed in receivership. In November 1986,
Lampasas County Joint Venture (Joint Venture) executed a promissory note
payable to Citizens State Bank of Lometa (Lometa) for the principal amount
159. Id. at 507.
160. Id. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i)(2) (1988).
161. First Indiana, 964 F.2d at 507.
162. Id. at 506 n.7.
163. Id. at 507.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 508.
166. Id. at 507.
167. Id. at 508.
168. 946 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1991).
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of $295,200. The partners of the Joint Venture signed the note both as mak-
ers and in their capacities as partners. In addition, each of the individuals
executed guaranty agreements in their individual capacities. North Central
National Bank located in Austin, Texas (North Central) issued three letters
of credit in favor of Lometa as consideration for the note and the guaranties.
The letters of credit specified that North Central would pay Lometa upon
Lometa's presentment to North Central (a) the original letter of credit, and
(b) a written notification of an officer of Lometa certifying that the loan to
the Joint Venture is in default.
Further, the terms of the letters of credit provided that upon presentment
of a draft that complied with the terms of the letters, North Central would
honor the draft. On April 23, 1987, North Central was declared insolvent,
and the FDIC was appointed as receiver. All three of the letters of credit in
question existed prior to the closing of North Central. Subsequent to the
failure, the Joint Venture, along with the three individual guarantors, de-
faulted on their note and individual guarantees. Following the default,
Lometa sent the following documents to the FDIC: (1) copies of the original
letters of credit; (2) written notice certifying that the $295,200 loan to the
Joint Venture was in default; and (3) drafts in the amount of the letters of
credit. Approximately two months later, Lometa sent the FDIC: (1) origi-
nal proofs of claim on each of the letters of credit; (2) the original letters of
credit; (3) written notice certifying that the loan to the Joint Venture was in
default; and (4) drafts in the amounts of the letters of credit. The FDIC then
notified Lometa that its claims were rejected, stating that the note was not in
default prior to North Central's failure and therefore the claims by Lometa
were not "provable claims" under section 194 of the National Bank Act.
During 1988 and 1989, Lometa obtained judgments on the note and the
guaranty agreements. As of the date of the court's decision, the FDIC had
not made any distribution of assets in the receivership proceeding relating to
North Central.
The court examined whether standby letters of credit are "provable
claims" against the FDIC under section 194 of the National Bank Act.1 69
Section 194 provides in part "[T]he Comptroller [receiver] shall make a rata-
ble dividend on the money so paid over to him ... on all such claims as may
have been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competent
jurisdiction . . .- 170 In reaching the conclusion that the standby letters of
credit were provable, the court relied on the provability test set forth in First
Empire Bank-New York v. FDIC.17 1 In First Empire, the court concluded
that a standby letter of credit claim was provable even though the default on
the underlying note occurred subsequent to the issuer's insolvency. The de-
cision was based on the following criteria: "(1) it existed before the issuing
Bank's insolvency and did not depend on any new contractual obligations
arising later; (2) liability on the claim was absolute and certain in amount
169. Lometa, 946 F.2d at 412. See U.S.C. § 194 (1988).
170. 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1988).
171. 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978).
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when suit was filed against the receiver; and (3) the claim was made in a
timely manner."' 72
Relying on a series of cases interpreting the meaning of "ratable" in sec-
tion 194, the FDIC argued that a claim must be absolutely fixed, due, and
owing as of the date of insolvency to be provable and thus entitled to partici-
pate in a ratable funds distribution pursuant to 12 U.S.C. section 194. Fur-
ther, the FDIC argued that no reference should be made to post insolvency
events. Distinguishing Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville 73 and
American Surety Co. v. Bethlehem National Bank, 174 the court held that
although the two concepts are related, "whether a claim is provable under
section 194, and whether a distribution is 'ratable', represent two entirely
different inquiries."' 175 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling that Lometa could enforce the standby letters of credit against
the FDIC as receiver for North Central. 176
2. Disappointed Bidder Denied Injunctive Relief
In Ward v. RTC177 the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas dismissed an action to enjoin the RTC from selling govern-
ment property to a third party. 78 The plaintiff submitted a bid to the RTC
on an office building. The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) wrote a let-
ter rejecting his bid and inviting him to submit another bid. Before he sub-
mitted a new bid, however, he was informed that the RTC was selling the
property as part of a bulk sale of government property to Patriot American
Investors (PAI). The plaintiff then brought the suit to enjoin the sale of the
property to PAL. In dismissing the suit, the court relied on 12 U.S.C. section
1821(j), which states: "[E]xcept as provided in this section, no court may
take any action, except at the request of the Board of Directors by regulation
or order, to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Cor-
poration as a conservator or a receiver."' 79 Since one of the functions of the
RTC as receiver is the liquidation and receivership of assets, it follows that
the RTC is free to liquidate receivership assets without being subject to in-
junctive actions.
The court stated that even if the anti-injunction statute was not applicable,
an injunction would not be issued because the plaintiff failed to meet the test
for injunctive relief, which requires a showing of likelihood of success on the
merits. '80 The court found that Ward could not show a likelihood of success
on the merits because he could not prove he was a third party beneficiary to
the contract between the RTC and PAI.' 8' Further, the letter from the
172. Lometa, 946 F.2d at 412 (citing First Empire 572 F.2d at 1367-69).
173. 173 U.S. 131 (1899).
174. 314 U.S. 314 (1941).
175. Lometa, 946 F.2d at 413.
176. Id. at 417.
177. 796 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
178. Id. at 259.
179. Id. at 258, citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (1988).




RTC inviting Ward to submit a new bid did not constitute a counter-offer;
therefore, the property did not qualify as excluded property under the agree-
ment between the RTC and PAI. In addition, the court found that the
plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm if the RTC proceeded with the
sale to PAI. Relying on Geneva Ltd. Partners v. Kemp, 18 2 the court held
that "[w]here the property in dispute is to be used for commercial purposes,
money damages can provide an adequate remedy."' 83 The court addition-
ally weighed any damage the plaintiff might suffer against the underlying
public interest in the RTC's ability to dispose of surplus government proper-
ties quickly and efficiently. 184 The court found that the "potential for harm
to the public interest if an injunction is granted is considerable"' 18 5 and out-
weighs the potential harm to the plaintiff.' 86
The court also held that the plaintiff lacked standing under FIRREA to
bring an action challenging the RTC's asset distribution. 87 In order to have
standing, the plaintiff must show he suffered an injury as a result of not
obtaining the property, and also that he is within the "zone of interest to be
protected or regulated" by FIRREA.18 8 The plaintiff asserted that he was
within the zone of interest to be protected because FIRREA was enacted to
protect and insure a fair bid process. The court disagreed, finding that the
purpose of FIRREA "is to give the RTC broad powers to liquidate receiver-
ship assets within its control and plaintiff is not within the protected
zone." 89 The court noted that the RTC can maximize its profits on an
entire group of properties through the use of bulk sales and to disturb the
sale would be more detrimental to the RTC than to the plaintiff.' 90
3. Ad Valorem Tax
In Irving Independent School District v. Packard Properties'9' the Fifth
Circuit analyzed the responsibilities of the FDIC with respect to property
tax liens that were in existence prior to the acquisition of the property in
question by the FDIC as receiver. The Irving III court's decision encom-
passed two cases where property liens for the payment of ad valorem taxes,
statutory interest, penalties, collection costs, and attorneys fees were in-
curred with respect to property that was then acquired by the FDIC as re-
ceiver.' 92 The taxing authorities brought suit against the FDIC to recover
the unpaid ad valorem real property taxes, penalties, interest, costs of collec-
182. 779 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
183. Ward, 796 F. Supp. at 258.
184. Id. at 258-59.
185. Id. at 259.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Ward, 769 F. Supp. at 259 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 258-59.
191. 970 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1992) (Irving III).
192. Irving III, 970 F. Supp. at 59. See generally, Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Packard
Properties, (Irving II), 762 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Tex 1991); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Packard
Properties, (Irving I), 741 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
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tions, and attorneys fees relating to the unpaid taxes. The Irving I district
court held that the FDIC was not liable for the additional charges denomi-
nated as penalties and interest. 193
In a later decision in this series of cases, the Irving II court held that liens
securing the unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest for the years prior to the
ownership of the property by the FDIC were not extinguished by the
FDIC's acquisition of that property. 194 The FDIC appealed the second
holding, asserting that liens as security for the pre-existing charges consti-
tuted penalties that are invalid once the FDIC acquires the property. In its
analysis, the Irving III court reviewed section 1825(b)(1) 195 and held that the
FDIC is responsible for paying the base ad valorem taxes on the property it
owns. 196 Reviewing 12 U.S.C. section 1825(b)(2), 197 the court held that
"[t]he piain language of this statute means no involuntary lien attaches to
the property held by the FDIC when the FDIC is acting as a receiver."' 198
The court noted, however, that the language did not exclude liens attached
to the property before the FDIC owned it.199 The court held that although
liens may not attach to the property owned by the FDIC, previous liens
remain in place.2°° The FDIC asserted that 12 U.S.C. section 1825(b)(3) 20
requires that any lien on property owned by the FDIC, to the extent that the
lien secures penalties, should be extinguished. The FDIC reasoned that if
such liens are not extinguished, the FDIC will receive a lower price for the
property upon resale, and that such reduction of price indirectly imposes a
penalty upon the FDIC. The court rejected this argument, noting that the
liens were in place before the FDIC obtained ownership of the property and
therefore did not cause a reduction in the value of the FDIC's assets.20 2
Further, the court noted that although the liens securing penalties incurred
prior to FDIC ownership of the property would remain in place, the FDIC
193. See Irving I, 741 F. Supp. 120, 124 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
194. See Irving II, 762 F. Supp. 699, 704-05 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
195. 12 U.S.C. § 1825 (Supp. 11 1990). Section 1825(b)(1) provides that when acting as a
receiver, the following provisions shall apply with respect to the Corporation:
(I) the Corporation including its franchise, its capital, reserves, and surplus,
and its income, shall be exempt from all taxation imposed by any State, county,
municipality, or local taxing authority, except that any real property of the Cor-
poration shall be subject to State, territorial, county, municipal, or local taxation
to the same extent according to its value as other real property is taxed ....
Id.
196. Irving 11, 970 F. Supp. at 61.
197. 12 U.S.C. § 1825 (1984). Section 1825(b)(2) provides that "[n]o property of the Cor-
poration shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale without the
consent of the Corporation, nor shall any involuntary lien attach to the property of the
Corporation."
198. Irving I1, 970 F.2d at 61 (citing Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Packard Properties, (Ir-
ving II), 762 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Tex. 1991)).
199. Id.
200. Irving III, 970 F. Supp. at 61.
201. See 12 U.S.C. § 1825 (1989). Section 1825(b)(3) provides that "[the Corporation
shall not be liable for any amounts in the nature of penalties or fines, including those arising
from the failure of any person to pay any real property, personal property, probate, or record-
ing tax or any recording or filing fees when due." Id. § 1825(b)(3).
202. Irving III, 970 F. Supp. at 62.
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is not liable for the payment of penalties incurred in connection with the
failure of previous owners to pay property taxes. 203
The taxing authorities argued that interest and collection costs associated
with unpaid taxes are not penalties and therefore the FDIC should not be
shielded from payment of those amounts. The long standing interpretation
in Texas that interest charges are regarded as penalties is set forth in Jones v.
Williams.2° 4 Although this interpretation may be changing,20 5 the court de-
clined to apply the emerging concept of interest as compensation for the use
or the lost use of money, 20 6 and held that the interest charges were penal-
ties. 207 Section 33.01 of the Tax Code recently was amended and provides
that "interest payable under this section is to compensate the taxing unit for
revenue lost because of the delinquency. ' 20 8 Although section 33.01(e) is
contrary to the intrepretation in Jones, the court noted that the amendment
to section 33.01(c) of the Texas Tax Code did not become effective until
August 26, 1991. 20 9 The Irving cases originated prior to such date and the
court declined to apply the amendment retroactively.
The taxing authorities also contended that section 33.07(a)210 is not a pen-
alty provision. The court cited Jones as the controlling Supreme Court pre-
cedent.2 11 The court stated:
the case of Jones v. Williams ... decides that the penalty and interest
added to delinquent taxes is not an incident of the taxes, but is a sepa-
rate and distinct item provided by the Legislature as a punishment for
the failure to pay taxes, prior to delinquency, and therefore a "penalty"
within the meaning of the Constitution.21 2
Thus, pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. section 1825(b)(3), the FDIC is not liable
either by lien or suit, for interest, tax penalties, or collection costs incurred
during the years the FDIC owned the property in question.2 13
203. Id.
204. 121 Tex. 94, 45 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. 1931).
205. See Spindletop Oil and Gas Co. v. Parker County, 738 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1987, writ denied).
206. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 33.01(d) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
207. Irving III, 970 F. Supp. at 65.
208, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.01 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
209. Irving III, 970 F. Supp. at 65.
210. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 33.07(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Section 33.07(a) provides:
A taxing unit or appraisal district may provide, in the manner required by law
for official action by the body that taxes that remain delinquent on July I of the
year in which they become delinquent incur an additional penalty to defray
costs of collection, if the unit or district or another unit that collects taxes for
the unit has contracted with an attorney pursuant to § 6.30 of this Code. The
amount of the penalty may not exceed 15% of the amount of taxes, penalty and
interest due.
Id.
211. Irving III, 970 F. Supp. at 64.





In Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. v. Clarke214 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, reviewed
the Office of the Comptroller of Currency's (OCC) approval letters which
allowed a national Bank to offer various annuity contracts through a wholly
owned subsidiary. North Carolina National Bank (NCNB) and its wholly
owned subsidiary, NCNB Securities, Inc. (NCNBS) applied to the OCC for
approval to offer various annuity contracts on an agency basis through
NCNBS. The Comptroller approved NCNB's request on March 21, 1990.
In issuing its approval, the Comptroller found that annuities are primarily
financial investments. As such, the sale of the annuities is within the power
of national banks to broker financial investment instruments. Variable An-
nuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC), an insurance company with its
principal place of business in Houston, Texas, underwrites and sells securi-
ties in fifty states. On April 16, 1991, VALIC filed suit seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. VALIC contended that the Comptroller's decision to
allow NCNB and other national banks to offer annuity contracts on an
agency basis through an operating subsidiary (1) was arbitrary, capricious,
and an abuse of discretion; and (2) allowed and encouraged NCNB and
other national Banks to enter the insurance business in violation of section
24(7)215 and section 92216 of the National Bank Act. Relying on Chevron
USA, Inc., v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,217 the court initially
inquired as to whether Congress had directly addressed this issue.218 Find-
ing that the issue had not been specifically addressed by Congress, the court
reviewed whether the OCC's ruling was based on a reasonable interpretation
of the statute in question.219 The court applied the standard used in Chev-
ron, which states that in order to uphold the OCC's decision, "[t]he Court
need not conclude that the agency's construction was the only one it permis-
sibly could have adopted, or even the reading the court would have reached
if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. ' 220 Thus, pro-
vided that the Comptroller's interpretation of the National Bank Act is rea-
sonable, and not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, and the
interpretation is otherwise in accordance with the law, the court must defer
to the Comptroller's interpretation.221
VALIC relied on Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Insurance Agents,
Inc.222 for its contention that 12 U.S.C. section 92 plainly prohibits national
banks from acting as sales agents for insurance companies in communities
214. 786 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
215. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (Supp. 11 1990).
216. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988).
217. 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
218. Variable Ins., 786 F. Supp. at 641.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 641 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n.l1).
221. Variable Ins., 786 F. Supp. at 641 (citing Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Assoc., 479 U.S. 388,
403-04 (1987); Camp, Comptroller of the Currency v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-42 (1973).
222. 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
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where the population exceeds 5,000.223 In Saxon, the court held that the
OCC exceeded its authority and acted contrary to section 92 when it granted
national banks the broad and unlimited power to "act as agent in the issu-
ance of insurance which is incidental to banking transactions. ' 224 The court
disagreed with VALIC's reading of Saxon and relied on the legislative his-
tory for the proposition that section 92 was enacted, at least in part, to "pro-
vide an additional source of revenue for national banks located in small
towns and not to protect the markets from competing insurance agents. '22
The court also held that the term "insurance" which is not defined in section
92, probably cannot be construed to include annuities. 226 The court rea-
soned that Congress explicitly "left a gap for the [Comptroller] to fill" 2 2 7
when it did not define the term "insurance. ' 228 The Comptroller filled the
gap with respect to the definition of "insurance" by making a factual deter-
mination that annuities are primarily financial investment instruments and
not insurance. In reaching this conclusion, the Comptroller found "that an-
nuities lack the basic insurance characteristic of indemnification against risk
of loss." ' 229 The Comptroller also found that, to the extent the annuities at
issue are securities, they fall within the securities brokerage authority of na-
tional banks.230 The court held that it was neither arbitrary nor capricious
for the Comptroller to view 12 U.S.C. section 92 as a supplemental powers
provision and not as a limitation on the incidental powers of the Bank under
12 U.S.C. section 24(7).231 The court also found that the Comptroller acted
reasonably in determining that annuities are a specialized product and not a
broad form of insurance that would be governed by Saxon.232
On February 24, 1992 the district court corrected its ruling by adding 12
U.S.C. section 24(7) to the statutory basis for the initial ruling. The correc-
tion contained no explanation, but noted that section 24(7) should be in-
cluded as part of the ruling. A footnote was also included which stated
"[T]he Court notes that section 92 is omitted from recent editions of the
223. Variable Ins., 786 F. Supp. at 641.
224. Id. (citing Saxon, 399 F.2d at 1012).
225. Variable Ins., 786 F. Supp. at 641; See 53 Cong. Rec. 11001 (1916).
226. Variable Ins., 786 F. Supp. at 641.
227. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
228. Variable Ins., 786 F. Supp. at 641.
229. Id.
230. Id. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. 11 1990). Section 24(7) provides in pertinent part:
Upon duly making and filing articles of association and an organization certifi-
cate a national banking association shall become, as from the date of the execu-
tion of its organization certificate, a body corporate, and as such, and in the
name designated in the organization certificate, it shall have power .. . (T)o
exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to
law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking; ... (T)he business of dealing in securities and stock by the association
shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without re-
course, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case
for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of securi-
ties or stock ....
Id.




United States Code. Because the issue of section 92's continuing validity is
not part of the case or controversy before the Court, the Court does not
address this issue."' 233 This footnote was added due to a holding by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on February 7, 1992,
which held that 12 U.S.C. section 92 was repealed in 1918, thereby leaving
the OCC without a basis for a separate insurance ruling.234 The impact of
the revised ruling on the OCC's ability to approve applications by national
banks to offer annuities through operating subsidiaries remains a question.
H. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
1. Negotiability
Prior to Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee,235 no Texas case had ad-
dressed the affect that a variable rate of interest with respect to a promissory
note may have on the note's negotiability. Amberboy answered a question
certified to the Texas Supreme Court by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The specific question, which the Supreme Court answered affirmatively, was
whether a promissory note is a negotiable instrument as defined by the Texas
Uniform Commercial Code (Code) if the interest rate charged can only be
calculated by reference to the bank's prime rate. 236 The Code sets forth the
requirements of a negotiable instrument in section 3.104.237 One of the re-
quirements is that the instrument contain an unconditional promise or order
to pay a sum certain in money. The Code does not define what is meant by
the term "sum certain." The court recognized that most courts that have
addressed the issue declined to hold that notes with variable interest rates
are negotiable instruments. The court also recognized that the issue had
been submitted to the Texas legislature in a bill that passed the House in
1991 but which was not voted upon by the Senate.238 The court, however,
believed its mandate under the Code and official comments to the Code was
to advance the fundamental purpose of the Code set forth in section
1. 102(b)(1). 239 That purpose is to "simplify, clarify and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions" and to construe the Code's provisions
"in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices. ''24°
Although the official comment to section 3.106 of the Code states that the
sum certain to be paid must be capable of computation "from the instrument
itself without reference to any outside source," the court found the rule flexi-
233. Id. at 640 n.1.
234. BNA's Banking Report, Vol. 58, p. 482, March 16, 1992.
235. 831 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1992).
236. Id. at 793.
237. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
238. At the time this article is going to press, at least one bill (HB 2195) has been intro-
duced in the Texas House of Representatives which, if passed and signed by the Governor,
would legislatively overrule Amberboy by amending § 3.106 of the Code to exclude from the
term "stated interest" certain variable rates of interest which are not ascertainable on the face
of the instrument. Tex. H.B. 2195, 3rd Leg., R.S. (1993).
239. Amberboy, 831 S.W.2d at 794.
240. Id. at 794 (quoting the comment to the Texas UCC. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 1.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992)).
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ble because the Code itself permits reference to outside sources in determin-
ing the sum payable under a negotiable instrument.241
The court expanded on its answer to the certified question by explaining
what it considered to be included in the phrase a "bank's published prime
rate." By using that phrase, the court wrote:
we intend our answer to include only those rates which are public,
either known to or readily ascertainable by any interested person ....
We do not, however, specify or limit the manner in which the rate must
be published. The requirement of commercial certainty is satisfied
when the information is readily available to the public, regardless of the
means utilized to make that information available. 242
In another negotiatability cases, the court held that incorporating the
terms of another agreement into an otherwise negotiable instrument defeats
its negotiability. 243 Reference in a note of the fact that it is secured by an-
other document is a common practice that does not cause an otherwise nego-
tiable note to become non-negotiable. However, by incorporating the other
agreement into the note by reference, the note in question in 1601 Partners
became "subject to or governed by" another agreement for the purposes of
section 3.105(b) of the Texas UCC. 244 The promise was, therefore, rendered
conditional, and the note was not negotiable. 24 5
2. Availability of Extrinsic Evidence to Alter Express Terms
Four cases were decided during the Survey period dealing with the issue of
varying the express terms of a note by extrinsic evidence and all of them
were decided in Houston. Three were decided by the court of appeals, first
district, and one by the court of appeals, Fourteenth district. The first case,
Strickland v. Coleman,246 decided by the first district court of appeals, and
the opinion by the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Mestco Distribu-
tors, Inc. v. Stamps2 4 7 appear to be consistent, while the other two, Simmons
v. Compania Financiera Libano248 and Litton v. Hanley,249 each consistent
with the other, seem to differ from Strickland and Mestco Distributors.
In Strickland v. Coleman,25 0 the lender sued the borrower for the full
amount owing on a promissory note, although the borrower contended that
he was liable only for half of the amount. The borrower claimed shared
liability on the note and supported his claim with evidence of both an agree-
241. Id.
242. Id. at 797-98; see also, FSLIC v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1992); Ackerman v.
FDIC, 937 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1992) (the federal case from which the question was certified to
the Texas Supreme Court which was decided in Amberboy).
243. See RTC v. 1601 Partners, Ltd., 796 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
244. Id. at 240.
245. Id.
246. 824 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, no writ).
247. 824 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
248. 830 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
249. 823 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1992, no writ).
250. 824 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
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ment and a course of dealing. All of the evidence conflicted with the terms
of the note, which indicated no such agreement.
The evidence introduced by the maker to support his defense was any-
thing but conclusive. However, it was admitted into the record. The court
characterized the promissory note as a contract between the maker and
payee, and its introduction into evidence where execution has not been de-
nied makes a prima facie case for the holder of the note.25 1 When the holder
is not a holder in due course, however, the maker can defend on the basis of
any defense available to a simple contract. 252 The court stated:
Therefore, evidence is admissible that tends to prove a defense to the
action on the promissory note, such as want or failure of consideration,
non-performance of a condition precedent, non-delivery, delivery for a
special purpose, fraud in the inducement, or other defenses which
would be available in an action on a simple contract. 25 3
The court also permitted evidence of custom or course of dealing to prove or
interpret the terms of the contract. The court distinguished North Town
National v. Broaddus because it involved a single transaction represented by
only one promissory note and a claim of fraud in the inducement based on
evidence of what the payee told the maker as an inducement to sign the
note. 254 The dissent relied on Broaddus as prohibiting the variance or con-
tradiction of the unambiguous terms of a promissory note by extrinsic evi-
dence. 255 The dissent would allow avoidance of the promissory note only by
representation of the payee that the maker would not be liable or if trickery,
artifice or device were used to induce the payee. 25 6
Similarly, in Mestco Distributors, Inc. v. Stamps, 257 the payee of several
notes sued to collect. Some of the notes were clearly signed by the defendant
in a representative capacity as an officer of a corporation in accordance with
the provisions of section 3.403(c) of the Code. Others were clearly signed
only by the individual with no representative capacity being indicated. The
trial court allowed extrinsic evidence to show that the parties agreed or un-
derstood that the defendant would not be liable on the notes. Section
3.403(c) of the Code provides that representative capacity exists if a signa-
ture is proceeded or followed by the name and office of an authorized
signer. 258 If the signature is not shown to be in a representative capacity, the
signer (in a dispute between the immediate parties) has the burden to offer
proof that he signed only in a representative capacity. 259 The court cited
Griffin v. Ellinger,26° favorably, as follows:
Under Section 3.403(b), extrinsic evidence is admissible between the
251. Id. at 192.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing North Town National Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978)).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 194 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
256. Id.
257. 824 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
258. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.403(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
259. Mestco Distributors, Inc., 524 S.W.2d at 980.
260. 538 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. 1976).
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parties to the instrument to show that they agreed or otherwise under-
stood that the signer would not be personally liable thereon, even
though the instrument itself does not reveal the signer's representative
capacity. The Code does not delineate what proof is necessary to "other-
wise establish" between the parties that the signer is not personally liable
on an instrument which he intended to sign only in a representative ca-
pacity. Therefore, the general principles of law and equity are to be ap-
plied. Section 1.103. In Seale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1974),
this Court had occasion to construe Section 3.403(b). We there stated
that, in order for an agent to avoid liability on his signature, "he must
disclose his intent to sign as a representative to the other party." 505
S.W.2d at 255. We also recognized that prior dealings between the par-
ties are relevant in determining whether the parties understood the sig-
nature to be in a representative capacity. 261
The same court that decided Strickland v. Coleman262 also decided the
cases of Litton v. Hanley263 and Simmons v. Compania Financing Libano.264
In Strickland, the court distinguished Broaddus,265 but in Litton and Sim-
mons the same court followed Broaddus.
Litton and Hanley were owners of a corporation that operated an unsuc-
cessful restaurant business. They engaged in a dispute ending with Hanley
purchasing Litton's interest. In exchange for Litton's stock in the corpora-
tion, Hanley agreed to make certain tax payments and executed and deliv-
ered to Litton a promissory note payable in fifty-eight monthly installments.
When Hanley failed to make any payments on the note, Litton sued to col-
lect. Hanley pled lack of consideration and failure of a condition precedent
in defense of the suit and was able to introduce parol evidence at the trial in
support of his defense. He contended that Litton induced him to sign the
note by representing that his payment was contingent upon the success of
the restaurant after Hanley took over its business. Litton, of course, denied
making any such agreement.
The court addressed the issues as follows:
It is well settled that a written instrument may not be varied by evi-
dence of an oral agreement that contravenes its terms. However, parol
evidence is admissible to show (1) that the execution of a written agree-
ment was procured by fraud, (2) that an agreement was not to become
effective except upon certain conditions or contingencies, or (3) to as-
certain the parties' true intentions, where the writing is ambiguous. If
the written instrument is worded so that it can be given a certain defi-
nite meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous, and the court
will construe the contract as a matter of law.266
Under the fraud exception the court held that the payee must have used
"trickery, artifice or device" and represented that the maker would not be
261. Mestco Distributors, Inc., 824 S.W.2d at 681.
262. 824 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
263. 823 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
264. 830 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
265. 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978).
266. Litton, 823 S.W.2d at 430 (citations omitted).
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personally liable. 267 The only evidence that Hanley introduced was that Lit-
ton represented to him that he would be liable on the note only if the restau-
rant succeeded. That evidence did not rise to the level required to show
fraud in the inducement and allow introduction of parol evidence. 26 8
If an agreement existed that Hanley would be liable only if the restaurant
succeeded, then the success of the restaurant would have been a condition
subsequent, not a condition precedent. A condition subsequent extinguishes
an existing agreement, whereas a condition precedent delays the formation
of an agreement until the contingency occurs.269 The note given by Hanley
to Litton was given in consideration for the transfer by Litton to Hanley of
Litton's stock in the corporation and was effective at that time. The agree-
ment alleged by Hanley was a condition subsequent and, according to the
court, parol evidence of its existence was not admissible. 270 Finally, the
court believed that the terms of the promissory note were not ambiguous and
parol evidence of the parties' intent should not be admitted when the lan-
guage of the instrument is clear and unambiguous. 271
The parties to the suit in Simmons v. Campanio Financeria Libano272 were
the maker of the note and the pledgor of collateral for the note. The
pledgor, after his collateral was applied to the note, sued the maker on a
suretyship theory. The maker asserted that he and the pledgor were part-
ners, but the court of appeals, based on Broaddus, held that the parol evi-
dence rule prohibited the use of parol evidence to alter the terms of the
agreement. 273 Therefore, the maker could not prove any collateral agree-
ments and was liable to the pledgor.
Consistent with Litton and Simmons was the holding by the Fifth Circuit
in Rosas v. United States Small Business Administration.274 Rosas brought
suit against Meadowbrook National Bank, its president, and the United
States Small Business Administration alleging, among other things, negli-
gent misrepresentation. The claim of negligent misrepresentation dealt with
the allegation that Meadowbrook verbally agreed to a twenty year payout on
the promissory note even though the promissory note, by its explicit terms,
required a fifteen year payout. The district court granted summary judg-
ment, concluding that the testimony necessary to support this allegation was
inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.27 5 On appeal, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule applied so that the
testimony was admissible. The Fifth Circuit followed Texas law, which re-
quires that a person seeking to utilize the fraud exception to the parol evi-




270. Id. at 431.
271. Id.
272. 830 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston (st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
273. Id. at 791.
274. 964 F.2d 351 (5th Cir.1992).
275. Id. at 354.
276. Id. at 356.
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The plaintiff is required to show some type of trickery, artifice or device
employed by the bank in addition to the misrepresentation. 277
3. Payment
Payment to a lender by a private mortgage insurer in accordance with the
provisions of the insurance contract does not constitute payment on the
note. This issue was raised and disposed of by the court in Pineda v. PMI
Mortgage Insurance Company.278 According to the court, the payment by
PMI to the lender was pursuant to its insurance policy issued to the lender,
not to Pineda. It was not a payment on behalf of Pineda because Pineda was
not the insured. 279 Texas Insurance Code section 21.50 allows only lenders
to be insured by mortgage insurance. 280
The maker of a note in Rea v. Sunbelt Savings28 1 was not allowed to raise
the defense of payment because of his failure to comply with the procedural
requirements of Rule 95 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 282 Payment
is an affirmative defense, and Rule 95 requires the defendant to plead specifi-
cally the nature of the payment and the several items thereof.283 Evidence
regarding payment becomes inadmissible if not properly pled.284 In this
case, the maker pled the defense of payment only in general terms, and the
court required the maker to specify what credits and offsets he was relying
on.
285
Although not a Texas case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico was faced
with deciding whether, under Texas law, a borrower who was liable for in-
terest only could tender the collateral to the lender in payment of the debt
thereby discontinuing any liability for interest that would otherwise accrue
in the future.286 In Brown, the borrower executed a five-year real estate lien
promissory note, a deed of trust, and a guaranty in which the borrower only
guaranteed payment of interest accruing on the note and certain costs, and
the lender agreed not to look to the borrower for the payment of the princi-
pal. The note provided for monthly interest-only payments during the five-
year period. Upon maturity, all outstanding principal plus any unpaid inter-
est was due. The borrower transferred its interest in the property to a part-
nership of which the borrower was the managing general partner. The
partnership tendered a special warranty deed to the property along with
other pertinent documents to a trustee for the lender with an amount of
money representing all interest due under the note through three days after
the tender. The lender rejected the tender and several weeks later the part-
277. Id.
278. 843 S.W. 2d 660 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
279. Id. at 665.
280. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.50 (Vernon 1981).
281. 822 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
282. Id. at 373.
283. TEX. R. Civ. P. 95 (Vernon 1979).
284. Id.
285. Rea, 822 S.W.2d at 373.
286. See Brown v. Financial Savings, 828 P.2d 412 (N.M. 1992) (deciding the case under
Texas law pursuant to terms of the note, deed of trust and guaranty).
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nership tendered to the lender a special warranty deed to the property with
all interest due through the date of maturity of the note. This was also re-
jected by the lender. The court held that the borrower could not tender the
real property without the express consent of the lender and stated "that ab-
sent an agreement to the contrary, tender of payment in a medium other
than provided in the note will not constitute valid legal tender. ' 287 A tender
is an unconditional offer by a borrower to pay "in current coin of the realm"
a sum not less than the amount due on a specific debt. 288 Without an agree-
ment to the contrary, requiring a maker of a promissory note to repay with
money is the common commercial practice. 289
4. When a Demand Note is not a Demand Note
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Conte v. Greater Houston Bank29° in Bank
One, Texas v. Taylor.29' In the case before the Fifth Circuit, each note con-
tained a monthly payment schedule, an acceleration clause, and a demand
clause. The demand clause stated that "this obligation is, as an alternative
to the above-recited payment schedule, due and payable on demand. '29 2
The notes also contained an acceleration clause entitling the bank to acceler-
ate payment "if default occurs in the punctual payment of any installment of
principal or interest. ' 293 The court held that the provisions dealing with
default and acceleration indicated that the instrument was not a demand
note, but rather the note was an instrument that was payable upon demand
only if the obligor failed to meet the installment obligations. 294 The court in
Bank One, Texas specifically distinguished Conte, where it was held that the
language "[payable] on demand, but if no demand is made: principal and
interest shall be due and payable in monthly installments" created a demand
instrument that was due at anytime upon the demand of the holder.29 5 The
intention manifested by the wording of the notes that they only became pay-
able on demand if Taylor failed to meet installment obligations distinguishes
the notes from those in Conte.296
5. Reasonableness of Exercising Acceleration and Insurity Clauses
In Hall v. R TC297 the borrower requested that the lender accept different
collateral in substitution of existing collateral. The lender rejected the bor-
rower's proposal. Expressing concern about the declining value of the ex-
isting collateral and other events, the lender exercised its rights under the
287. Id. at 414 (quoting Arguelles v. Kaplan, 735 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1987, writ ref'd, n.r.e.)).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. 641 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
291. 970 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1992).




296. Id. at 32.
297. 958 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1992).
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security agreement to call for additional collateral. In response to this, the
borrower stopped making loan payments. The court noted at the outset that
under Texas law, "undisputed evidence of a significant impairment in the
prospect of satisfaction of a debt establishes, as a matter of law, the reasona-
bleness of invoking insecurity provisions under a security/loan agree-
ment. '298 Since the evidence was undisputed that the borrower himself had
provided information to the lender that the stock pledged by the borrower
had dramatically declined in value, the lender's decision to call for more
collateral was objectively reasonable and consistent with the terms of the
agreement. 299
In finding sufficient evidence that the lender did not act in good faith in
accelerating the payment of a note, the Waco court of appeals noted in
American Bank v. Waco Airmotive, Inc. 30 that the creditor's security is pro-
tected from impairment by the acts of debtors through the use of accelera-
tion clauses.30' Such clauses are not to be used for the commercial
advantage of the creditor because acceleration is a harsh remedy.30 2 Analy-
sis of whether acceleration is in good faith is performed on a case-by-case
basis.30 3 Presumably, the court based its acceleration decision on the fact
that the lender was aware of essentially all the facts leading to the accelera-
tion at the time the lender accepted the note from the borrower in renewal of
existing debt. The court also noted that the borrower's proposal for substi-
tution of collateral did not satisfy the call for additional collateral.
6. Novation
The rule in Texas regarding novation of original indebtedness by the exe-
cution of a renewal note is well settled and was accurately stated by the
court in Allied Elevator, Inc. v. East Texas State Bank:3°4
[T]he giving of a new note for a debt evidenced by a former note does
not extinguish the old note unless such is the intention of the parties.
Nor is there a presumption of the extinguishment of the original paper
by the execution and delivery of a new note. The burden of proving a
novation is on the person asserting it. . . . When renewal notes are
involved, the holder may sue either on the original note or on the re-
newal note.305
The holder of the note sought a judgment on the original note, rather than
the renewal note, because the makers had a possible defense to the renewal
note. Because the original note in this case was stamped "CANCELLED
BY RENEWAL" and the bank sent a past due notice for the renewal note,
the court was unable to say that no fact issue existed for summary judgment
298. Id. at 78.
299. Id.
300. 818 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ denied).
301. Id. at 172.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 965 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1992).
305. Id. at 37 (citations omitted).
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purposes.3° 6 That evidence alone was sufficient to create a material issue of
fact as to whether a novation occurred. 30 7
7. Missing Endorsements
Because of the frequent receiverships of financial institutions in recent
years and the resultant transfer of assets from failed institutions to new insti-
tutions, servicing companies and others, it is not uncommon for notes that
were originally held by the failed institution to have missing endorsements in
their chains of title. This produces inevitable proof problems for the holder
who must sue to enforce collection. One such instance occurred in the case
of FDIC v. Selaiden Builders, Inc. 308 The FDIC sought to enforce two
promissory notes and the guaranties of those notes that were executed by
several individuals. The notes and guaranties passed through several hands
before landing with the FDIC. The endorsements on the notes did not track
the alleged history of the various transfers. The issue was whether the sum-
mary judgment proof sufficiently established that the FDIC was the owner
and holder of the notes. Affidavits of two employees of the FDIC to the
effect that the FDIC was the owner and holder of the notes was the basis on
which summary judgment was granted for the FDIC. 30 9
In RTC v. Camp310 the court acknowledged that mere possession of an
unendorsed note did not establish that the possessor was the owner and
holder.311 In order to create a material fact issue for purposes of summary
judgment, however, the person disputing the ownership of the note must
show some evidence of a legitimate fear that the possessor is not the owner
and holder of the note.31 2 In the Selaiden case, since one of the notes bore
an endorsement to an entity that was not in the chain of title, there was some
evidence of a legitimate fear that the FDIC was not the owner and holder.31 3
The FDIC argued that the endorsement merely failed to include the words
"Association" or "F.S.A." to make the endorsement accurately name a
party in the chain and that the entity actually named never existed. Had the
FDIC presented summary judgment evidence that the entity never existed,
then the court apparently would have upheld the summary judgment on
both notes.31 4
In Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Insurance Co. 315 Pineda argued that there was
no summary judgment proof of the transfer of the note to PMI's transferor.
The note was endorsed, however, directly to PMI, the party suing on the
note. This created an evidentiary presumption under sections 3.201 and
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. 973 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1992).
309. Id. at 1254-55.
310. 965 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1992).
311. Id. at 29.
312. Id.
313. Selaiden Builders, Inc., 973 F.2d at 1254.
314. Camp, 965 F.2d at 29.
315. 843 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
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3.202 of the Code that PMI was the owner of the note.316 Pineda failed to
meet the burden of controverting PMI's evidence of ownership of the
note. 317
I. LETTERS OF CREDIT
1. "Duly Honoring" a Draft as a Condition to the Issuer's Right of
Reimbursement
RTC v. Kimball318 involved three letters of credit, identical except that a
different person was the account party on each. A draft by the beneficiary of
the letters of credit was presented to the bank. The draft identified each
letter individually, and the bank honored the draft, apportioning the amount
of the draw equally among the three letters. Pursuant to agreement with the
account parties, the payer of the draft then sought reimbursement from the
account parties. The court held that under Texas law, the issuer of a letter
of credit duly honors a draft presented to it by a beneficiary when the draft
complies with the terms of the letter, without more.319 In addition, the
court held (i) that an account party has standing to raise the issue of whether
the draft was duly honored as a defense to the issuer's claim for reimburse-
ment, (ii) that the letters themselves need not be presented before any drafts
can be honored where the letter states that a draft may be drawn by present-
ing the letter, and (iii) that absent affirmative terms to the contrary in the
letters of credit, proration of the draw among the three letters as well as the
inclusion of the three letters on one draft was permissible. 320 The court
stated that as a general proposition, an issuer of a letter of credit must pay
the beneficiary without inquiry into the transaction between the beneficiary
and the account party. 32' Without regard to whether the issuer honored a
draft, an account party must generally reimburse the issuer upon demand.322
The court noted, however, that section 5.114(c) of the Code plainly makes
the right of reimbursement contingent upon the duly honoring of the draft by
the issuer. In order to interpret the term duly honored, the court looked to
sections 5.114(c) and (b)(2), which, according to the court, "absolves [the]
issuing bank from liability in the situation where it honors a draft despite
notice 'of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the
[draft]'. ' 323 The court stated that because the issuer's duty in honoring a
beneficiary's draft is limited to a facial examination of the draft, then the
issuer's statutory right of reimbursement merely requires that the issuer
make payment only on presentations of drafts that conform with the require-
ments of the letter of credit.324 The court supported its analysis with the
316. Id. at 666.
317. Id.
318. 963 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1992).
319. Id. at 825.
320. Id. at 825-26.
321. Id. at 823.
322. Id.




language of section 5.109(b), which describes the issuer's duty to carefully
examine drafts in order to ascertain that on their face they comply with the
terms of the letter of credit.3 25 Having satisfied this duty, the issuer assumes
no liability or responsibility for the legitimacy of the documents. 326 Regard-
ing whether an account party has standing to raise the defense of wrongful
honor, the court stated that the plain terms of section 5.114(c) make it clear
that the account party has such standing. 327
2. Injunctions
Pursuant to section 5.114(b)(2) of the Code, the Amarillo court of appeals
confirmed that there are three grounds upon which a court can enjoin the
issuer of a letter of credit from honoring a draft.328 Those grounds are: (1)
where the beneficiary has committed fraud; (2) where one of the requisite
documents is forged; and (3) where there is some defect not apparent on the
face of the documents. 329 In Goldome, a bank issued a letter of credit to
Goldome Credit Corporation authorizing it to draw $150,000 against Uni-
versity Square's account. A few days later, Goldome's lawyer presented to
the bank documentation necessary for payment under the letter of credit. In
the meantime, University Square obtained a temporary restraining order en-
joining the bank from honoring the letter of credit because it was concerned
that Goldome no longer existed and thus it might have to pay twice. A
temporary injunction was later granted based on evidence that the press re-
ported that Goldome Savings Bank, Goldome's parent, had been seized by
the FDIC. In this case the issue is whether the exercising party is Goldome
or an authorized agent, not whether the false statement related to the con-
tractual duty or whether University Squares was obligated to pay Goldome.
Even though this fact might not reach the level of fraud, which would de-
stroy the underlying agreement, denying the injunction would risk subject-
ing University Square to double payment on the debt, destroying the
legitimate purposes of the bank's obligation to honor the letter of credit, and
this doubt was sufficient to allow the court to enjoin the issuer based on a
defect not apparent on the fact of the documents. 330 The court also noted
that while under similar circumstances "a trial court may enjoin present-
ment of a letter of credit, the issuing bank 'acting in good faith may honor
the demand for payment despite notification from its customer of fraud, for-
gery or other defects not apparent on the face of the documents.' ",331
325. Id.
326. Id. at 824-25.
327. Id. at 825.
328. Goldome Credit Corp. v. Univ. Square Apartments, 828 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1992, no writ).
329. Id. at 509.
330. Id. at 509-10.
331. Id. at 511 (citations omitted).
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J. ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS
1. Repossession - Breach of Peace
By a sharply split five to four vote, the Supreme Court of Texas held that
section 9.503 of the Code imposes a nondelegable duty on a secured party
pursuing nonjudicial repossession to do so without breaching the peace. 332
The facts of the case were so egregious that they possibly influenced the
outcome. MBank hired an independent contractor to repossess an automo-
bile. The owner confronted the contractor and demanded that the contrac-
tor cease its efforts to repossess the car. When the contractor refused to do
so, the owner jumped into the car and locked the doors. The contractor
proceeded to tow the car, at a high rate of speed, to the tow yard. The car
was parked inside a fenced area, behind a padlocked gate and with a
Doberman pinscher guard dog roaming loose in the yard. The owner of the
car was ultimately rescued by her husband and the police. The court framed
the issue as an attempt by a lender to avoid responsibility, which foretold the
answer it would ultimately reach: "The issue in this case is whether a se-
cured creditor may avoid liability for breaches of the peace by using an in-
dependent contractor to carry out repossession. ' '333
The majority of the court relied upon section 424 of the SECOND RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS to state the general rule as follows: "when a duty is
imposed by law on the basis of concerns for public safety, the party bearing
the duty cannot escape it by delegating it to an independent contractor. ' '334
The Restatement actually states the general proposition that one cannot
delegate a duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety
of others. 335 Section 9.503 of the Code does not set forth specified safe-
guards or precautions for the safety of others. 336 The Code imposes a gen-
eral standard instead, leaving the specifics to be established by case law.337
2. Duty of Preservation of Collateral
Section 9.207 of the Code imposes the duty upon a secured creditor to
"use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in his pos-
session. ' 338 The Official Comment indicates that the duty is the same as the
duty imposed by common law.339 The court of appeals recently construed
the language of section 9.207 in Roquemore v. National Bank of Com-
merce.34 The court held, with respect to stocks held as loan collateral, that
the bank did not breach its duty by failing to sell the stock when its value
332. MBank El Paso, N.A. v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 151-52 (Tex. 1992).
333. Id. at 152.
334. Id. at 153.
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965).
336. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
337. MBank El Paso, N.A., 836 S.W.2d at 154.
338. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
339. Id. at comment 1 (citing RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 17-18 (1941), which states,
"[duty is] confined to physical care of the chattel, whether an objectionor a negotiable instru-
ment or document of title.").
340. 837 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
19931
SMU LAW REVIEW
began to decline. 34 1
In United States of America v. Alphagraphics Franchising, Inc.,342 the
Small Business Administration (SBA) acquired a loan by performing on its
guaranty. Two significant pieces of collateral that it had in its possession
were held for two years before they were sold. In the meantime, the collat-
eral was not maintained by the SBA and deteriorated. When the SBA sued
the guarantor under its guaranty for the deficiency, the guarantor raised as a
defense the fact that the SBA failed to maintain the collateral during the
period before it was sold, resulting in a lower price than could have been
received had the collateral been maintained. The SBA countered by citing
the terms of the guaranty, which provided that the SBA was not responsible
for any "deterioration, waste, or loss by fire, theft or otherwise of any of the
collateral, unless such deterioration, waste, or loss be caused by the willful
act or willful failure to act of [the SBA]. ' 343
The evidence established that the decline in the price of the collateral was
caused by the failure of the SBA to maintain it. In order to succeed, how-
ever, the guarantor also was required to prove that the decline in the price of
the collateral was caused by the willful failure of the SBA to act due to the
provisions of the guaranty.344 The court held that the SBA was not respon-
sible for the deterioration because there was no evidence that it failed to
maintain the collateral with the intent to cause it harm.345 The word willful
requires a showing of an act done with an intent to bring about the deteriora-
tion of the property.346
3. Commercial Reasonableness of Foreclosure
In Greathouse v. Charter National Bank,347 the bank sued the borrower
and guarantor for the deficiency, interest, and attorney's fees resulting from
the foreclosure and sale of collateral securing a note. In its pleadings, the
lender pled generally that "All conditions precedent had been performed or
have occurred. All just and lawful credits, payments and offsets have been
allowed. '' 348 The debtor answered with a general denial.
The Supreme Court held that a creditor must plead commercially reason-
able disposition of collateral in a deficiency action. 349 The court held that
commercially reasonable disposition was a condition to recovery because the
creditor usually controls the disposition.350 Since the reasonableness of dis-
position is not generally at issue, the creditor must specifically plead com-
mercial reasonableness or generally aver that all conditions precedent were
341. Id. at 216-17.
342. 973 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1992).
343. Id. at 130 (emphasis in original).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 431.
346. Id. at 430.
347. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1017 (July 1, 1992).
348. Id.




performed. 351 The creditor must prove reasonableness under a specific plea,
but only needs to prove reasonableness under a general plea if the debtor
denies the disposition was reasonable. 352
The Texarkana court of appeals in Roquemore,353 in addition to following
Greathouse, held that the requirement that a secured creditor dispose of the
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner is a condition to its recovery
of a deficiency.3 54 Transfer to a holder in due course does not extinguish the
commercially reasonable disposition defense.355 In addition the court held
that a sale of stock can be commercially reasonable even if not sold at the
most advantageous time.35 6 The fact that a better price could have been
obtained at a different time or in a different manner is not sufficient, standing
alone, to establish that the disposition was not commercially reasonable. 357
The court also noted, that the Fifth Circuit has held the sale of collateral on
a recognized market commercially reasonable as a matter of law under the
Code.358
4. Deposit Accounts
a. Equitable Exception to Enforcement of Consensual Security Interest
In FDIC v. Golden Imports, Inc. 359 the court considered whether the equi-
table exception to a bank's common law right of offset against a borrower's
deposit account is also applicable to a bank's right to enforce a consensual
security interest in a deposit account. The bank in this case applied funds in
its borrower's account to the borrower's debt. A third party sued the bank
for conversion, claiming that at least a portion of the funds that were offset
belonged to it. According to the court, a conversion is
unlawful exercise of dominion, ownership or control by one party over
the property of another to the exclusion of the exercise of the same
rights by the owner, either permanently or for an indefinite time.
Money is the subject of conversion only when it can be described specif-
ically, as opposed to discharging a debt by payment of money generally.
When a person designates a particular use for proceeds from a check,
those proceeds are specific money capable of conversion. 360
Texas recognizes an equitable exception that is applicable to the bank's
right to setoff the funds on deposit in the account, whether the bank is exer-
cising its common law right or is acting as a secured creditor holding a se-
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Roquemore v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 837 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1992, no writ).
354. Id. at 214.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 215.
358. Id.
359. No. 01-88-00307-CV, 1991 WL 204175 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] Oct. 10,
1991).
360. Id. at 2.
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curity interest in the account. 361 That being so, the bank was charged with
the duty of inquiring as to the ownership of the funds and, once offset, would
be required to pay the funds over to the rightful owner, unless the bank had
changed its position to its detriment.362 Further, even though the parties
seemed to have an honest dispute over the bank's right to the funds relative
to the claimants' right, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to
show that the bank acted with malice and was, therefore, subject to punitive
damages. 363 The only evidence of malice suggested, at best, a knowing con-
version, but the court held that malice can be implied from a knowing
conversion. 364
b. Equitable Exception to Right of Offset
The equitable exception rule was also discussed and applied in a common
law offset case. 365 According to that court, in reliance upon National In-
demnity Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank,366 the equitable exception to setoff
requires a bank to return setoff funds it would otherwise be entitled to keep,
despite the fact that the bank had no notice that the funds were held in
trust. 367 The court noted that the exception is not limited to funds held
pursuant to an express trust, but that it applies to any funds held in a fiduci-
ary capacity. 368 The court relied on Indemnity Co. for the rule that a bank
may not apply funds held in trust to the individual debt of the depositor if
there has been no detrimental change in the bank's position and no superior
equities have been raised in its favor.369 In Indemnity Co., the bank had no
knowledge that funds in its depositor's account were held in trust. Never-
theless, the supreme court held that the equitable exception applied and that
the funds must be returned by the bank.370 Detrimental reliance is a defense
to the equitable exception and here it appeared that the bank had detrimen-
tally relied on its right to setoff because the bank obtained a judgment
against the depositor on the underlying debt less the amount of the offset.
The bank failed, however, to present this issue to the trial court and could
not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Thus, under the facts of this
case, had the bank properly raised the defense of detrimental reliance, it
could have kept the setoff funds.
c. Improper Pledge
In Cushman v. RTC371 the bank allowed a husband to pledge accounts
361. Id. at 3.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 7.
364. Id.
365. First Nat'l Bank v. Arrow Oil & Gas, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1991, no writ).
366. 348 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1961).
367. See National Indemnity Co., 348 S.W.2d at 531.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. National Indemnity Co., 348 S.W.2d at 531.
371. 954 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1992).
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that were in the names of the husband and the wife. They were each "and"
accounts, rather than "or" accounts. Nevertheless, the bank permitted the
husband to pledge the accounts without the joinder of the wife and pro-
ceeded to foreclose on the accounts when the debt was not paid. Not sur-
prisingly, the court held that the pledges were invalid as were the
foreclosures. 372 In addition, the court did not allow the bank to recast the
foreclosures as offsets after the fact.373
d. Other Offset Cases
Mutuality of obligations is a requirement that must be met as a condition
to a bank's common law offset rights. In FDIC v. Projects American Corp. 374
the borrower was a corporation, but the depositor was a defined benefit pen-
sion plan maintained by the corporation. When the bank failed, the corpora-
tion attempted to have the deposit accounts of the pension plan offset against
its debt. The court held that there was no mutuality of obligations stating
that mutuality exists where debts are owing between the same parties in the
same right or capacity. 375 The debts must be such that the party asserting
setoff could maintain an action on the debt, while the other party could
claim his cause of action in the same suit as a setoff.376
The Austin court of appeals addressed the propriety of offsetting a bor-
rower's account in American Bank v. Waco Airmotive.377 The court noted
that the relationship of a bank to a general depositor is a debtor/creditor
contract which arises out of the depository contract. 378 Offset is authorized
by the nature of the relationship, assuming proof of the amount owed, but an
offset is not authorized without a mature or past-due debt owed by the de-
positor.379 A depositor's remedy for wrongful offset is an action for breach
of contract, and the remedy of return of the funds on deposit.380 The court
held that exemplary damages are not recoverable for wrongful offset because
a wrongful offset action is in the nature of a breach of contract action. 381
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court held in Bandy v. First State Bank 382 that a
bank does have an equitable right of setoff against assets of a decedent's
estate, whether or not it is solvent, without following the claims procedures
found in the Texas Probate Code.
5. Sufficiency of Security Agreement/Financing Statement
In Austin Area Teachers Federal Credit Union v. First City Bank-North-
372. Id. at 327.
373. Id.
374. 828 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
375. Id. at 773-74.
376. Id. at 774.
377. 818 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, writ denied).
378. Id. at 170.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 176.
382. 835 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1992).
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west Hills N.A. 3 8 3 a mother pledged a certificate of deposit she owned as
collateral for a loan to her son. The certificate of deposit was issued by the
credit union, and the loan to her son was made by the bank. The mother
executed an assignment and a consent to pledge. The assignment failed to
specify the account at the credit union being pledged by the mother, but the
notice of assignment (which was signed by the bank) and the acknowledg-
ment of the assignment (which was signed by an employee of the credit
union) both specified the certificate by number. The notice and the acknowl-
edgment were part of the assignment. In addition, the consent to pledge
specified the particular certificate of deposit. The acknowledgment, which
was signed by an employee of the credit union, stated that the mother could
not withdraw any money from the assigned account. Contrary to that prohi-
bition, the credit union allowed the mother to withdraw funds. When the
son defaulted on the loan, the bank asked the credit union to release the
certificate of deposit and sued the credit union for breach of contract when
the credit union was unable to comply with the request. The credit union
attacked the effectiveness of the assignment on five grounds:
1) it failed to designate the specific account being assigned
2) it purported to secure debt owed by the mother, not the son, and the
mother had no debt to the bank
3) the credit union employee who signed the acknowledgment had no
actual or apparent authority to do so
4) the certificate of deposit was not assignable by its terms
5) the bank had not perfected it security interest by taking possession of
the certificate of deposit
The court read the assignment as a whole, including the notice and ac-
knowledgment, which were part of the assignment, to find that the assign-
ment adequately described the account being assigned. As to the claim that
the assignment secured only debt of the mother, the court noted that the
assignment secured all debt, liability, and obligation of the mother at any
time owed to the bank. 384 The assignment and consent to pledge, in the
opinion of the court, became obligations of the mother to the bank the mo-
ment the son defaulted on the loan from the bank.385 Those obligations
were, therefore, secured by the assignment. Addressing the issue of the au-
thority of the credit union's employee, the court stated: "Actual authority of
an agent may arise as a result of conduct by the principal that intentionally
or negligently allows the agent to believe he or she has been given actual
authority to represent the principal. '386 In this case, the evidence regarding
the employee's work history and belief he was authorized supported the trial
court's implied finding. The court of appeals believed it was the credit
union's responsibility to ensure that proper personnel signed documents for
the credit union, not the bank's responsibility. 38 7 Because the credit union
383. 825 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
384. Id. at 799.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 799-800
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failed to provide convincing evidence that the certificate was not assignable
and because the assignment was acknowledged, the credit union also lost its
argument that the account could not be assigned. 388 Finally, because the
dispute was not between competing creditors claiming security interests in
the same collateral, but a dispute over the credit union's contractual obliga-
tions, the credit union's argument that the security interest of the bank was
not perfected was overruled.
The sufficiency of a financing statement to provide notice was the issue
between competing third parties in Continental Credit Corp. v. Wolfe City
National Bank.38 9 In that case, Mr. Summers was the sole shareholder of
Pawn Partners, Inc., which purchased Greenville Pawn Shop in January
1982. Days later, Pawn Partners, Inc. filed an assumed name certificate in
Hunt County to do business as Greenville Pawn Shop. In 1983, Mr. Sum-
mers married Judy Owen who had pre-existing loans and accounts with
Wolfe City National Bank. The Summers began doing business with Wolfe
City using their name Summers coupled with the trade name of "Greenville
Pawn Shop."
During the marriage, Mrs. Summers signed successive promissory notes
payable to Wolfe City as well as three security agreements placing the inven-
tory and accounts receivable of Greenville Pawn Shop as collateral for the
Notes. Wolfe City filed two financing statements, one with the Secretary of
State in Austin and one in Hunt County. In 1986, Continental Credit Cor-
poration (Continental) purchased the assets of Pawn Partners, Inc. d/b/a
Greenville Pawn Shop. Wolfe City National Bank claimed a superior inter-
est in the inventory and accounts receivable and made demand upon Conti-
nental. Continental refused to return any of the assets it had purchased or
the proceeds from the sale thereof. The court held that sufficient notice was
not given to Continental by the filing of financing statements in the name of
Judy Summers d/b/a Greenville Pawn Shop or Judy and Olan Summers
d/b/a Greenville Pawn Shop, since the corporation and actual owner's name
was Pawn Partners, Inc.390 Even though the requirements for a perfected
security interest allow minor errors, the errors must not be seriously mis-
leading. Therefore, the critical inquiry in assessing whether the creditor has
perfected a security interest is whether a reasonably prudent subsequent
creditor would have discovered the prior security interest. 391
6. Real Estate Foreclosures
a. Notice
In First National Bank Mansfield v. Nelson (In re Nelson)392 the court
held that the lender did not give proper notice of the foreclosure sale of
certain real estate, which was thus declared void, because the notice of fore-
388. Id. at 800.
389. 823 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
390. Id. at 691.
391. Id. at 690-92.
392. 134 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
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closure was posted in the late afternoon and the sale was conducted in the
morning, just a few hours shy of the twenty-one full day requirement for
notice.393 The Texas Property Code requires notice of foreclosure to be
given at least twenty-one days prior to the foreclosure sale.394 Under Texas
law a day means a twenty-four hour period; therefore, notice of the sale must
be posted, filed with the clerk, and deposited in the mail at least twenty-one
full twenty-four hour days prior to the sale to be valid. 395 Here, notice was
posted, filed, and mailed at approximately 4:00 p.m., and the sale was con-
ducted on the morning of the 21st day thereafter. The court held that notice
was insufficient. 396
Another court held that a real estate foreclosure sale was valid even
though the notice of substitute trustee's sale was signed by the first substitute
trustee but posted and filed by the second substitute trustee.3 97 The court
held a substitute trustee does not have to re-post notices of sale when the
notices have been properly posted by a former trustee.398 Each substitute
trustee had the authority to act when he acted. 399
b. Irregularities
A real estate foreclosure sale will not be set aside because the bid was
inadequate unless coupled with irregularities in the sale process that caused
or contributed to the inadequacy. In one case, irregularities sufficient to set
aside the sale included (1) the property was posted by a substitute trustee
hours before the substitute trustee was appointed; (2) the note was not in
default; and (3) the notice of sale erroneously set January 2, 1989, as the date
of sale, rather than January 2, 1990.4 w The bid price was approximately
10% of the value.
c. Post-Foreclosure Liability for Ad Valorem Taxes
The opinion in Vista Development Joint Venture II v. Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co.401 distinguished Smart v. Tower Land & Investment Co.402 on
the issue of liability for ad valorem taxes paid by the mortgagee after foreclo-
sure. In December 1981, Pacific Mutual made a five year loan to Vista so
Vista could purchase commercial real estate near El Paso. The loan was
made under a standard commercial promissory note that was secured by a
deed of trust. The deed of trust named Pacific as beneficiary. The loan only
required interest payments during the five year life with a repayment of prin-
cipal in December 1986. When Vista failed to pay the final installment, Pa-
393. Id. at 848.
394. TEX. PROp. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
395. In re Nelson, 134 B.R. at 847.
396. Id. at 848.
397. Davis Chevrolet Inc. v. Texoma Fin. Corp. (In re David Chevrolet, Inc.), 135 B.R. 29,
34 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. RTC v. C & E, Inc., No. MO-91-CA-002 (W.D. Tex. October 16, 1991).
401. 822 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
402. 597 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1980).
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cific gave the required notice, foreclosed its lien and sold the property
through a non-judicial foreclosure sale that left a deficiency. At the time of
foreclosure, 1985 and 1986 property taxes in the amount of $109,323 were
due and owing. Pacific sued Vista to recover the 1985 and 1986 property
taxes, the 1987 taxes that Pacific had paid, collection expenses, attorney's
fees and pre-judgment interest as provided for in the note. The non-recourse
provision of the note included the following specific exemption:
It is further understood and agreed, however, that nothing contained in
the preceding paragraphs shall in any manner or way release, affect or
impair:...
(vii) the right of the payee or other holder of this Note after the occur-
rence of such an Event of Default to recover from Maker the amounts
required to satisfy any taxes or other "Impositions" . . . with respect to
the Mortgaged Property which were due but not paid by the
Maker .... 403
The deed of trust also provided a similar exception from personal liability
as to:
(vii) the right of payee or other holder of this note after the occurrence
of such an event of default and during the pendency of such default to
recover from maker the amounts required to satisfy any taxes or other
impositions...404
The court held the note and deed of trust must be construed together and
the note's terms provided for recovery of a personal deficiency for unpaid
taxes against Vista, even though proceeds from the sale were first to be ap-
plied toward expenses, fees, and costs of foreclosures, then to payments of
impositions and other costs necessary to release liens against property, ex-
cept those extinguished by the sale.4o 5 The court distinguished Smart v.
Tower Land & Investment Company,4 6 cited by Vista as authority for the
proposition that personal tax liability will not accrue to a mortgagor when
reimbursement of tax liability is secured and payable similar to outstanding
debt according to the note and deed of trust.40 7 The court stated in Vista's
case the note and deed of trust contained exceptions to the general release of
the maker's liability for the indebtedness.4 8
Additionally, the court held that since Pacific was free to pursue any rem-
edy, its discharge of the tax lien and subsequent action under the personal
liability provision of the notes was proper. The court also stated:
[B]y the terms of the agreement, Pacific became equitably subrogated to
the taxing authority's liens when it paid the property taxes. Even
though the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship terminated upon foreclo-
sure, payment of the outstanding taxes was made under the terms of the
note, which specifically granted rights of recovery to the obligee.4 9
403. Vista Development, 822 S.W.2d at 307.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 307-08.
406. 597 S.W.2d at 333.
407. Vista Development, 882 S.W.2d at 307-08.
408. Id. at 307.
409. Id. at 308.
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Under Smart v. Tower Land & Investment Company, Pacific was not a mere
volunteer and thus was entitled to subrogation because Pacific was a "mort-
gagee and note holder and was conscientiously acting to preserve its title to
the subject property. ' 410 Therefore Pacific was not a stranger to the foreclo-
sure transaction.
d. Rights Transferred
In Lindsey v. FDIC411 the Lindseys owned land upon which a peanut al-
lotment was in effect. The bank foreclosed on the property, and the Lind-
seys sued seeking a declaratory judgment that they were the owners of the
allotment. The deed of trust securing the note with the bank did not refer to
the allotment. Additionally, the Lindseys did not orally or in writing reserve
ownership in the allotment at the time they granted the deed of trust.
Citing the general rule from Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. Norris,412
that where there is a transfer of ownership wherein the transferee acquires
an entire farm, he necessarily receives the farm's allotments, unless such al-
lotments are specifically reserved by the transferor, the court found that as
transferee of the entire Lindsey parcel of 516 acres the bank acquired the
peanut allotment along with the farm land. 413 Because under Combustion
Engineering the allotment runs with the land when a transfer involves all of
the land upon which the allotment is in effect, and because the bank had a
security interest in the entire parcel, the bank's security interest included the
allotment. 414 The court noted that "the allotment gave substantial value to
the farmland and consequently to the security interest to which the bank and
the Lindseys agreed."'415 The court found the allotment so important to the
security interest that to withdraw the interest would substantially impair the
bank's security interest. 416
K. LENDER LIABILITY
1. Usury
Although it is frequently stated by courts that the Texas usury statutes are
penal in nature and, therefore, should be strictly construed, a reading of
usury cases could lead one to believe that the courts often fail to follow that
directive. During the Survey period, on the other hand, the courts that con-
sidered usury cases seemed to be willing to apply the rule of strict construc-
tion and to take a more rational approach to what could be considered
technical violations. In addition, usury savings clauses were cited with in-
creasing frequency to save loan transactions from the terrible consequences
of violating the usury statutes.
410. Id. at 309.
411. 960 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1992).
412. 271 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. 1980).
413. Lindsay, 960 F.2d at 570.
414. Id.




a. Pleadings as the Basis for Charging Interest
At least insofar as a charge of prejudgment interest in a pleading is con-
cerned, the Texas Supreme Court held that it cannot be the basis for a usury
claim.417 Carpet Services, a sub-contractor to Fuller Company, sued Fuller
Company to recover sums owed to Carpet Services under its contract. In its
original petition, Carpet Services sought prejudgment interest on a portion
of the debt for a period before the debt was due. The trial court held that the
petition was a usurious charge of interest in excess of twice the legal rate.
The court of appeals reversed and held that a demand for usurious interest
in a pleading is not a usurious charge of interest. The supreme court af-
firmed the judgment of the court of appeals. 418
In this case, there was not an improper contract for interest, nor a situa-
tion where usurious interest was received. The sole issue was whether the
pleading for prejudgment interest was a charge. Since the statute does not
define what a charge of interest is, the court first looked to the declaration of
legislative intent. It provides that:
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this revision [of the statute
on interest] to protect the citizens of Texas from abusive and deceptive
practices now being perpetrated by unscrupulous operators, lenders and
vendors in both cash and credit consumer transactions . . . and thus
serve the public interest of the people of this State. 419
Because the legislature gave no indication that it intended the usury laws to
be applied to pleadings, nothing mandated a holding that pleadings can con-
stitute a charge of interest. 420
The supreme court then distinguished Moore v. Sabine National Bank,421
because in that case the combined statements of the creditor contained in the
notice of intention to repossess the collateral, its original petition, and its
sequestration affidavit together constituted a usurious charge of interest. 422
In discussing the purpose of pleadings, the court stated:
Usury statutes are designed to correct abusive practices in consumer
and commercial credit transactions, not to serve as a trap for the un-
wary pleader in a court proceeding. Pleadings serve to give a party
notice of the issues at trial. Murray v. 0 & A Express, Inc.423 Pleadings
are addressed to the court, and only demand that the court grant judg-
ment. There is no demand on the opposing party. 424
The court's holding was specifically limited to a claim for prejudgment
interest, since it arises from the judicial process itself, rather than directly
from a credit transaction, and a claim for prejudgment interest is best dealt
417. George A. Fuller Company v. Carpet Services, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992).
418. Id. at 605.
419. Act of May 23, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 24 § 1, 1967 Tex. Gen. Law 609 (declaring
legislative intent to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.06(1), (2)).
420. Fuller, 823 S.W.2d at 604.
421. 527 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd, n.r.e.).
422. Fuller, 823 S.W.2d at 605.
423. 630 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1982).




with in the judicial process.42
The Fifth Circuit expressly expanded the holding in Fuller in its opinion
in FSLIC v. Kral. 426 The court based its decision on the purpose of the
usury laws, which is to correct abusive practices in consumer and commer-
cial credit transactions, and the purpose of pleadings, which is to notify a
party of the issues at trial. 427 Although Fuller involved a claim for prejudg-
ment interest, the court determined that the policy arguments are consistent,
so long as the underlying documents are not usurious.428 The court stated:
if the underlying documents are not usurious, then irrespective of the
type of interest demanded in the pleadings, imposing a penalty for
usury, based solely on a demand made in a pleading or interrogatory
answer, does nothing to fulfill the purpose of usury law, which is to
correct abusive practices in consumer and commercial credit
transactions. 429
On the last day of 1992, the Texas Supreme Court issued a per curiam
opinion in Briones v. Solomon, 430 which, if anything, may indicate the
court's willingness to expand its holding in Fuller v. Carpet Services.431 Be-
cause the specifics as to the actual acts of charging interest were unclear, it is
difficult to read very much from the case. It is clear that the acts related to
letters written by the attorney for a judgment creditor to the judgment
debtor to collect on the judgment. The appellate court opinion does not
specify what the judgment debtor claimed was usurious about those letters.
Nevertheless, the supreme court, without approving or disapproving any
portion of the opinion of the court of appeals, held that a demand for post-
judgment interest arises from the judicial process and is not a charging under
the usury laws.
b. Other "Charging" Cases
The Austin court of appeals also considered what is meant by the provi-
sion of the usury statute that prohibits charging excessive interest. In the
case of McPherson Enterprises, Inc. v. Producers Cooperative Marketing Asso-
ciation, Inc. ,432 that court found that a claim for interest on an unliquidated
principal debt cannot be the basis for usury liability solely because the liqui-
dated principal amount is less than the unliquidated amount claimed. In
other words, at least in the case of a good faith disagreement regarding the
amount owed, the lender does not violate the usury statute by demanding
425. Fuller, 823 S.W.2d at 605.
426. 968 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1992).
427. Id. at 504.
428. Id.
429. Id.; see also, Sumrall v. Navistar Financial Corporation, 818 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont, 1992, writ denied) (decided before the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in
George A. Fuller Co.); RTC v. Ammons, 836 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ); First South Savings Association v. First Southern Partners, II, Ltd., 957 F.2d
174 (5th Cir. 1992).
430. 842 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1992).
431. 823 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1992).
432. 827 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1992, no writ).
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the higher unliquidated amount, even if the liquidated amount is determined
to be less.433
In the case in point, Ronnie and Suzanne McPherson owned McPherson
Enterprises, Inc., which purchased Bandera Feed and Garden Supply. In
connection with the purchase, the corporation assumed certain debt owing
to Producers. Later, when the corporation had difficulty paying the debt,
the McPhersons transferred to Producers a promissory note that was owing
to them individually. Although the note was for an amount less than the
amount owed by the corporation to Producers, the McPhersons asserted
that the agreement of the parties was that the note would be accepted in full
satisfaction of the corporate debt. Producers, however, disagreed and sued
the McPhersons for the difference between the amount of the debt owing by
the corporation and the amount of the note transferred to Producers. Before
doing so, Producers mailed the corporation a bill for the full amount owed,
plus interest. In addition to the McPhersons' denial of personal liability for
the corporate debt, the corporation raised a usury claim on the ground that
the interest calculated on the full principal amount exceeded the maximum
lawful amount that could be charged on the true, lesser amount.
The McPhersons cited Steves Sash & Door Co. v. Ceco Corp.,434 in their
support. The Austin court of appeals, to the contrary, found support for its
holding that the actions of Producers were not usurious in the following
statement from the supreme court's opinion: "Interest and principal are syn-
ergistic words which imply one another, and by necessity principal must be
the amount that is used, forborne, or detained, and upon which the interest
is charged. '435
The rate of interest used by Producers was a lawful rate, but it was applied
to the wrong principal amount. According to the court, the only complaint
the corporation could have is that Producers charged too much principal.436
By focusing on the synergism between the principal amount of a debt and
the interest on that principal amount, the court held that the charge was not
usurious.437 In the opinion of the court, the amount of interest claimed
could not be divorced from the incorrect principal amount on which it was
calculated and then transferred to the proper principal amount that was
owed in order to result in a usurious claim.438 To do so would mean any
claim of interest on an unliquidated principal amount would be subject to
claims of usury.
In Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Commercial Federal Bank,439 the lender ac-
celerated the payment of the note and demanded payment of principal, inter-
est, and a prepayment penalty, which was payable in accordance with the
terms of the note whether the prepayment was voluntary or involuntary.
433. Id.
434. 751 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1988).




439. 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1992, no writ).
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The borrower's claim that the lender charged usurious interest was based on
the argument that the accelerated balance is a separate contract on which
the prepayment penalty would have been interest. Had the borrower paid
the balance one day after it was accelerated, together with the prepayment
penalty, the entire penalty would have been interest for one day only and
would have exceeded the lawful amount of interest that could have been
charged for that day. The court failed to cite or discuss earlier cases ad-
dressing the usury issues related to prepayment penalties as applied to volun-
tary prepayments 440 and failed to make clear whether it was holding that a
prepayment penalty applied to an involuntary prepayment is "interest" as
defined under Texas law or a penalty for the loss of originally contracted for
interest on the initial loan.441 The court characterized the prepayment pen-
alty as the latter but then applied the spreading doctrine and the savings
clause in determining that the charge was not usurious. 442 If the prepay-
ment penalty was, in fact, a penalty and not interest, as defined under Texas
law, which the court seemed to say, then it would not have been necessary to
apply either the spreading doctrine or the savings clause to determine that
the loan was not usurious as a result of the application of the penalty
provision.
c. Unauthorized Charges
The issue of unauthorized charges as a basis for usury came before at least
two courts. The first, Sunwest Bank of El Paso v. Gutierrez,443 involved the
improper addition to the loan of a premium for vendor single interest insur-
ance (VSI). The portion of the note that would have required the borrower
to maintain insurance had not been completed. When the borrower failed to
provide evidence of insurance, the lender purchased VSI and added it to the
note amount, an entry that was later reversed when the borrower provided
evidence of insurance and protested the charge. Despite the reversal, the
borrower sued the lender. According to the court, in order to be usurious,
the bank must have made an excessive charge for the use, forbearance, or
detention of money. 444 If the VSI charge was not for the use, forbearance,
or detention of money, then it was not interest. If it was not interest, then it
could not be usurious. The court relied upon the supreme court opinion in
Texas Commerce Bank -Arlington v. Golding,445 for the proposition that "a
lender [can] impose [a] fee which entitles a borrower to a distinctly separate
and additional consideration, apart from the lending of money, [and which]
is not and cannot be the basis of usury. ' '" 6 VSI is a distinctly separate and
additional consideration. It provides the borrower the separate and addi-
440. See, e.g., Bearden v. Tarrant Say. Ass'n, 643 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth
1982, writ refd, n.r.e.) and the cases cited in that opinion.
441. Affiliated Captial Corp., 834 S.W.2d at 525-26.
442. Id. at 526.
443. 819 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
444. Id. at 675.
445. 665 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1984).
446. Sunwest Bank, 819 S.W.2d at 675.
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tional consideration of the payment of the debt if the collateral is damaged
or destroyed. The fact that the VSI was unauthorized did not cause the
premium charge to become interest.44 7
In a case that may be far more important, Brazosport Bank of Texas v.
Oak Park Townhouses,44 8 the lender made a loan in connection with which it
charged the borrower a "non-refundable commitment fee equal to
$35,000.00 as consideration for the issuance of" the commitment. Later, the
lender renewed the loan and charged the borrower an additional two percent
fee. The borrower claimed that the fees were unlawful loan fees by virtue of
the provisions of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.. art. 342-508449 and that the
collection of interest in addition to the loan fees was usurious. The court
read that statute to prohibit banks from charging fees for the granting of a
loan unless the fees are authorized by law.450 Charges that are authorized
by law and not in violation of art. 342-508 include interest, bona fide com-
mitment fees, and the fees expressly permitted by art. 342-508. 451 If the
disputed charges were interest or an authorized charge, then the lender
would not have violated the provisions of art. 342-508.452
The statute does not include a penalty for a violation, so the court first
concluded that the penalty would be the disallowance of the fee, as opposed
to the penalties imposed on a usurious loan. 453 The court next addressed the
nature of the fees to see if they were authorized by law or not. The court
upheld the trial court's finding that the first fee violated art. 342-508 and
disallowed the fee because the evidence regarding the fee, did not establish it
was a commitment fee or interest, either of which would have been an
autorized charge. 454 Because the evidence established that the second fee
was actually interest, it was an authorized charge and did not violate the
statute.455
447. Id.
448. 837 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
449. TEx. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-508 (Vernon 1977). At the time in question, Art.
342-508 provided: "No bank shall charge or collect any loan fee or any other charge, by
whatever name called, for the granting of a loan unless authorized by law. Provided, however,
a bank may require an applicant for a loan or discount to pay the cost of any abstract, attor-
ney's opinion or title insurance policy, or other form of insurance, and filing or recording fees
or appraisal fee. Expenses necessary or proper for the protection of the lender, and actually
incurred in connection with the making of the loan may be charged. In all loan transactions in
which the amount loaned is $100.00 or more and the loan period is one month or more, a bank
may charge any borrower the reasonable value of services rendered in connection with the
making of any loan, including the drawing of notes, the taking of acknowledgements and affi-
davits, the preparation of financial statements, and the investigation or analysis of the financial
responsibility of the borrower or any endorser, surety or co-signer in an amount agreed upon,
but not to exceed $15.00 for each loan transaction, which shall be in lieu of all interest and
other charges which could otherwise be collected in connection with the loan."









A number of courts focused on contractual usury savings clauses to defeat
usury claims and in at least one of those cases, the savings clause was relied
upon even against a plausible argument that the loan document was usurious
on its face. 456 The first court to give effect to a savings clause during the
survey period did so in a case in which the borrower argued that somehow
the existence of more than one prime rate caused the loan to be usurious. 457
Since usury is a matter of intention and the savings clause expressed the
intent of the parties, it was given effect to correct any inadvertent or uninten-
tional charges.458 The Fifth Circuit also applied a savings clause in Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Claycomb.45 9
In First South Savings Association v. First Southern Partners, II, Ltd. ,46
the lender made demand upon guarantors of a note jointly and severally for
payment in full, even though each guarantor was contractually obligated to
pay only one-half of the principal amount outstanding. When payment was
not made, the lender sued the guarantors for full payment. In addition to
other grounds for denying relief, the court believed that the guarantors were
sophisticated businessmen and treated the erroneous demand and complaint
as automatically remedied by the savings clause. 461
Finally, FSLIC v. Kral, may be authority that a savings clause might
work, although the loan is usurious on its face, if the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction justify applying the savings clause. 462 Kraj argued
that the note was usurious on its face because it called for interest to be
calculated on a 360 day basis and provided for default interest at the rate of
18% per annum. This, according to Kralj, also provided a contingency by
which the holder could receive more interest than that allowed by law. The
lender argued, in effect, that the note had to be read as a whole and that the
savings clause defeated a construction of the contract that would violate the
state usury laws, even though one clause of the note may charge excessive
interest. The court considered the authority that the mere presence of a
savings clause will not rescue a note that is usurious on its face but decided
that the savings clause should be given effect in light of the circumstances
surrounding the transaction.463 In this case, there was no evidence that the
lender actually charged usurious interest. In effect, the court is saying that a
note may be usurious on its face and the savings clause still given effect if the
circumstances surrounding the transaction justify doing so.464
456. FSLIC v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1992).
457. Edmondson v. First State Bank of Mathis, 819 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, no writ).
458. Id. at 606.
459. 945 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that usury saving clauses defeat usury defenses).
460. 957 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1992).
461. Id. at 178.
462. FSLIC v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1992).




e. Usury as a Defense to Guarantor Liability
The Fifth Circuit followed established Texas law in refusing to allow a
guarantor to raise usury as a defense to liability on the guaranty, so long as
the guaranty itself is not a usurious transaction.465 As previously described,
First South Savings was based, in part, upon an erroneous demand made
upon the guarantors jointly and severally for full payment, contrary to the
provisions of the guaranty, which limited their liability. Since the claim was
based upon a charging of usurious interest directly against the guarantors
and not a claim that the guaranteed loan was usurious as to the borrower,
one might expect the court to have been inclined, if not persuaded, to rule in
favor of the guarantors. Addressing the issue of the demand contained in
the letter, the court first considered the statutory definition of the term inter-
est as "compensation allowed by law for the use or forbearance or detention
of money."'4 66 Since only the borrower receives the use, forbearance, or de-
tention of money under a promissory note and not the guarantor, then a
demand upon the guarantor for amounts owed by the borrower is not a de-
mand for interest. 467 The court distinguished Houston Sash & Door Co., Inc.
v. Heaner,46 8 as a contracting for case and not a charging case since, in He-
aner, the guarantor had agreed in writing to pay interest on the debt at a
specified rate of interest exceeding the maximum lawful rate.
469
f. Hypothetical Events as a Basis for Usury
Borrowers frequently argue that even though no usurious interest was ac-
tually charged or received, the promissory note as written entitled the lender
to usurious interest under certain hypothetical occurrences. In other words,
even though the lender committed no overt usurious act, the borrower
claims that if a certain set of events had occurred (although it did not), then
the loan would have entitled the lender to excess interest and, therefore, the
promissory note is a contract for usurious interest. In Affiliated Capital
Corp. v. Commercial Federal Bank,4 70 the court also dealt with a borrower's
claim that a hypothetical default early in the life of the transaction could
have resulted in the acceleration of a relatively small amount of principal in
comparison to the large prepayment penalty and that the penalty would
have been usurious interest as calculated on the small amount of principal.
The court seemed to retreat from statements in existing cases dealing with
the possibility of contingencies which could result in usurious interest and
applied the savings clause to the hypothetical facts in holding it was not
usurious. 4 7 1 As stated by the court:
The [borrower] claims that the possibility of this contingency, although
it never occurred, makes the Note usurious on its face and cannot be
465. First South Savings, 457 F.2d at 174.
466. Id. at 177.
467. Id.
468. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979).
469. First South Savings, 957 F.2d at 177.
470. 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
471. Id. at 526.
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avoided by the savings clause in the Note which calls for a rebate of any
amount of interest which would be usurious. That is not the law of this
state. The law requires all provisions of a contract to be given full ef-
fect, and a provision that calls for the actual reduction of the interest
paid, down to a legal amount, saves a contract from being usurious on
its face.472
g. Federal Preemption
Moore v. United National Bank, 473 presented an interesting argument con-
struing the literal language of the federal preemption statute,474 and the in-
terest provisions of the National Bank Act.475 The latter statute allows a
national bank to receive interest at the higher of one percent over the dis-
count rate and interest allowed by the laws of the state where the bank is
located. 476 The statute goes on to say
except that where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for
banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed
for associations organized or existing in any such State under this chap-
ter. When no rate is fixed by the laws of the State ... the bank may
take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate not exceeding 7[%], or 1[%] in
excess of the discount rate.477
The federal preemption statute, on the other hand, preempts state ceilings on
certain loans secured by first liens on residential real estate. 478 The borrower
argued that no rate is fixed by state law because of the preemption statute.
Since no rate is fixed by state law, then section 85 limits a national bank to
the higher of seven percent or one percent over the discount rate. •
The court recognized that a literal reading of the statutes would require a
result different from its holding, but that a literal reading would be inconsis-
tent with the purposes of the law.479 The intent was to allow national banks
the ability to charge interest on loans at rates at least as high as those which
state banks could charge in the same state.480 Since state banks can charge
an unlimited rate of interest on the types of loans in question, then national
banks should be given the same privilege. 481
2. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Attempts by borrowers to hold lenders to a standard duty of good faith
and fair dealing took a beating during the survey period. Courts devoted
little discussion to the issue in Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Insurance Com-
472. Id.; see also Kralj, 968 F.2d at 502.
473. 821 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
474. 12 U.S.C. § 1735-7(a)(1) (West 1989).
475. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (West 1989).
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. 12 U.S.C. § 1735-7(a)(1) (West 1989).
479. Moore, 821 S.W.2d at 411.
480. Id.
481. Id. (citing Hiatt v. San Francisco National Bank, 361 F.2d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 948 (1966)); see also, Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., 843 S.W. 2d 660
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
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pany,482 Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Commercial Federal Bank483 and Hall v.
R TC.484 The courts followed existing Texas law, which does not recognize a
duty of good faith and fair dealing in every contractual relationship, unless a
special relationship exists between the parties.485 Absent a special relation-
ship, there is no duty of good faith and fair dealing in a debtor and creditor
relationship. 486
In Affiliated Capital, the lender refused to accept a proffered prepayment
at a time when the note did not permit prepayment. Shortly thereafter, the
lender accelerated payment and demanded collection of a prepayment pen-
alty. As to the issue of breach of a duty of good faith, the court found that
the insistence by one party upon strict adherence to the terms of a contract
cannot be the basis for the violation of a duty of good faith.48 7 The lender's
reason for refusing to accept prepayment when offered by the borrower was
irrelevant in this case because the lender had the contractual right to refuse
the offer, even if the reason given may have been false.488
Similarly, in Hall v. R TC, the borrower asked to substitute new collateral
for existing collateral, but the lender had no obligation to accept substitution
under the loan documents. The court rejected the borrower's attempt to
impose an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in this context based
on the fact that, "[u]nder Texas law, an 'agreement made by the parties and
embodied in the contract cannot be varied by an implicit covenant of good
faith and fair dealing'. ' 48 9 In addition, the court noted that there existed no
special relationship of the type recognized by Texas courts upon which to
base such a covenant under the circumstances. 490
3. Deceptive Trade Practices Act
To be a consumer entitled to bring an action under section 17.50 of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), one must seek to acquire
goods (including real estate) or services and the complaint must be about the
goods and services sought to be acquired. The Supreme Court of Texas held
that money is not goods under the DTPA in Riverside National Bank v.
Lewis.491 It is a currency of exchange that enables one to acquire goods.49 2
That being the case, one who merely seeks to borrow money and nothing
more is not a consumer under the DTPA. This principle has been used time
and again to shield banks from liability under the DTPA, but borrowers
482. 843 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.).
483. 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
484. 958 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1992).
485. Affiliated Capital, 834 S.W.2d at 527; Hall, 958 F.2d at 79.
486. Hall, 958 F.2d at 79.
487. Affiliated Capital, 834 S.W.2d at 527.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.; see also, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Kingston Inv. Corp., 819 S.W.2d
607 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
491. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980), on remand, 605 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. 1980).
492. Id. at 174.
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continue to attempt to tie the loaning of money to the acquisition of some
good or service as a way of breaking the shield.
In Henderson v. Texas Commerce Bank,493 the borrower claimed that he
was seeking not just a loan, but a complete banking relationship. However,
he did not produce evidence of any service he was seeking from the bank.
Further, even if he was seeking service and not simply a loan, he only com-
plained about the transaction regarding the loan. Therefore, he failed to
meet the test of a consumer under the DTPA. 494
The borrowers in Baskin v. Mortgage and Trust, Inc.49 5 tried to tie the
loans to the lender's activity as the servicer of the loans. Even if that was a
sufficient nexus, the court refused to apply the DTPA because no cause of
action arising from the lender's servicing activity was alleged. 496
In Affiliated Capital Corporation,497 the borrower made two claims under
the DTPA. The first, based on an alleged failure to disclose the lender's
rights under the note was disposed of by construing the terms of the note as
making the disclosure. The borrower apparently also argued that the ac-
tions of the lender in refusing prepayment when offered and shortly thereaf-
ter demanding prepayment at a time when the borrower was no longer able
to do so, was an unconscionable action in violation of the provisions of sec-
tion 17.50(a)(3) of the DTPA. The narrowly construed the transaction be-
tween th lender and the borrower as a contract to lean money. 498 The
borrower then used the money to build an apartment complex and mort-
gaged it to secure the loan. Because the borrower had only contracted with
the lender for the use of money and had received the use of money, the fact
that the lender's accelerates of the note and foreclosure of the apartment
complex may have deprived the borrower of the value of its investment did
not mean the lender had violated the DTPA.499 The court did not specifi-
cally address the rule that the mere lending of money, coupled with nothing
else, is not the sale or lease of a good or service. The result would have been
the same, however, had that rule been applied.
Another borrower claimed that the bid price paid by the lender at the
foreclosure sale under a deed of trust was grossly inadequate. 5°° Even
though there was no irregularity in the foreclosure proceedings which would
invalidate it, the borrower claimed that bidding a grossly inadequate price
was unconscionable conduct under the DTPA. This argument was also dis-
missed due to the lack of evidence as to the inadequacy of the price, but the
court noted that the borrower was not a consumer who is entitled to bring
an action under the DTPA because he did not seek to acquire any goods or
493. 837 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
494. Id. at 782.
495. 837 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
496. Id. at 748.
497. 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
498. No copy.
499. Id. at 529.
500. FSLIC v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1992).
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services. 50 1 Indeed, the lender was the purchaser at the foreclosure, not the
borrower. 502
A case that will be more than alarming to bank officers who take comfort
in the Riverside National Bank rule is the case of Walker v. FDIC,503 which
leaves open the door for officer liability to bank customers under the DTPA,
if a proper complaint can be made. In Walker, customers of a savings and
loan brought suit against the institution and two officers for fraud and
DTPA violations in connection with the institution's failure to fund a verbal
loan commitment. After suit was filed, the institution was declared insolvent
and the FDIC was substituted as defendant. Summary judgment was ren-
dered in favor of the FDIC and the individual officers. While the court held
that the customers of the failed institution were not consumers under the
DTPA, because their sole complaint was the failure of the institution to fund
the loan, it also held that the bank officers can be personally liable for their
conduct. 504 The existence of directors and officers insurance makes it likely
that debtors will add individual officers as defendants in future lender liabil-
ity cases.
Finally, one plaintiff who was successful in framing a DTPA cause of ac-
tion against a bank was not a borrower, but a depositor.505 Coincidentally,
he was also a former officer of the bank. He gave instructions to the bank to
open an IRA account. The bank mistakenly opened a regular money market
account. He later transferred funds from an IRA account into the account
he thought was also another IRA account. The bank failed to send him the
tax form required to be sent to a customer who transfers money from an
IRA to a taxable account. Later, he discovered that the initial account had
been incorrectly opened as a regular money market account and that he
would have to pay taxes on the amount transferred into the money market
account from his other IRA account. He sued the bank alleging breach of
fiduciary duty, violations of the DTPA, and negligence. The court distin-
guished the Riverside decision by saying that in that case the plaintiff only
sought a loan from the bank whereas, here, the customer sought the services
of the bank as an IRA trustee.10 6
4. Fraud in the Inducement
A case which arose before the effective date of section 26.02 of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code,5 0 7 is TO. Stanley Boot Co., Inc., et al. v.
Bank of El Paso,508 in which a bank sued a borrower and a group of guaran-
tors to collect a debt. The borrower and guarantors defended and counter-
501. Id. at 507.
502. Id. at 508.
503. 970 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1992).
504. Id. at 122-23.
505. McDade v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 822 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
506. Id. at 719.
507. Subsection (b) of section 2.02 provided that an agreement to make a loan is excess of
$50,000.00 is not enforceable if not signed and in writing.
508. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 259.
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claimed on several bases, including a breach of contract theory, a fraud
theory, and an impairment of collateral theory. Each was discussed sepa-
rately by the court.
As grounds for the breach of contract claim, the borrower and guarantors
claimed that they had an oral contract with the bank pursuant to which the
bank would provide the borrower a $500,000 line of credit. However, the
court was unable to find any evidence of the essential terms of the con-
tract.50 9 As the court stated: "[in a contract to loan money, those essential
terms will generally be: the amount to be loaned, the maturity date of the
loan, the interest rate and the repayment terms."510 In this case, only the
amount of the purported loan was supported by any evidence. Since the
material terms of the contract had not been agreed upon, it could not be
enforced.511
As to the fraud claim, the court required proof that the bank lacked intent
to perform the act at the time promised, because the alleged representation
involved a promise to do an act in the future.5 12 The borrower and guaran-
tors pointed to the fact that the bank denied ever having made the agreement
as evidence that it never intended to perform its promise. The court recog-
nized that denial of ever making the loan may be a factor showing the bank's
lack of intent to perform, but alone is not sufficient to show that the bank
never intended to fulfill its promise. 13
5. Negligent Lending
In Baskin v. Mortgage and Trust, Inc.,5 ' 4 the borrowers raised several
claims, including one of negligent lending. The plaintiffs were forty-one
homeowners who purchased homes in a subdivision that was allegedly trav-
ersed by a geological fault. The defendants were the homebuilder and the
lender that financed the development of the subdivision. The plaintiffs al-
leged that the lender had actual knowledge of the fault during its involve-
ment with the subdivision and failed to advise potential homebuyers (some
of whom financed their homes through the same lender) of the fault's exist-
ence. The lender was liable to the homeowners, according to the plaintiffs,
either because it was a partner or joint venturer with the homebuilder in the
project or it breached an independent duty of care to the homebuilders or it
violated the DTPA. The elements of a joint venture or partnership are: (1) a
community of interest, (2) an agreement to share profits, (3) an agreement to
share losses, and (4) a mutual right of control or management of the enter-
prise. 51 5 Each of the elements must be met and the absence of any one of
them defeats the claim that a joint venture or partnership exists. The lack of
an agreement to share profits and losses alone defeated the claim in Bas-
509. Id. at 220.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 262.
513. Id.
514. 837 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
515. Id. at 747.
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kin.516 Furthermore, the court found no authority in Texas for a cause of
action for negligent lending. 517 The Texas courts have, however, found an
action for negligent misrepresentation in certain cases based on the Restate-
ment of Torts.5"' In this case, however, negligent misrepresentation does
not apply because the plaintiffs admitted that the lender made no representa-
tions, promises, guarantees, warranties, or statements regarding their homes
and there was no showing of any circumstances that would give rise to a
fiduciary relationship between the lender and homeowners.519
6. Negligent Misrepresentation
In Federal Land Bank Assoc. of Tyler v. Sloane,5 20 the Sloanes applied for
a $141,000.00 loan from the Federal Land Bank Assoc. of Tyler for the con-
struction of chicken houses. About a month later, a bank officer informed
them that the bank's board had approved the loan and that they could go
forward with site preparation. The Sloanes testified that the officer said
there was "no problem" and that "there was not any reason for them not to
continue at that point. ' 521 The bank officer disputed this claim but the jury
made findings of fact against the bank on this issue.
The issues before the appellate court were whether a claim for negligent
misrepresentation is barred by the statute of frauds and whether the plaintiff
may recover for lost profits based upon a claim of negligent misrepresenta-
tion. The court made a very technical distinction between a claim that the
bank agreed to loan money to the plaintiffs and then breached that agree-
ment and a claim that the bank did not agree to lend them money, but negli-
gently represented that it had made such agreement.5 22 The former claim is
one for breach of contract and would be barred by the statute of frauds,
section 26.01 the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Further, a claim for
negligent misrepresentation cannot be used to circumvent the statute if the
plaintiff's claim is for breach of the agreement to loan the money.523 If, on
the other hand, the claim is simply for negligently representing that the bank
had agreed to lend the money, the claim is not barred. 524 The court adopted
section 552b of the Second Restatement of Torts, 525 which disallows any
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Id. at 747-48; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) stating:
One, who in the course of his business, profession, or employment, or in a trans-
action in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuni-
ary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining of communicating
the information.
519. Baskin, 837 S.W.2d at 748.
520. 825 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1992).
521. Id. at 441.
522. Id. at 442.
523. Id. (emphasis added).
524. Id.
525. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B (1977).
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recovery for lost profits.5 26 Since the claim was for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, the plaintiff only recovered the pecuniary losses he suffered in reliance
upon the representation, which included substantial site preparation and re-
lated costs. 5 2 7
Negligent misrepresentation can also be the basis for a claim against a
bank by one who is not a customer, depositor, or borrower. For example, in
First Interstate Bank v. S.B.F.L, Inc. ,528 the plaintiff gave substantial funds
to a Texas resident (Ballard) for investment purposes. Without authority,
Ballard transferred the funds to a different bank and under a different com-
pany name. He also used a different name for himself, "Bailey." A bank
officer contacted the plaintiff regarding the account and failed to disclose
certain information about the account, namely the fact that a person by the
name of "Bailey" was the sole signatory on the account. In fact, when ad-
vised by the plaintiff that Ballard was the only person who should have au-
thority on the account, the bank officer indicated that a person by that name
also had authority on the account. When Ballard/Bailey absconded with the
plaintiff's funds, the plaintiff sued the bank for negligence and negligent mis-
representation. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the bank appealed.
The court of appeals had to decide whether the bank owed a duty to the
plaintiff such that it could be found liable for negligence and whether the
bank could be liable for negligent misrepresentation. The appropriate test
for determining whether a duty exists where one voluntarily assumes a duty
to act is as follows: "[o]ne who voluntarily undertakes an affirmative course
of action for the benefit of another has a duty to exercise reasonable care that
the other's person or property will not be injured thereby. '529 The court felt
that there was no evidence that the bank undertook a course of action for the
benefit of the plaintiff.530 In fact, the bank's interest in contacting the plain-
tiff was to obtain more business (i.e. to benefit the bank). The court did find,
however, that there was evidence to support the claim of negligent misrepre-
sentation because plaintiff testified that had he been told by the bank officer
that only someone named Bailey had authority on the account, he would
have immediately been aware that Ballard was attempting to steal his
money.5 3' Since the bank officer made an actual representation, which was
relied upon by the plaintiff to his detriment (the funds were removed from
the account shortly thereafter), the claim was valid.53 2
7. Promissory Estoppel
The borrower in Henderson v. Texas Commerce Bank 533 also sought to
enforce a loan commitment based on a promissory estoppel argument. The
526. Id.
527. Id. at 443.
528. 830 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
529. Id. at 244.
530. Id. at 244- 45.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. 837 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
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court refused to enforce the commitment since it was subject to certain un-
satisfied conditions.5 34 To make performance of a promise conditional,
words such as "if," "provided that," "on condition that," or similar wording
are necessary. Although the finding of a condition precedent is to be
avoided when another reasonable construction of a contract is possible and
although Texas courts do not favor conditions, here the loan commitment
was "subject to" certain requirements that were not satisfied by the bor-
rower. 535 Consequently, any duty of the bank was conditional on those re-
quirements being met, and they were not.536
8. Guarantor Liability
Mention should be made, at least, of the unpublished opinion5 37 in Finch
v. FDIC.538 That case involved the liability of a guarantor under a continu-
ing guaranty. The court held the guarantor was not liable because the guar-
anteed note was materially altered. 539 It reasoned that "if the creditor and
principal materially vary the terms of their contract, a new contract is
formed and the guarantor is not bound thereby." 54 The court relied upon
Vastine v. Bank of Dallas,541 which was a case that apparently involved a
specific guaranty. The guaranty in Finch, however, was a continuing guar-
anty. A continuing guaranty is not specific to particular debt, but guaran-
tees all debt, both old debt and new debt. The formation of a new contract
would not relieve the guarantor from liability under a continuing guaranty.
The court dismissed this argument, saying "[a]lthough a continuous guaran-
tee maintains the responsibility of a guarantor for changes occurring within
the scope of his agreement, it will not bind a guarantor to a contract that was
materially altered without his consent and to his detriment. 5 42
L. DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
1. Joint Accounts
Situations continue to arise in which bank depositors disagree among
themselves and sometimes with the bank regarding ownership of joint ac-
counts. In Bandy v. First State Bank,543 the Texas Supreme Court consid-
ered the circumstances where a bank may pay the funds in a joint account to
the surviving party, whether or not it is a survivorship account, without sub-
jecting itself to liability. In that case, the court held that unless a financial
institution has received written notice that withdrawals in accordance with
the terms of the account should not be permitted from any party able to
534. Id. at 782.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Unpublished opinions are not to be cited as authority. See TEX. R. App. P. 90.
538. No. 3-91-420-CV, (Tex. App.-Austin July 1, 1992, writ denied).
539. Id. slip op. at 4.
540. Id.
541. 808 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1991).
542. Finch, No. 3-91 - 420 - CV, slip op. at 4.
543. 835 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1992).
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request present payment, then the institution will not be liable for paying in
accordance with the terms of the account, regardless of the beneficial owner-
ship of the account. 5"
A simple case decided by the Eastland court of appeals led to a holding
that the mere addition of a typed name and signature on a bank signature
card for an existing joint account with right of survivorship does not create a
right of survivorship in the person added to the account pursuant to section
440 of the Texas Probate Code.545 In 1981 a husband and wife deposited
community funds with the bank and signed an account agreement establish-
ing a joint account with right of survivorship. In 1986 the name Raymond
Rogers was typed onto the bank signature card and Rogers signed the card.
Rogers never contributed any of the funds to the account. The wife died in
1986, and the husband died in 1989. Rogers asserted that all of the funds
passed to him at the death of the husband pursuant to the survivorship pro-
vision of the joint account.
When the husband and the wife opened the account they entered into a
written agreement creating in favor of each of them a right of survivorship in
the deposit funds should the other die. This written agreement was in con-
formity with section 439 of the Texas Probate Code for creating a right of
survivorship.5 46 Texas Probate Code section 440 contains the procedure for
changing a properly established joint account with right of survivorship.147
This section provides that in order to alter the written agreement for survi-
vorship, a written order must be given by the party to the financial institu-
tion to change the form of the account. 548 This order or request must be
signed by the party, received by the financial institution during the party's
lifetime and not countermanded by other written order of the same party
during his or her lifetime. 549 Mere addition of a name and signature to an
account's signature card does not constitute a written order to change the
form of the account as required by Texas Probate Code section 440.550 Be-
cause there was no order request signed by the husband and the wife and
received by the bank during the parties' lifetime to add Rogers as a joint
owner with right of survivorship, their written survivorship agreement was
not amended pursuant to section 440 and Rogers was not entitled to the
funds upon the last to die of the husband and wife. 55'
The Houston court of appeals (14th District) decided two cases involving
ownership interests in multi-party accounts. The first case, Oadra v. Ste-
gall,5 52 may have reached the correct conclusion but not necessarily for the
correct reasons. In that case, the decedent and his mother (Grantor) put
544. Id. at 622.
545. Rogers v. Shelton, 832 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied).
546. Id. at 710-11.
547. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 440 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Rogers, 832 S.W.2d at 711.
551. Id.
552. 828 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ granted).
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funds in an account with the bank pursuant and subject to a revocable trust
agreement provided by the bank and signed by the decedent and his mother
as trustees with the decedent, his two children and his two grandchildren as
beneficiaries. The decedent's mother signed the back of the account card as
Grantor. The trust was revocable by the Grantor but would last until the
death of the Grantor, if not revoked earlier. At termination, the remaining
funds in the account were to be distributed in equal shares to the then living
beneficiaries. The decedent was murdered two months after establishing this
account. He was survived by his mother, his two children and his two
grandchildren. The decedent's mother thereafter closed the account and
moved the funds to another account with other individuals named with her
on the new account. The legal analysis of the facts in this case is erroneously
centered around the Texas Probate Code provisions governing joint ac-
counts. The first line of the Revocable Trust Agreement signed by the dece-
dent and his mother states that "[a] trust under the Texas Trust Act is
hereby created by the undersigned Grantor(s) with respect to the funds in
the account(s) identified on the reverse side hereof [the Account(s)]. ' '55 3
Following this statement is the statement that the Trustees and the Benefi-
ciaries of the Trust are named on the reverse side of the account card and the
trust's conditions are named below. The trust agreement stipulated invest-
ment powers, revocation procedures, and termination and distribution provi-
sions. In short, the trust agreement fully outlined the trust and detailed its
governance. The decedent and his mother signed the front of the account
card as trustees, and the decedent's mother signed the back of the account
card as Grantor. Therefore the first part of the legal analysis of this matter
should have centered around whether this was a valid trust and, if a valid
trust, what was to happen to the trust estate upon the decedent's death. The
decedent and his mother were trustees with the mother signing as Grantor.
The document stipulated that the Grantor could revoke the trust at any time
and that, unless sooner revoked, the trust would continue in existence until
the Grantor's death, and the trust assets would be distributed equally to the
then living beneficiaries. The trust document itself is clear and there is no
doubt that according to the face of this document the decedent's mother was
the Grantor, and she had the right to revoke the trust by withdrawing the
funds.
The dissent mentions that the decedent's mother testified that the funds
belonged to the decedent, that he was the Grantor, and that she really had
never had anything to do with the funds and didn't know what she was
signing when the decedent brought the trust agreement home for her to sign.
Therefore, there is a question of whether the decedent intended to gift these
funds to his mother for her to gift into the trust as the Grantor or rather a
mistake was made by having his mother sign as a Grantor rather than the
decedent signing as Grantor. Nonetheless, this is a question of trust law.
Section 438(c) of the Texas Probate Code does not create a right of survivor-
553. Id. at 463.
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ship between the trustees as suggested by the dissent. 554 A trustee is a fiduci-
ary, holding legal title to property for the equitable benefit of a beneficiary.
Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent recognize and focus upon that
fact. If a trust were created, then the trustees were fiduciaries for the benefit
of the beneficiaries and owned nothing on their own behalf - the question is
not one of survivorship, it is one of successor trustee to continue to adminis-
ter the trust for the equitable benefit of the beneficiaries. The dissent miscat-
egorized this relationship by focusing on survivorship in joint accounts. 555
It does appear that the majority correctly categorized this account as a
trust account within the meaning of section 436(14) of the Texas Probate
Code and that during the trustees' lifetime they own it beneficially in propor-
tion to their contribution to the trust unless a contrary intent is shown. 556
However, there was a contrary intention evidenced. Even if the decedent
was the actual owner of the funds prior to deposit, by asking his mother to
sign the card as the Grantor, it is arguable that this is clear and convincing
evidence of a different intent. Nonetheless, the court held that because she
was a trustee, after the decedent's death the decedent's mother owned the
entire trust account by virtue of section 438(a) because she was the only
trustee remaining. 557 The court next makes an unexplainable jump to a con-
clusion that the decedent's mother is therefore entitled to the funds with no
consideration of her role as a fiduciary on behalf of the beneficiaries. 558
The court does finally decide that because the account card designated the
mother as Grantor, parol evidence was inadmissible to prove otherwise. 559
Therefore, the terms of the agreement allowed her to revoke the trust and
withdraw the funds. 56° The remainder of the majority decision exploring the
joint account provisions is necessary only to the extent the beneficial owner-
ship of the funds during lifetime or allocation of the funds on the death of
the last trustee is in question.
The same court decided Archer v. FDIC,561 which involved payment by a
bank directly to a guardian despite a court order to turn the funds over to
the ward. Upon the ward's eighteenth birthday, the probate court ordered
that all institutions holding funds turn them over to the ward. The final
accounting had yet to be approved, and the guardian was still serving as the
ward's personal representative. The bank, subject to a safekeeping agree-
ment, issued a check for the full balance of the guardianship account payable
to the "Estate of Brenda Gail Archer, Lula Bell Hendrix Guardian. 5 62 The
check was forwarded to the guardian's attorney, who in turn forwarded the
check to the guardian. The guardian thereafter endorsed the check and mis-
554. Id. at 468 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
555. Id.
556. Id. at 465.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 466.
559. Id. at 467.
560. Id.
561. 831 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
562. Id. at 484.
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appropriated the funds. The court held that the bank acted in conformity
with the Texas Probate Code so it did not wrongfully issue the check to the
guardian.5 63
The pertinent statute is section 409 of the Texas Probate Code, which
states the following:
Until the order of final discharge of the personal representative is en-
tered in the minutes of the court, money or other thing of value falling
due to the estate or ward while the account for final settlement is pend-
ing may be paid, delivered, or tendered to the personal representative,
who shall issue receipt therefor, and the obligor and/or payor shall be
thereby discharged of the obligation for all purposes.5 6
Because the guardian had not yet been discharged from her responsibili-
ties as guardian, the account for final settlement was still pending when the
bank issued the check and receipt was acknowledged, the bank was not
therefore liable for the loss. 565 The court found that the statutory require-
ments contained in section 409 were met and, therefore, the bank was pro-
tected from liability. 566
Despite the court's finding that the bank complied with the statute, the
holding is of questionable protection to a bank. Texas Probate Code section
409 specifically states that at any time when the account for final settlement
is pending and before the order approving such account and discharging the
guardian is entered any "money or other thing of value falling due to the
estate or to the ward ... may be paid to the personal representative." ' 567 The
plain meaning of falling due encompasses situations where a certificate of
deposit, bond or other evidence of indebtedness matures, a note falls due, or
a ground lease terminates with a reversion to the ward or her estate. In that
situation, it is entirely appropriate for the property to be paid or delivered to
the personal representative because he or she is the only party who may
lawfully issue a receipt for such property before the estate is closed. It is an
entirely different matter, however, for a bank that is subject to a safekeeping
arrangement with a reduced bond to simply close out the guardianship ac-
count and pay the funds to the personal representative before final discharge.
Under a safekeeping arrangement, such as the one here, the bank agrees to
keep the funds safe, and in exchange for such agreement, the guardian's
bond is reduced. The ward is literally relying on the bank to protect against
this type of misappropriation. Obviously the ward's attorney did not do his
job properly because before discharge he produced an order that the bank
immediately pay any funds it was holding to the ward, which caused the
bank to close the account and pay the account balance to the guardian. The
bank was subject to a safekeeping arrangement, however, and should not
have paid the account funds before the guardian's discharge. The safekeep-
ing issue and agreement were not properly brought up, so the court may not
563. Id. at 485.
564. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 409 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1993).
565. Archer, 831 S.W.2d at 485.
566. Id.
567. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 409 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
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have had ample opportunity to analyze this issue. Nonetheless, the statute
only applies to situations in which money falls due and closing out an ac-
count is not what one usually thinks of as falling due. Despite the holding,
one may not wish to advise a client to follow this course of action.
The opinion in Ephran v. Frazier568 addressed the question of the suffi-
ciency of various writings to create a joint account with right of survivor-
ship. In that case, the decedent opened a joint savings account and a joint
checking account with the plaintiff. In each instance the parties executed a
signature card and a depository agreement on a form provided by the bank
reciting that the account was payable to the plaintiff or the decedent. The
signature cards listed several types of accounts that could be opened includ-
ing "Joint - with Survivorship" and "Joint - No Survivorship." Boxes ap-
peared opposite each type of account and the depositor could mark the type
that was desired, but none were marked to indicate the type of account
opened. The savings account depository agreement with the bank contained
the following clause:
"JOINT ACCOUNT - WITH SURVIVORSHIP. Each joint tenant in-
tends and agrees that the account balance upon his death shall be the prop-
erty of the survivor .... 569
The checking account depository agreement with the bank contained the
following clause:
"JOINT ACCOUNT - WITH SURVIVORSHIP. Such an account is is-
sued in the name of two or more persons each of you intend that upon your
death the balance of the account ... will belong to the survivor(s) .... -570
Neither the signature cards nor the depository agreements stated that the
accounts were joint accounts with right of survivorship. The court held that
the documents in question were not sufficient to create a joint account with
right of survivorship. 571
Texas Probate Code section 439(a) is very specific in its requirement that
in order to create a joint account with right of survivorship, there must be a
written agreement signed by the party who dies stating that the interest of
such deceased party is made to survive to the surviving party or parties.572
A survivorship agreement will not be inferred from the mere fact that the
account is a joint account. 573 The statute and the cases interpreting the stat-
ute are very strict with regard to compliance with the requirements for creat-
ing a survivorship account. 574 This is due, in part, to an historical prejudice
against survivorship arrangements.
568. 840 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.).
569. Id. at 82.
570. Id.
571. Id. at 87.
572. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1993).
573. Ephran, 840 S.W.2d at 85.
574. See Kruger v. Williams, 359 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1962); Stauffer v. Henderson, 746
S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988), afl'd, 801 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1990); Dickinson v.
Brooks, 727 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sawyer v.
Lancaster, 719 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Chopin v.
First Bank Dallas NA, 649 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ad-
dressed the sufficiency of writings in Union National Bank of Texas v. Or-
nelas - Gutierrez.57 5 There the decedent opened a money market account
with a bank. Later, the decedent invested $5 million in certificates of deposit
with the bank. This investment was given an identification number. In that
same year the decedent reinvested the funds that had been in CDs in book-
entry U.S. T-bills using the bank as his broker. The bank purchased the T-
bills on the decedent's behalf from the Federal Reserve Bank in San
Antonio. The T-bills were held for decedent in the bank's T-bill account at
the Federal Reserve Bank. In order to keep track of the uncertificated T-
bills, the bank continued to use the identification number it had previously
used for the Cds. In exchange for this service the bank charged the decedent
its usual brokerage and custodial fee. The bank gave the decedent a receipt
signed by an officer of the bank and identifying the number and denomina-
tion of T-bills held for him, the maturity date, his identification number, and
other relevant data including CUSIP number specifically identifying the T-
bills held on his behalf. On the back of the receipt the bank stated the terms
and conditions of its custodial agreement with decedent. The decedent was
not required to and did not sign the receipt. The decedent instructed the
bank to automatically reinvest on his behalf the funds held in the T-bills
when they reached maturity. When certain T-bills reached their maturity
date, the decedent instructed the bank to sell them and deposit their pro-
ceeds in his money market account.
In 1988 the decedent requested the bank to alter the custodial agreement
for the T-bills in order to designate Maria Ornelas Gutierrez as a pay on
death (P.O.D.) beneficiary of the T-bill investment. An officer of the bank
explained the significance of this change. The decedent wrote out and signed
an altered safekeeping receipt reflecting the arrangement and delivered it to
the bank. Later in that same year the decedent again requested the bank to
alter the custodial agreement to add Maria Tenorio Ornelas as a second
P.O.D. beneficiary of the investment. The same process was followed, and a
reinvestment receipt was issued reflecting this alteration. Five months later
the decedent died. After the decedent's death, the bank continued to rein-
vest the T-bill funds, delivering the receipts to Gutierrez and depositing the
proceeds of the partial sales to the money market account. Eight months
after the decedent's death, Gutierrez presented legal proof of the decedent's
death to the bank and directed that the T-bills be sold and the proceeds
invested in United States Government securities under a repurchase agree-
ment with the bank. The bank complied. After having contrary claims to
this property, the bank interplead it into the registry of the court.
The court held that writing and signature were not required because the
custodial arrangement involved in this case was neither a joint account
under Tex. Prob. Code section 439 nor an account under Tex. Prob. Code
section 436(1) that would require a writing in order to validate the P.O.D.
575. 772 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
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designation under section 440.576 Rather, the custodial arrangement may
stipulate a P.O.D. beneficiary without a writing under section 450.577
Therefore, even though the decedent did not sign anything evidencing the
P.O.D. designation, the designation was nonetheless valid.578
In situations where parties create joint accounts, there are very good pol-
icy reasons for the Legislature to require fairly strict standards for creating
survivorship rights in joint accounts. This is because many people add indi-
viduals to their accounts for convenience only, not with the intention of
transferring title to the co-signator on the account. 579 Therefore, when cre-
ating survivorship rights in a joint account or when designating an individ-
ual to take the account upon death, the Texas Probate Code requires a
writing.580 This is due in part to Texas' long-standing prejudice against sur-
vivorship arrangements. Certain instruments such as insurance policies, em-
ployment contracts, bonds, mortgages and depository or custodial
agreements or "any other written instrument effective as a contract," how-
ever, may pass to a person designated by the decedent in such instrument
free of probate without a writing and signature by the decedent.58' This is
due in part to the nature of the transaction or instrument and the desire to
facilitate the decedent's testamentary intention.
2. Garnishment of Accounts
Banks are frequently placed in the difficult position of having to decide
immediately whether or not funds on deposit should be frozen in response to
a writ of garnishment that indicates funds may belong to the judgment
debtor even though the depositor of record is a different person or entity.
The Texas Supreme Court addressed just such a situation in Bank One,
Texas, N.A. v. Sunbelt Savings, FS.B. 58 2 and relieved the bank of having to
decide that issue. In this garnishment suit, Sunbelt had obtained a personal
judgment against an individual who was also the sole shareholder, director,
officer, and employee of a corporation. The corporation, but not the individ-
ual, maintained an account at the bank. Post-judgment discovery indicated
that the individual had commingled personal funds with corporate funds in
the account. Sunbelt obtained a writ of garnishment against the bank in
order to collect the judgment debt and pled commingling in its application
for the writ. The corporation, however, was not a judgment debtor. The
bank responded to the writ by stating that it was not indebted to the individ-
ual. The funds in the corporate account were subsequently withdrawn, and
Sunbelt sued the bank. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the bank. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision.
The supreme court held that a bank served with a writ of garnishment
576. Id. at 964-66.
577. Id. at 966.
578. Id. at 967.
579. Id.
580. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a), 440 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1993).
581. Id. § 450.
582. 824 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1992).
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may rely on its deposit agreements when determining to whom it is in-
debted.58 3 The court stated that "[a] garnishee bank is not indebted to a
judgment debtor unless some form of deposit agreement creates a debtor-
creditor relationship between the bank and the judgment debtor. '5 8 4 In this
case, there was no deposit agreement between the bank and the judgment
debtor.
The Texas Supreme Court also considered the proper test to be applied
when a garnishee fails to answer a writ of garnishment and seeks a new trial
after a default judgment is entered against it. In Bank One, Texas, N. A. v.
Moody,585 a default judgment in a garnishment proceeding was taken where
a writ of garnishment was served on the bank, which then froze the account
and, instead of filing an answer, submitted a check in the amount of the
depositor's funds to the court clerk. The bank filed a motion for new trial,
which was denied. On appeal, the court applied its interpretation of the
Craddock test to determine whether to grant a new trial after a default judg-
ment was entered.58 6 The supreme court held that "the court of appeals
improperly treated the Craddock test as having four independent elements,
and... that a mistake of law is one type of mistake that may satisfy the first
element of the three element Craddock test ... revers[ing] the judgment of
the court of appeals. '58 7
The court reasoned that the trial court's discretion in determining
whether to grant a new trial after a default judgment must be referenced to a
guiding principle or rule such as the Craddock test.5 8 The test, when prop-
erly applied, has three parts. A default judgment should be set aside and a
new trial ordered where "(1) the failure of the defendant to answer before
judgment was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on [the
defendant's] part, but was due to a mistake or an accident; provided (2) the
motion for new trial sets up a meritorious defense; and (3) is filed at a time
when the granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury
to the plaintiff." 589 If the first element is divided into (1) whether the failure
to answer was intentional or due to conscious indifference and (2) whether
the failure was due to mistake or accident, the potential for a mistake of law
to satisfy the first part of the three-part test is read out of the test.590 Under
the correct interpretation of the test, a mistake or accident may negate any
intention not to file an answer, however, "if the test is interpreted as having
four elements, a mistake or accident cannot negate the intent not to file an
answer." 591 In a four part test, "the requirement that the failure to answer
not be intentional or due to conscious disregard and the requirement that the
583. Id. at 558.
584. Id.
585. 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992).
586. Id. at 81 (applying the test from Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 133 S.W.2d 124
(Tex. 1939)).
587. Id. at 81-82.
588. Id. at 82.
589. Id. at 82-83.
590. Id. at 82.
591. Id. at 83.
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failure to answer be due to an accident or mistake must be met indepen-
dently. '3 92 The court stated that the fact that most courts apply the Crad-
dock test by focusing on whether the failure to answer was intentional or due
to conscious indifference does not justify considering mistake or accident as
a separate element of the test.593
Regarding whether mistake of law can satisfy the test, the court stated
that mistake of law may be, but will not necessarily be, sufficient to satisfy
the first element of the test.594 The court was careful to say that not every
act of a defendant that could be characterized as a mistake of law is a suffi-
cient excuse to satisfy the first element of the Craddock test. 595
The case of Baca v. Hoover, Box & Shearer,596 while not really a garnish-
ment case, included a long discussion of the nature of a garnishment pro-
ceeding. This discussion does not seem to be necessary to the decision and
can be characterized as dicta, but it nevertheless has its troubling aspects.
The Bacas were sued by their former attorneys for attorneys' fees. While
that suit was pending, the former attorneys sought a pre-judgment writ of
garnishment against Texas Commerce Bank in a separate suit. The bank
answered by saying it was indebted to the Bacas. A summary judgment was
entered in favor of the former attorneys and against the Bacas in the first
suit. The Bacas then appealed that judgment and filed a cash deposit in lieu
of a supersedeas bond. While the first case was on appeal and after the cash
deposit had been made, the former attorneys and the bank entered into an
agreed judgment in the garnishment suit pursuant to which the bank deliv-
ered $32,000.00 of the Bacas' funds to the former attorneys. The court of
appeals later reversed the summary judgment in the first case. 597 After it
was remanded, one of the Bacas was granted a motion for partial summary
judgment and filed a motion for restitution and for dissolution of the writ of
garnishment. The former attorneys then moved to dismiss the case and the
court entered an order doing so. The motion for restitution was denied. 598
Since the garnishment action was between the former attorneys and the
bank, whether or not the garnishment was proper seems to be irrelevant to
the Bacas' desire to obtain reimbursement from their former attorneys. Nev-
ertheless, in discussing the nature of a garnishment proceeding, the court
made the following statements:
Further, it is a well-established and longstanding rule that the validity
of judgment in a garnishment action rests upon the finality of the under-
lying debt judgment. If the underlying judgment has not reached that
stage of the judicial process in which it is not subject to being set aside
by the trial or appellate court, then the judgment in the ancillary gar-
nishment action cannot stand. A garnishment is not an original suit,
592. Id.
593. Id. at 84.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. 823 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
597. Id. at 737.
598. Id. at 738.
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but ancillary to the main one, and for that reason takes its jurisdiction
from the main suit. Thus, when the trial court loses jurisdiction in the
main suit by reason of an appeal, it likewise loses jurisdiction in the
ancillary garnishment proceeding. If the judgment in the main suit is
affirmed, the trial court regains jurisdiction over the garnishment ac-
tion. If the judgment in the main suit is reversed, the garnishment pro-
ceedings become a nullity and the writs issued thereunder are functus
officio, or of no further force or authority.5 99
The statutory grounds for a writ of garnishment are set forth at section
63.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. It can be pursued
either as a pre-judgment or post-judgment remedy. If post-judgment, the
underlying judgment is deemed final and subsisting for the purpose of the
garnishment, unless a supersedeas bond has been approved and filed.60° In
either case, the applicant must swear to the existence of certain facts by affi-
davit. 6° 1 If the garnishee answers the writ by stating it is indebted to the
garnishor, then the garnishor is entitled to a judgment.6° 2 The alleged
debtor must be served with the copy of the writ 6°3 and has the opportunity
to contest it.6° 4 If the alleged debtor fails to do so and a judgment is entered
ordering the garnishee to deliver the funds to the garnishor, what is the lia-
bility of the garnishee if (as the Baca opinion indicates) the court entering
the order did so without jurisdiction or later loses jurisdiction or "the gar-
nishment proceedings become a nullity and the writs issued thereunder are
functus officio, or of no further force or authority?" 6°5 Neither the rules, nor
the statute, mandate that jurisdiction bounce back and forth in a garnish-
ment proceeding, nor is that a necessary finding before debtors such as the
Bacas are entitled to restitution. The forgotten party in this is the garnishee,
who now has an added worry over the jurisdiction of the court which orders
it to deliver funds held by the garnishee.
3. Wrongful Dishonor
Considering the wrongful dishonor issues raised in American Bank of
Waco v. Waco Airmotive, Inc.,606 previously discussed, the court reasoned
that under section 4.301 of the Texas Business and Commercial Code, the
bank could make a valid decision to pay or dishonor an item at any time up
to midnight of the next banking day after receipt of the item, if it had not
previously completed the process of posting the item. On the other hand, if
the bank earlier decided to pay a particular item or completed the process of
posting that item, whichever occurred first, it lost the right to offset the ac-
count under section 4.301 as to the funds necessary to pay the item. 6" 7 The
599. Id. (citations omitted).
600. TEX. R. Civ. P. 657.
601. TEX. CIv. PROC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 63.001 (Vernon 1986); TEX. R. Civ. P. 658.
602. TEX. R. Civ. P. 668.
603. Id. at 663a.
604. Id. at 664, 664a.
605. Baca, 823 S.W.2d at 738.
606. 818 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, no writ).
607. Id. at 168.
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court also stated that exemplary damages are recoverable if there is a finding
that the bank acted with malicious intent or in reckless disregard of the
rights of its depositor.608 In addition, the court noted that the remedy of
recovery of the face amount of a dishonored check is available to the payee
of the dishonored item that the bank should have paid. 609 The court rea-
soned that, logically, recovery is not available to the maker of a wrongfully
dishonored item because the amount of that item ordinarily remains in the
account.610
4. Duties of Bank as Escrow Agent
According to the Tyler court of appeals in Pack v. First Federal and Loan
Association of Tyler,611 a bank that agrees to act as an escrow agent takes on
a fiduciary duty of loyalty, a duty to make full disclosure, and a duty to
exercise a high degree of care to conserve the money in its possession.
M. SURITIES AND GUARANTORS
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the theory of res judicata in a case
where the defendant being sued to collect the debt was both a general part-
ner of the borrower and a guarantor and was sued separately, in both capaci-
ties. 612 Barr was a partner in a partnership that executed a promissory note
in favor of Sunbelt Federal Savings' predecessor in interest. Barr also exe-
cuted a personal guarantee of the note. Sunbelt sued Barr in two lawsuits.
In one lawsuit, Sunbelt claimed that Barr was liable personally on the note
due to his execution of the guarantee. Barr moved and was granted sum-
mary judgment in that lawsuit. In the other suit, Sunbelt initially sued only
the partnership on the note and the other partner on his guarantee. Sunbelt
did not appeal the summary judgment in the first lawsuit, but rather
amended its pleadings in the second lawsuit by adding Barr as a defendant
based on has liability as a general partner. Barr moved for summary judg-
ment on the basis of res judicata.
The court reaffirmed the transactional approach to res judicata first ar-
ticulated by the court in Gracia v. R C Cola-7- Up Bottling Co. 613 The court
specifically overruled the test set forth in Griffin v. Holiday Inns of
America,614 that held that res judicata did not prevent a subsequent suit
based upon a different cause of action except as to issues of fact actually
litigated and determined in the first suit. 615 The court stated that the trans-
actional approach is substantially similar to the rule governing compulsory
counterclaims. 61 6 That is, claims that "arise out of the transaction or occur-
608. Id. at 176.
609. Id. at 175.
610. Id.
611. 828 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ).
612. Barr v. RTC, 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992).
613. 667 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.1984).
614. 496 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.1973).
615. Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 630.
616. Id.
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rence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim" 6 17 are compul-
sory counterclaims that must be asserted and will be barred in subsequent
litigation.618 The court noted that it made little sense to require the part-
ner/guarantor to defend himself in separate lawsuits.619 The court stated in
a footnote that res judicata is really an application of merger and bar de-
pending upon which party was successful in the prior litigation.620 If the
party pursuing the claim (i.e. breach of contract) is successful, the additional
claim (i.e. quantum merit) is "merged" into the judgment and ceases to exist
and if the party defending the claim is successful, the additional claim is
barred in subsequent litigation.621
In a not surprising decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the guarantor of a non-recourse note was liable for the payment of the
debt. 622 As a general rule, the liability of a guarantor does not exceed the
liability of the principal. 623 The guarantor, however, can agree to greater
liability. Here, the guarantors guaranteed the payment of the indebtedness
of the joint venture, and the note was an indebtedness of the joint venture
even though the joint venture was not obligated for its payment. Moreover,
the terms of the guaranties and the terms of the note made it clear that the
guarantors were liable for the indebtedness, because the guaranties were ex-
pressly excluded from the operation of the non-recourse provision of the
note. 6
24
In Simmons v. Compania Financiera Libano,625 the court considered the
rights of one who pledged collateral for a loan to a borrower as against the
borrower. The court held that a suretyship relationship existed stating that,
"[a] surety is a party who promises to answer for the debt of another .. ,
includ[ing] an 'endorser, guarantor, drawer of a draft which has been ac-
cepted, and every other form of suretyship, whether created by express con-
tract or by operation of law'. A guaranty is a promise of a person to perform
an act of the same kind and content as another is contractually bound to
perform." 626 Pledging property as security for another's obligation creates a
position of surety up to the amount of property pledged.627 Upon liquida-
tion of the pledged property, the surety obtains a right of action against the
principal or the debt. 628
In the T.O. Stanley v. Bank of El Paso6 2 9 case discussed earlier, both the
borrower and guarantors claimed they were entitled to a reduction in the
617. TEX. R. Civ. P. 97.
618. Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 630.
619. Id. at 631.
620. Id. at 628 n. 1.
621. Id.
622. RTC v. Northpark Joint Venture, 958 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1992).
623. Id. at 1321.
624. Id.
625. 830 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
626. Id. at 792 (citations omitted).
627. Id.
628. Id.
629. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 259 (Dec. 2, 1992).
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amount owed equal to the amount of loss suffered as a result of the bank's
impairment of the collateral. They claimed that the collateral had been
damaged by exposure to the elements and by vandalism due to the bank's
failure to maintain a security system. The court recognized that the guaran-
tors were not entitled to assert the defense of impairment of collateral under
section 3.606 of the Code, because the guaranties were not negotiable instru-
ments and the guarantors were not parties to the promissory note, which
presumably was a negotiable instrument. 630 The court, however, upheld the
impairment claim under the common law.631 Under the common law, a
creditor has a duty to use ordinary care to secure and preserve collateral in
its possession from waste, injury, or loss and if breached, the guarantor is
discharged on the note to the extent of the loss. 632 In addition, because the
bank failed to plead waiver as an affirmative defense to the impairment
claim, the waiver provisions in the guaranty were ineffective to protect the
bank from the guarantors' claim. 633
N. FEDERAL DOCTRINES AND STATUTES
1. D'Oench, Duhme and 12 U.S.C. Section 1823(e)
a. Alleged Tying Act Violations
12 U.S.C. section 1972 prohibits certain tying arrangements by banks.634
For example, a bank can not require a customer to purchase a foreclosed
property from the bank as a condition to that customer being granted a loan.
In NCNB Texas National Bank v. King,635 the borrower alleged that the
predecessor institution violated the Tying Act by orally demanding that the
borrower both cease doing business with any other bank and transfer all of
the banking business of a separate company to the bank, in exchange for
extending certain indebtedness. The Fifth Circuit held that the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine barred King's Tying Act claim. 636 The court noted that
King's Tying Act claim was wholly dependent on oral promises made by the
officers of the predecessor bank to King to provide financing for his other
businesses. The court noted that: (1) the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine pre-
cludes a borrower from bringing defenses "against the collection efforts of
the federal receiver of a failed bank, which are based on unrecorded agree-
ments with the failed bank;" (2) the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine protects the
assignees of the FDIC; and (3) D'Oench, Duhme also bars defenses framed
as causes of action.637




634. 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1988).
635. 964 F.2d 1468 (5th Cir. 1991).




b. Written Side Agreements
RTC v. Toler638 dealt with the application of the D'Oench, Duhme doc-
trine to a written side agreement. In that case, the borrowers executed a
promissory note in favor of First City Savings Association. In addition, an
irrevocable letter of credit, which expired the day after the note's maturity,
was issued in favor of the failed financial institution and secured the note.
The note's terms provided that upon maturity, the failed financial institution
had the option of either drawing on the letter of credit or declaring the note
immediately due and payable. The borrowers defaulted on the note when it
matured, but despite a letter sent by the failed financial institution to the
borrowers in which the failed financial institution stated its intention to draw
upon the letter of credit if full payment was not received upon the note's
maturity, the failed financial institution failed to draw on the letter of credit.
A transferee of the FSLIC, which was acting as the receiver for the failed
financial institution, acquired the note and instituted this suit against the
borrower. Subsequently, the RTC, as conservator, was substituted as plain-
tiff for the transferee of the FSLIC, and it filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.
The district court concluded that the RTC proved all of the necessary
elements to recover in an action for breach of contract, and, relying on the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, the court rejected the borrowers' argument that
the failed institution's failure to draw on the letter of credit constituted non-
performance and impairment of collateral. 639 The court specifically stated
that the terms of the note did not require the failed institution to draw on the
letter of credit, rather such action was merely an option. 640 Furthermore,
the court stated that the letter relied upon by the borrowers was unenforce-
able under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine because the letter was a side agree-
ment and was not part of the failed institution's record regarding the
transaction, and the RTC was entitled to rely on the promissory note as a
complete agreement between the failed institution and the borrowers. 64 1
c. Tort Claims
In R TC v. Cook, 642 the lender made a home improvement loan by taking
an assignment of the contract between a homeowner and a contractor, sub-
ject to the Federal Trade Commission holder in due course rule, 16 C.F.R.
433.2.643 The borrower sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress
based on collection actions of the lender. The court held that D'Oench,
638. 791 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
639. Id. at 652.
640. Id.
641. Id.
642. 840 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied).
643. The notice on the contract as required by the rule read as follows: "Notice: Any
holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor
could assert against the seller of goods or services obtained pursuant hereto or with the pro-
ceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor
hereunder." Id. at 45.
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Duhme does not apply to defeat a tort claim, but only agreements that are
not in writing, executed by the parties, approved by the board or loan com-
mittee as reflected in its minutes, and continuously a part of the official
records of the institution. 6"
d. Agreements with Other Than Financial Institutions
R TC v. 1601 Partners, Ltd. 645 involved an agreement made by the original
payee of the note, but the original payee was not a financial institution. The
original payee of the note released the borrowers from liability on the note
and then transferred the note to an insured savings and loan association.
After foreclosing on the collateral, the transferee's receiver, the RTC, sued
the borrowers to recover the deficiency. The borrowers asserted that the
transferee took the note subject to the release because the transferee was not
a holder in due course since the note incorporated the deed of trust into the
note by reference thereby destroying the unconditional promise to pay re-
quired of a negotiable instrument. The RTC relied upon the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine and the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to abrogate the
borrowers' defense based on its agreement with the prior holder of the note.
The court held that D'Oench, Duhme does not apply to agreements entered
into between private, non-financial institution parties and is not available to
an insured financial institution that acquires the note and later fails, unless
possibly the agreement is somehow the product of a scheme or arrangement
likely to mislead bank examiners. 64 6
e. Oral Agreements Unrelated to the Loan
The Fifth Circuit stated in Texas Refrigeration Supply v. FDIC64 7 that the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine is very broad and may be used by the FDIC to
protect itself against a claim based on any unwritten agreement between the
insolvent bank and borrower, even if the agreement is unrelated to the loan
in question. Despite the doctrine's breadth, a leaders'obligations regarding
proper acceleration and disposal of collateral are implicit in every promis-
sory note and cannot be said to be secret and unwritten. 6 "
f. Federally Assisted Transactions
In Cockrell v. Republic Mortgage Insurance Company,64 9 the holder of a
note sought the protection of D'Oench, Duhme as the assignee of an insol-
vent institution prior to its merger with another institution in a merger as-
sisted by the FSLIC. The appellate court held that the D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine does not protect a federally insured institution from a liability when
644. Id. at 48. The court also held that the FTC holder in due course rule, 16 C.F.R. 433,
permits a refund of payments from the holder of the contract, whether or not the holder is the
person to whom the payments were made. Id. at 49.
645. 796 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
646. Id. at 240.
647. 953 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1992).
648. Id. at 981.
649. 817 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
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the institution and not the FSLIC acquires a potential liability. The court
noted that the notes at issue were assigned to Republic Mortgage Insurance
Co. (RMIC) before the FSLIC assisted merger occurred. The court further
noted that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine was designed "to aid the FDIC's
ability to protect the assets of failed [financial institutions] in purchase and
assumption transactions. It was not designed to let every lending institution
escape liability for possible fraudulent acts .... -650 Accordingly, the appel-
late court held that since the FSLIC never acquired the notes, the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine did not protect RMIC as the assignee of the insolvent
institution. 65'
g. Enforcement by FDIC of Oral Agreement
An interesting turn of events was addressed in Allied Elevator, Inc. v. East
Texas State Bank of Buna652 when the FDIC attempted to enforce an al-
leged oral agreement. In that case, several makers executed a renewal note
that was the last in a long line of renewal notes. One of the makers initialed
a request on the face of the renewal note requesting credit life insurance.
The premium for the insurance was added to the amount of the note, but the
insurance was never obtained by the bank. As luck would have it, the maker
for whom credit life insurance was requested died. The makers sued the
bank for breach of an agreement to provide credit life insurance. The FDIC,
as successor to the lender, counterclaimed for judgment on the original note,
not the renewal note. This was done, apparently, because the request for
credit life insurance was on the renewal note and not on the original note.
Summary judgment in favor the FDIC was reversed and remanded by the
Fifth Circuit. 653
Regarding the allegation of the makers that the bank had breached an
obligation to obtain credit life insurance, the court applied the rule of con-
tract law that whenever a party commits a material breach, the other party is
excused from performance. 654 It remanded the case for the trial court to
consider whether the bank's failure was a material breach.655 The FDIC
claimed the issue was moot because any agreement to obtain credit life insur-
ance was oral and unenforceable under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. That
argument was dismissed by the court because the provision in question was
not oral but was written on the face of the note. 656 The FDIC then wanted
to enforce an alleged side agreement to the effect that the party to be insured
did not actually want insurance and invoked the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
to entitle the FDIC to enforce an oral side agreement that protects a failed
bank's depositors and creditors. The court refused to allow the FDIC to do
650. Id. at 115.
651. Id.
652. 965 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1992).
653. Id. at 35.








The issue before the court in Stiles v. R TC65 8 was whether, to avoid sum-
mary judgment, a borrower has the burden to demonstrate that the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine and section 1823(e) of the U.S. Code do not estop him from
asserting affirmative defenses. The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doc-
trine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) mandate that, to avoid summary judgment, a
borrower alleging affirmative defenses that would defeat the RTC's right,
title, or interest in a promissory note acquired from a failed financial institu-
tion has the burden to demonstrate that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and
section 1823(e) do not estop him from asserting those defenses. 659
The sufficiency of the borrower's evidence to overcome the RTC's motion
for summary judgment was the issue in Park Club, Inc. v. R TC.66° The
critical issue to the court was whether or not the board of directors of the
failed institution had approved a side letter agreement with the borrower.
Section 1823(e) sets forth that no such agreement is valid against the RTC
unless it was "approved by the board of directors of the depository institu-
tion or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes
of said board or committee. '661 The court noted that on their face the board
minutes did not reflect the approval of a permanent loan as set forth in the
side letter agreement. However, the court said that the testimony of a mem-
ber of the loan committee to the effect that the usual practice of the board
was to approve a permanent loan at the time the interim loan was approved
just barely satisfied the summary judgment standard.662
i. Raising D'Oench, Duhme on Appeal
During the Survey period, state and federal courts further defined the abil-
ity of government agencies to assert D'Oench, Duhme defenses for the first
time on appeal. For example, in Larson v. FDIC,663 the Texas Supreme
Court had to decide whether or not FIRREA enabled the FDIC, as receiver,
to step in after an adverse judgment against the failed financial institution,
which judgment resulted in voiding the asset at issue, and assert substantive
federal defenses for the first time on appeal. The Texas Supreme Court
657. Id.
658. 831 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
659. Id. at 28.
660. 967 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1992).
661. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(E) (1988).
662. Id. at 1057.
663. 835 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1992); see also F & A Equipment Leasing v. FDIC, 835 S.W.2d
74 (Tex. 1992); Gray v. FDIC, 841 S.W.2d 72, 81 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no
writ) (holding that when the federal common law defenses are not available at the trial court
level to a failed financial institution subsequently taken over by a federal agency, the federal
common law defenses "cannot be raised for the first time on appeal to eviscerate or otherwise
disturb a Texas state trial court judgment that adjudicates the respective rights of the institu-
tion and the other parties and that is rendered before the receivership, regardless of whether
that judgment is rendered in favor of or against the institution.").
1018 [Vol. 46
noted that FIRREA does not give the FDIC the absolute new substantive
right to assert D'Oench, Duhme defenses for the first time on appeal. 664 The
court further stated that FIRREA may well provide the FDIC with an op-
portunity to raise an argument for the first time on appeal because it never
had the opportunity in the first instance.665 The supreme court, however,
held that if the judgment was adverse to the failed financial institution and
said judgment resulted in the voiding of an asset, then the FDIC may not
raise such defenses to set aside the judgment voiding the asset. 666 Accord-
ingly, because the failed financial institution lost at the trial court level and
the judgment rendered voided the asset at issue, the supreme court held that
the court of appeals erred in permitting the FDIC to assert D'Oench, Duhme
defenses for the first time on appeal under FIRREA.
667
In Gray v. FDIC668 the appellate court expanded upon the Larson opinion.
Specifically, the appellate court faced the issue left open by the Larson opin-
ion as to whether or not the FDIC may assert its D'Oench, Duhme defenses
for the first time on appeal when, although the trial court should have
awarded judgment against the failed financial institution, the trial court
judgment is in favor of the failed financial institution. Relying in part on
dictum in Larson, the court held that when the federal common law defenses
are not available at the trial court level to a failed financial institution subse-
quently taken over by a federal agency, the federal common law defenses
"cannot be raised for the first time on appeal to eviscerate or otherwise dis-
turb a Texas state trial court judgment that adjudicates the respective rights
of the institution and the other parties and that is rendered before the receiv-
ership, regardless of whether that judgment is rendered in favor of or against
the institution. '66
9
In 5300 Memorial Investors, Ltd. v. RTC670 the Fifth Circuit permitted
the RTC to raise its D'Oench, Duhme defenses for the first time on appeal.
In this case, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of 5300 Memorial
Investors, Ltd., but both parties appealed. The Houston court of appeals
(first district) rendered an opinion, reversing the judgment of the trial court
and remanding the case for a new trial. While a writ of error was pending
before the Texas Supreme Court, the financial institution failed and the RTC
was appointed as its receiver. The RTC then removed the action to federal
district court, which adopted the judgment of the Texas appellate court as its
own, prepared the record for appeal and forwarded it to the Fifth Circuit for
review. Before the Fifth Circuit, the RTC argued that it was entitled to
assert its rights under D'Oench, Duhme and its codification. The Fifth Cir-
cuit held that because the RTC urged D'Oench, Duhme and section 1823(e)
in support of the federal district court's judgment, which adopted the judg-




668. 841 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1992, no writ).
669. Id. at 81.
670. 973 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1992).
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ment of the Texas appellate court reversing the trial court's judgment and
remanding the case for a new trial, the RTC, on remand, could assert the
defenses afforded by D'Oench, Duhme.671 Apparently, the court recognized
that on remand, the RTC would be a party to the actual trial, and, thus, the
RTC could unquestionably assert its D'Oench, Duhme-type defenses.
j. Limited Guaranty as Unenforceable Side Agreement
Based on the opinion in R TC v. Oaks Apartment Joint Venture,672 limited
guarantors of a note could become fully obligated, depending on how the
failed institution maintained its records. In 1984, five individuals, as part-
ners, formed the Oaks Apartments Joint Venture and borrowed $2 million
from Meridian Service Corporation. The partnership used the money to
purchase land and construct an apartment complex. At the time the note
was executed, the partners also executed a personal guaranty for the loan
with Meridian. The guaranty limited each partner's liability to twenty per-
cent of the amount outstanding. In 1986, the loan defaulted, Meridian fore-
closed on the property, leaving a deficiency of $755,249.06. Suit was filed for
this amount in 1988. After suit was filed, the RTC took over Meridian. The
RTC contended that the personal guaranty had no effect on the loan because
of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and that each partner was jointly and sever-
ally liable for the deficiency amount. It argued that since the note itself did
not mention the limitation on liability, the note should stand alone as a sepa-
rate agreement. The district court disagreed, and the RTC appealed.
The Fifth Circuit stated that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine does not re-
quire that agreements between lenders and borrowers be confined to the face
of one particular document.673 It is important, if not determinative, to as-
certain whether the guaranty was part of the integral loan transaction files
associated with the note or if it was filed separately because "[w]ithout this
information, [the court] cannot determine if the Guaranty was a secret side
agreement ... [or] a valuable asset kept in tandem with the Note to ensure
payment. '674 If on remand, it is determined that the guaranty was not kept
with the loan, then the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine applies. 675 If this is the
case, the district court "should then determine whether or not the liability
limitation clause amounts to a contractual obligation on the part of [the
failed financial institution] which was not performed. ' 676 If it turns out that
the guaranty was a mutual obligation not performed by the lender, then the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine would not bar the partners' defense. 677
671. Id. at 1163-64.
672. 966 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1992).




677. Id. at 1001.
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k. Preemption of D'Oench, Duhme and Federal Holder in Due Course
Rule
The Fort Worth court of appeals, in Jones v. R TC,678 ruled that the codifi-
cation of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and the federal holder in due course
doctrine does not preempt their common law counterparts. 679 The court
could find no case holding that the codified law preempted the common law
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, and, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has made clear that
it does not. 680 The federal holder in due course doctrine is also not pre-
empted by codified law.68 1
2. Federal Holder in Due Course and Other Common Law Defenses
a. Negotiability
After first determining that the note in issue was not a negotiable instru-
ment, the court in RTC v. 1601 Partners, Ltd.682 considered whether the
RTC could nevertheless take advantage of the federal holder in due course
doctrine. The court ruled it could not with the following statements:
In Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, the Fifth Circuit held that the
FDIC may be a federal holder in due course without meeting the tech-
nical state law requirements for holder in due course status. Negotiabil-
ity, however, is not a requirement the Fifth Circuit has been willing to
relax. In Sunbelt Say., FSB v. Montross, the court expressly refused to
"extend federal holder in due course status to the FDIC or its successor
in cases in which it acquires non-negotiable instruments through
purchase and assumption transactions. ' '683
b. Knowledge of Defenses
The Fifth Circuit first held in FSLIC v. Mackie684 that, in order to defeat
the federal holder in due course doctrine, a borrower had to prove that the
FSLIC had actual knowledge of the defenses to a note at the time the FSLIC
took the note as a receiver. The court withdrew that opinion, however, and
issued a new opinion that did not discuss the knowledge issue. 685
c. Usury
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in FDIC v. Claycomb that the
state usury statute is punitive in nature and cannot be applied to the FDIC
inasmuch as the FDIC was created to serve the public interest. 686 Accord-
ing to the court, to apply the usury penalties to the FDIC would have "no
678. 828 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
679. Id. at 823.
680. Id.
681. Id.
682. 796 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
683. Id. at 241 (citations omitted).
684. 949 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir.1992).
685. FSLIC v. Mackie, 962 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1992).
686. 945 F.2d 853, 861 (5th Cir. 1992).
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deterrent effect, and would only serve to punish innocent creditors of the
failed institution by diminishing available assets."' 687 A Texas appellate
court held in RTC v. Ammons that the federal common law and federal
holder in due course doctrine bar a borrower from asserting personal de-
fenses such as usury against the RTC.688
In the same vein, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas held that even assuming that a usury violation occurred, the
FDIC was immune from usury penalties under the sovereign immunity doc-
trine.689 The court noted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the
United States and its several agencies from suit, except to the extent that
Congress has waived such immunity. 690 Furthermore, the court stated that
this immunity extends to the imposition of punitive fines, such as those im-
posed by the Texas usury laws. 691 Because the defendants failed to establish
that Congress had expressly authorized the imposition of usury penalties
against the FDIC, the court held that the FDIC was immune from the pen-
alties imposed by the Texas usury laws.69 2
d. Punitive Damages
According to a state court, the FDIC as receiver for a failed bank is sub-
ject to an award of punitive damages. 693 In that case, the bank failed and
the FDIC was appointed its receiver after a judgment had been entered
against the bank but while it was still on appeal. The court took issue with a
contrary ruling in FSLIC v. TF Stone - Liberty Land Associates.694 The
Fifth Circuit held that punitive damages and additional treble damages are
not recoverable against the FDIC in its receivership capacity in Bank One,
Texas v. Taylor.695 In that case, each note contained a monthly payment
schedule, an acceleration clause and a demand clause. The demand clause
stated that "this obligation is, as an alternative to the above-recited payment
schedule, due and payable on demand. ' '696 The notes also contained an ac-
celeration clause entitling the bank to accelerate payment "if default occurs
in the punctual payment of any installment of principal or interest. '697 The
court held that the provisions dealing with default and acceleration indicated
that the instrument was not a demand note but rather was an instrument
that was payable upon demand only if the obligor failed to meet the install-
ment obligations. 69 8 The court specifically distinguished Conte v. Greater
687. Id.
688. RTC v. Ammons, 836 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no
writ).




693. FDIC v. Golden Imports, Inc., No. 01-88-00307-CV, 1991 WL 204175 at *20 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 10, 1991).
694. 787 S.W.2d 475, 492 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ dism'd).
695. 970 F.2d 16, 34 (5th Cir. 1992).
696. Id. at 31.
697. Id.
698. Id. at 32.
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Houston Bank, wherein it was held that the language payable "on demand,
but if no demand is made: principal and interest shall be due and payable in
monthly installments" created a demand instrument that was due at anytime
upon the demand of the holder.699
MBank's motion for new trial and to modify the judgment, which was on
file at the time of MBank's failure, was adopted by the FDIC and presented
to the federal district judge once the case was removed. Taylor argued that
the FDIC could not assert it's claim of sovereign immunity to avoid punitive
damages when it intervenes post-judgment. The court disagreed, relying
principally upon the fact that MBank's motions were on file before the time
for filing a notice of appeal had expired and the issue in question had been
raised in the trial court at a time when there was no final unappealable judg-
ment.70° The situation would have been remarkably different had the FDIC
intervened when the judgment was final and unappealable.70' The court
stated that sovereign immunity was a jurisdictional prerequisite that may be
asserted at any stage of the proceedings, either by the parties or by the court
on its own motion. 70 2
e. Transferee Liability
In a long awaited case, the Fifth Circuit held that the federal holder in due
course status of a transferee of the FSLIC, as receiver for a failed financial
institution, does not shield the transferee from the maker's personal defenses
on a promissory note that was non-negotiable from its inception. 70 3 The
court, however, cautioned that the maker must base his personal defenses on
documents of the failed financial institution at the time of its insolvency and
not upon agreements unenforceable under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. 7°4
3. Removal
In R TC v. Eugenio, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas held that the ninety day removal period for the RTC com-
mences upon the date that the RTC is appointed as receiver, rather than the
date the RTC formally substitutes itself as a party.70 5 In that case, Sunbelt
Savings, FSB filed suit against the Eugenios on August 2, 1990, in the state
district court in Nueces County, Texas. On April 25, 1991, the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) declared Sunbelt insolvent and appointed the RTC
as receiver. The OTS also created Sunbelt Federal Savings, FSB on the same
day and placed it under the conservatorship of the RTC. On July 22, 1991,
the Eugenios filed counterclaims against Sunbelt. On August 21, 1991, the
RTC, as receiver of Sunbelt, substituted itself in the case and removed the
case to the District Court for the District of Columbia. On September 5,
699. 641 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
700. Id. at 34.
701. Id.
702. Id.
703. RTC v. Montross, 944 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 1991).
704. Id. at 228-29.
705. 790 F. Supp. 686, 689 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
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1991, the Eugenios filed a motion to remand. On September 30, 1991, the
District Court for the District of Columbia transferred the case to the
Northern District of Texas.
This case pre-dated the decision of the Fifth Circuit in FDIC v. Loyd,
where the court held that the FDIC's removal period commences upon the
date the FDIC becomes a party to the action.706 It is unclear from the deci-
sion in this case as to whether the Loyd decision would affect the court's
interpretation of the RTC's removal deadline. A strong argument can be
made that the Loyd decision would have no effect on this case since the
statutes involved are totally different. Here, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1446 governs
actions involving the RTC. Section 1441a(1)(3) provides that "The removal
of any action, suit, or proceeding [in which the RTC is a party] shall be
instituted- (A) not later than 90 days after the date the Corporation is
substituted as a party, or (B) not later than 30 days after the date suit is filed
against the Corporation, if such suit is filed after August 9, 1989." 707 The
court focused upon the question as to when the RTC is substituted as a party
to the action. More specifically, the court addressed the issue of whether the
RTC had to formally substitute itself into the case before it was substituted
as a party under the statute. The court decided that the RTC was substi-
tuted on the date of receivership or conservatorship and that, therefore, the
ninety day time period began to run on April 25, 1991, in this case. 708 Ac-
cordingly, the ninety day period had expired by the day the RTC filed its
removal. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would allow the RTC to
manipulate the removal of cases.709 Significantly, the court noted that it had
been previously held that the RTC could remove cases without formal sub-
stitution, thus implying that since the RTC could be a party without formal
intervention into the suit, it would be unfair to allow the RTC to later decide
to remove the case. 710
The really interesting part of this case is that Judge Sanders summarily
dismissed the notion that the filing of the counterclaims by the Eugenios
gave the RTC a second chance at removing the case even if the RTC had
filed to timely remove the suit under section 144la(l)(3)(A). 71' Keep in
mind that the Eugenios did not file their counterclaims until July 22, 1991.
So until that date there had been no "suit ... filed against the Corporation"
as set forth in section 144la(l)(3)(B). It seems that the removal was timely
under this section of the statute since the RTC removed the case within 30
days of the date of the counterclaims. In any event, it appears now that the
RTC and the FDIC have different timetables regarding removal.
In FDIC v. Loyd,712 First RepublicBank, the predecessor to NCNB Texas
National Bank and the Federal Insurance Corporation as Receiver, filed suit
706. 955 F.2d 316, 329 (5th Cir. 1992).
707. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a (1)(3)(1988).
708. Eugenio, 790 F. Supp. at 691.
709. Id. at 690.
710. Id.; see United Savings Bank v. Rose, 752 F. Supp. 506, 508 (D.D.C. 1990).
711. Id. at 688.
712. 955 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1992).
1024 [Vol. 46
against the defendants in 1985. On July 29, 1988, the Comptroller of the
Currency declared First RepublicBank insolvent and appointed the FDIC as
Receiver. On that same date, the FDIC executed a Purchase and Assump-
tion Agreement with NCNB whereby NCNB obtained the affirmative claims
of Republic and the FDIC retained the liabilities for the counterclaims. On
September 28, 1989, NCNB entered an appearance in the state court litiga-
tion. On November 4, 1989, the FDIC intervened and simultaneously re-
moved the case to federal court. Following removal, the parties engaged in
discovery and filed motions for summary judgment. On April 27, 1990, the
federal district judge sua sponte questioned the timeliness of removal under
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and required letter briefs on the issue. On August 2,
1990, the district court remanded the case to state court on its own motion.
The Fifth Circuit court of appeals concluded that the federal district court
could not sua sponte remand a case based upon a procedural defect after the
expiration of thirty days from the date of removal; the thirty day time limit
for removal set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) applies to the FDIC and that
the thirty day time limit begins to run upon the appearance of the FDIC as a
party to the litigation.7
13
Timeliness of removal was also addressed in NCNB Texas National Bank
v. P&R Investments No. 6.714 In that case, NCNB sued P & R to recover a
deficiency on a note. On November 30, 1991, NCNB assigned the note and
cause of action to the FDIC. On December 17, 1991, the FDIC intervened
in the action and filed a notice of removal in the United States District
Court. The federal district court remanded the case because under 12
U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) the FDIC was required to
remove an action within thirty days after receipt of a pleading or document
from which it could first determine the case was removable which, in this
case, was the date on which the loan was transferred to the FDIC. How-
ever, the filed papers did not specify the date of the transfer.
The Fifth Circuit citing the December 19, 1991 amendment to section
1819(b)(2)(B) allowed removal at any time before the end of the ninety day
period beginning on the date the action is filed against the FDIC or the
FDIC is substituted as a party. 715 The court applied the amendment and
noted that the notice of removal did state the date the FDIC intervened and
became a party.7 16 Deciding, also, that the amendment was procedural, not
substantive, the court had no trouble applying it retroactively to the pending
case. 
7 17
The Fifth Circuit decided two cases regarding the ability of the FDIC to
remove a state court appellate proceeding. The removal took place in FDIC
v. Meyerland Co.,718 before an appellate opinion was issued. Although re-
manded by the federal district court, the court of appeals considered the
713. Id. at 322.
714. 962 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1992).
715. Id. at 519.
716. Id.
717. Id.
718. 960 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1992).
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plain language of 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) to afford the FDIC the absolute
right to remove the state court proceeding that was at the state appellate
stage. 71 9 That statute allows the FDIC to "remove any action, suit or pro-
ceeding from a State court to the appropriate United States district
court. ' 720 The key to this question was whether the state proceeding has
reached the point of a final judgment. The court stated that a state court
action was final "(1) if it is an effective determination of litigation in that it is
not an interlocutory or intermediate judgment and (2) when it is subject to
no further review or correction in any other state tribunal."'72 1 This means
that, assuming the parties have filed appeals or motions for rehearing timely,
the right to remove a case continues until the state court of last resort over-
rules the motion for rehearing. 722
The twist in 5300 Memorial Investors, Ltd. v. R TC723 was that the state
appellate court had already issued an opinion when the removal occurred,
but while a writ of error was pending. The Fifth Circuit saw no reason to
distinguish its earlier opinion in FDIC v. Meyerland Co., so long as the state
appellate proceedings had not been exhausted when the removal was ef-
fected. 724 Once removed, the federal district court took the proper action of
adopting the judgment, preparing the record for appeal and forwarding it to
the proper federal appellate court for review. 725
4. Federal Statute of Limitations
In Davidson v. Mills, 7 2 6 the debtor filed a Motion for Temporary Re-
straining Order and Preliminary Injunction against the FDIC, seeking to
prohibit the FDIC from taking action on a debt and related property. The
plaintifrs primary argument in support of his motion was that the statute of
limitations had expired and, therefore, the FDIC could not pursue its rights
against the debt or the property at issue. For purposes of the court's ruling,
the court assumed that the cause of action on the debt and the property at
issue accrued on April 4, 1984. On June 4, 1987, the FDIC was appointed
as receiver for the failed financial institution. On April 4, 1988, the state law
limitations period expired. In August 1989, Congress enacted FIRREA,
which included the six-year statute of limitations for contract claims con-
tained in section 1821(d)(14). 727 The court ruled that the federal statute
applies and preempts state law when a claim is not barred by state law at the
719. Id. at 514.
720. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1819(b)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1992).
721. Meyerland, 960 F.2d at 516.
722. Id. at 517.
723. 973 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1992).
724. Id. at 1162-63.
725. Id. at 1163.
726. 789 F. Supp. 845 (W.D. Tex. 1992); see also FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that where government acquires derivative claim, "that claim is not barred by
the state statute of limitations at the time the government acquires the claim, the federal stat-
ute of limitations controls and the state statute ceases to run against the government at the
time of acquisition; however, if state limitations period had expired, action by government is
time-barred.")
727. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) (1988).
1026 [Vol. 46
time of the receiver is appointed.728
Two different state courts addressed the question regarding the applica-
tion of the federal statue of limitations to transferees of the FDIC. In
Thweatt v. Jackson,729 Jackson executed a promissory note on January 4,
1984, in favor of a failed financial institution. On May 3, 1984, the note
matured, and Jackson failed to pay the amount due, thereby defaulting on
the note. On April 18, 1985, the FDIC was appointed receiver for the failed
institution. Also on that same day, the FDIC, in its corporate capacity, ac-
quired Jackson's note from the FDIC, as receiver. On May 3, 1988, the
four-year statute of limitations contained in Section 16.004 of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code expired. 730 On December 28, 1988, the FDIC
sold Jackson's note to Thweatt. After making demand upon Jackson for
payment of the note, Thweatt brought suit against Jackson on the note on
April 15, 1991.
The Austin appellate court held that the six-year statute of limitations
contained in section 1821(d)(14) of FIRREA applies to transferees of the
FDIC.73 1 The court first recognized that the federal courts have unani-
mously given Section 1821(d)(14) retroactive effect. Furthermore, the court
stated that because an assignee of a promissory note obtains the "rights, title
and interest that the assignor had at the time of the assignment," Thweatt
stood in the shoes of the FDIC and had the right to assert the claim on the
promissory note to the same extent as the FDIC.732 Because the FDIC had
until April 18, 1991 to sue Jackson on the note, so did Thweatt. Accord-
ingly, the court held that Thweatt's cause of action against Jackson on the
promissory note was not barred by limitations.733
In R TC v. Boyar, Norton & Blair,734 the RTC, as receiver for a failed
financial institution, filed suit against attorneys who had represented the in-
stitution in connection with alleged malpractice arising from two different
loan transactions. The state statute of limitations had expired before the
RTC acquired the claim. The RTC argued that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)
governs any claim brought by the RTC on behalf of a failed institution,
whether or not the state statute of limitations may have expired when the
RTC acquired the claim. The court held otherwise and adopted a two step
analysis.735 The first step is to determine if the applicable state statute of
limitations had expired when the RTC or FDIC acquires a claim. 736 The
second step would apply only if the claim was still alive under state law and
that would be to determine if the applicable federal limitations period had
728. Davidson, 789 F. Supp. at 847.
729. 838 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1992, no writ).
730. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
731. Thweatt, 838 S.W.2d at 727.
732. Id.
733. Id. at 728; see also Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., No. 13-91-239-CV 1992 Tex.
App. WL 11606 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Nov. 19, 1992, n.w.h.).
734. 796 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
735. Id. at 1015.
736. Id. at 1013.
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expired before the date suit was filed. 737
0. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
1. Mandatory Stay
In Nation v. R TC,7 38 the federal district court considered whether the
mandatory stay provided by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12) runs for ninety days
after the appointment as receiver for an insured institution or ninety days
after the date on which the receiver files a motion to suspend. Under the
latter construction, the receiver could request a stay at any time, permitting
the stay to be effective for more than ninety days after the receiver's appoint-
ment. This court held that the receiver was entitled to request suspension at
any time within ninety days after its appointment and would be automati-
cally entitled to the stay upon doing so. 739 The stay, however, could not
remain in effect for more than ninety days after the appointment. 74°
2. Injunctions against Receiver
In Ward v. RTC,741 the plaintiff bid on a piece of surplus government
property that was currently held by the RTC as receiver for a failed financial
institution. The RTC rejected the plaintiff's offer on the property. Before
the plaintiff could submit a new bid, he discovered that the RTC had con-
tracted to sell a large package of surplus government property to a third
party, including the property in question. Believing that the property was to
be sold under the agreement, the plaintiff filed an emergency Motion for
Relief and sought to enjoin the sale of the property to the third party. The
federal district court held that the RTC as receiver must remain free to per-
form its congressionally mandated functions, such as the liquidation of re-
ceivership assets, without the encumbrances of possible injunctions. 742 The
court noted that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) specifically states that "[n]o court may
take any action.., to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of
[the RTC] as a conservator or a receiver. ' '743 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that injunctive relief against the RTC as receiver, when it performs
its mandated functions, is prohibited. 7 "
737. Id.
738. 791 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
739. Id. at 1154.
740. Id.
741. 796 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
742. Id. at 259.
743. Id. at 258.
744. Id. at 259; See also William C. Davidson, P.C. v. Mills, 789 F. Supp. 845, 847-48
(W.D. Tex. 1992) ("The FDIC... clearly cannot be enjoined from committing an act within
its legal authority.").
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